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ABSTRACT 
 
 
“…the whole river is a bustle some about their Children, Brothers and Husbands 
 and the rest of us about our salt.” 
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The Kanawha River of West Virginia begins at the confluence of the New and 
Gauley Rivers. It runs northwest for 97 miles through south central West Virginia until it 
reaches the Ohio River at the town of Point Pleasant. The Great Kanawha Valley is an 
area long recognized for its rich resources. Although not always fully appreciated, the 
history of the valley is one of relentless and innovative exploitation of its bounty. The 
development of the Kanawha salt industry in particular, with its late eighteenth- early 
nineteenth century beginnings, presents itself as a valuable lens through which to 
examine the historical assumption of post-bellum Appalachian industrialization. An 
examination of the early Kanawha Valley salt industry exposes a valley near the nation’s 
frontier which relentlessly pursued the industrial development of salt and monopolized 
the mineral’s supply across swaths of the Great West. In doing so, valley salt-makers 
created innovations which are still the basis of oil and gas drilling today, severely 
degraded their environment, created a unique slave-labor community, and began a pattern 
of relentless industrialization of the Kanawha Valley which continues to this day. This 
thesis intends to illuminate this early industry in the Kanawha Valley as a way of 
chipping away at myths of Appalachia and place Appalachian industrialization’s 
beginnings far earlier than is commonly considered. 
The introductory chapter focuses on the historiography of the Kanawha Valley, 
West Virginia and more importantly, Appalachia. It is important to establish why the 
proposed paper is important in the context of other writings, but more importantly, to 
help explore how the Kanawha Valley fits with past and present ideas of the Appalachian 
region.  
Chapter one explores the Kanawha Valley as a focal point in Virginians’ dreams 
of a commercial thoroughfare stretching from the Chesapeake Bay to the Mississippi 
River through Virginia. This includes discussions the formation of salt domes beneath the 
Kanawha River, the necessity of salt as a food preservative, and the mineral’s role in 
early American society. The chapter then discusses Native American uses of the salt 
marshes in the Kanawha, European exploration of the Kanawha Valley, valley settlement, 
land speculation in the region, and the inception of the salt industry on the banks of the 
Kanawha River.  
Chapter two begins with the early development of the commercial salt industry 
and follows that development until approximately 1815. The purpose of this is to root the 
Kanawha Valley salt industry in the larger context of the rise of the Ohio Valley’s meat 
packing industry and the region’s role in the international salted meat trade. 
Chapter three explores the innovation which was integral to the industry, making 
the Kanawha Valley the site of a number of developments, techniques and inventions 
which remain fundamental to the oil and gas well drilling industry to this day. This 
exploration of innovation marks the progress of the salt industry as well as serve as a 
contradiction to stereotypes of Appalachia. 
Chapter four explores the nature of slavery that the Kanawha Valley salt industry 
relied upon. The Kanawha Valley salt-makers relied heavily on agricultural slaves leased 
from owners in eastern Virginia. This extremely heavy reliance on hired slaves for 
industrial work a mere forty miles from the freedom of Ohio suggests unique innovations 
may have existed in the nature of slavery. The industrial slavery of the Kanawha Valley 
not only suggests possible unique facets to bondage there, it also provides a new light in 
which to examine Appalachia, a region where slavery remains less studied than 
agricultural regions. 
The thesis conclusion, points out the uniqueness of the Kanawha Valley. This 
thesis does not intend to suggest the post Civil War industrialization if Appalachia is 
incorrect, but that it cannot be assumed. This thesis serves to chip away at the assumption 
that the industrialization of the region was a post-Civil War event. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Kanawha River of West Virginia begins at the confluence of the New and 
Gauley Rivers. It runs northwest for 97 miles through south central West Virginia until it 
reaches the Ohio River at the town of Point Pleasant. The Great Kanawha Valley is an 
area long recognized for its rich resources. In 1784, George Washington wrote to then 
Governor Benjamin Harrison, “if the falls of the Great Kanawha can be made navigable, 
it will be found of equal importance to both the James and Potomac. Upon the whole, the 
object is, in my estimation, of vast commercial and political importance.”1 Even in a 
region renowned for its natural wealth, this narrow river valley is particularly blessed 
with resources. Although not always fully appreciated or recognized, the history of the 
valley is one of relentless and innovative exploitation of its bounty. The development of 
the Kanawha salt industry in particular, with its late eighteenth- early nineteenth century 
beginnings, presents itself as a valuable lens through which to examine the historical 
assumption of post-bellum Appalachian industrialization. 
In his book Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads, Deforestation, 
and Social Change in West Virginia, historian Ronald Lewis writes, “Appalachia is a 
region without formal history, beyond the physical reality of its mountains, ‘Appalachia’ 
is a socially constructed conceptual place, born in the fertile minds of the late-nineteenth-
century local color writers…”2 Lying in the heart of West Virginia, the Kanawha Valley 
                                                          
     1 Emery L. Kemp, The Great Kanawha Navigation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2000), 6.   
     2 Ronald L. Lewis, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads, Deforestation and 
Social Change in West Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 1. The 
writing of Mary Noialles Murfree, who used the pseudonym Charles Egbert Craddock, serves as 
an excellent example of local color writers’ descriptions of Appalachia and its residents. Charles 
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sits firmly in Appalachia. Geographically, West Virginia is the only state to lie entirely 
within the boundaries of Appalachia. West Virginians are often thought to epitomize 
what it is to be Appalachian. The “Mountain State” is saddled with a reputation for being 
inhabited by insular people. It is a region untrammeled by modern dentistry. Too simple, 
lazy, and drunken to capitalize on their region’s bounty following the Civil War, the 
people of the “hollers” left the natural wealth around them for outsiders to develop while 
they stared forlornly from dilapidated cabins or feuded.  
To this day, these myths or stereotypes persist with methamphetamine replacing 
moonshine and double-wide trailers replacing primitive cabins. Even those who seem to 
revere these Appalachians often promote the idea of xenophobic lives spent in isolated 
poverty. The work of photographer Shelby Lee Adams serves as an example of this. 
Adams clearly exhibits a great deal of affection, even reverence, for his subjects, yet he 
inevitably portrays them in rustic, isolated settings. Trappings of modernity in his work, 
such as a satellite dish on the roof of a shack, only serve to emphasize the rusticity of 
their existence and the intrusion of the outside into a closed society.3 Anthony Harkins 
discusses the extraordinary tenacity of the mountaineer image in his book Hillbilly: A 
Cultural History of an American Icon.4 Harkins claims “the portrayal of southern 
mountain people as pre-modern and ignorant ‘hillbillies’ is one of the most lasting and 
pervasive images in American popular iconography, appearing continually throughout the 
twentieth century in nearly every major facet of American popular culture.…”5 Even 
                                                          
Egbert Craddock, In a “Stranger People’s” Country (1891; repr., Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2005). 
     3 Shelby Lee Adams, Salt and Truth (Richmond: Candela Books, 2011). 
     4 Anthony Harkins, Hillbilly: A Cultural History of an American Icon (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
     5 Harkins, Hillbilly, 3. 
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within academic discussions, historians continue to deem it worthwhile to continue to 
refute this tenacious characterization before proceeding to their specific arguments. John 
Inscoe cites Allen Batteau as offering, “In the Appalachian Studies industry an entire 
shop floor is devoted to the labor-intensive task of debunking stereotypes.”6 
While the historiography of Appalachia may be rich, the Kanawha Valley has 
largely escaped historians’ attention. The valley’s shallow historiography persists despite 
the area’s long industrial history. The majority of writings specifically relating to the 
valley tend to fall into one of several categories: general regional histories, local histories, 
and industry-focused works. The perspectives offered by these histories vary, as one 
might expect from a diverse group of authors ranging from nineteenth century armchair 
historians to twentieth century chemical engineers. 
The late nineteenth century gave rise to several general histories. A good 
representation of this type work is George W. Atkinson’s, History of Kanawha County: 
From its Organization in 1789 until the Present Time; Embracing Accounts of Early 
Settlements, and the Thrilling Adventures with the Indians, Derived from History and 
Aged Citizens.7 Perhaps the lengthiest book of this type is John P. Hale’s work, History of 
                                                          
     6 Allen W. Batteau, The Invention of Appalachia (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 
7; John C. Inscoe, Race, War and Remembrance in the Appalachian South (Lexington, University 
of Kentucky Press, 1998), 8. For other historian’s efforts to address the Appalachian stereotypes, 
see Henry Shapiro, Appalachia on Our Mind: The Southern Mountaineers in the American 
Conciousness,1870-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Altina Waller, 
Feud: Hatfields, McCoys and Social Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1988); John Ed Pearce, Days of Darkness: The Feuds of Southern 
Kentucky (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994); Dwight B. Billings, Gurney Norman 
and Katherine Ledford, Back Talk from Appalachia: Confronting Stereotypes (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2001). 
     7 George W. Atkinson, The History of Kanawha County: From Its Organization in 1789 Until 
the Present Time: Embracing Accounts of Early Settlements, and Thrilling Adventures with the 
Indians Derived from History and Aged Citizens; Also, Biographical Sketches of a Large Number 
of the Early Settlers of the Great Kanawha Valley  (n.p.:Office of the West Virginia Journal, 
1876).  
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the Great Kanawha Valley.8 First published in 1891, its two volumes contain nearly 300 
pages each. Books such as this tend to focus on prominent white men, industry, and 
major events. An element of boosterism permeates these books touting the charms of the 
area and the great natural advantages offered by the Kanawha Valley. Often, these 
histories tend toward the romantic, with narratives of Native Americans kidnapping 
settler women and daring adventures in the wilderness.9 Despite their prominent role in 
Kanawha Valley history, the enslaved fail to appear meaningfully in early historiography. 
Works of this type fostered the stereotype of the Mountain South as an exotic land apart 
in the midst of late nineteenth and early twentieth century progress. 
As the capital of West Virginia and its largest city, Charleston has been the 
subject of a number of local histories. These books tend to rely heavily on photographs 
with accompanying comments to relay their story. Often self-laudatory works, they 
frequently mark the anniversary of past events. Stan Cohen’s, Kanawha County Images: 
A Bicentennial History 1788-1988 serves as a good example of this genre.10 Books of this 
genre feature many old photographs of civic architecture, old mansions, men of local 
civic stature, and industrial complexes accompanied by brief discussions of local 
historical highlights. Such studies are informative for the academic reader because they 
provide visual documentation of the industrial growth. Also noteworthy, is a pronounced 
emphasis on urban/industrial development. The photos depict the Kanawha and Elk 
Rivers primarily as avenues for expansive commerce. The images also effectively convey 
                                                          
     8 John P. Hale, History of the Great Kanawha Valley (Gauley Bridge, WV: Gauley and New 
River Publishing Company, 1891). 
     9 Hale, History of the Great Kanawha; Atkinson, The History of Kanawha County. 
     10 Stan Cohen, Kanawha County Images: A Bicentennial History 1788-1988 (Charleston, WV: 
Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1987). 
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the industrial rather than pastoral nature of the valley from its early days to present. The 
images of the narrow river valley illuminate the tight physical constraints on residential, 
commercial, agricultural, and industrial development dictated by the mountainous terrain.  
As might be expected from an industrial region, the Kanawha Valley arises in 
industry-specific writings. These industry-focused works tend to fall into two categories, 
those written by industry outsiders, and those written by industry insiders. Mining and 
shipping coal has long been a focus of the region’s industrial efforts. However, with the 
exception of cannel coal in the nineteenth century, the Kanawha Valley consumed most 
of its own coal and thus shipped comparatively little. The generally local consumption of 
Kanawha Valley coal may contribute to its lack of prominence in early coal mining 
studies when compared to Virginia’s earliest coal fields outside of Richmond and fields 
in counties south of Kanawha County, such as Logan County, which figures prominently 
in mining and labor histories.11  
Another type of industry specific literature is the body of work written by the 
companies or trade groups for an industry. Brief works such as The Salt Industry in the 
Kanawha Valley, written for the Chlor-Alkali company, tend to be written for the general 
public.12 They tout the important civic contributions of a particular industry or company 
in the valley. In these offerings, companies are solid corporate citizens who provide jobs, 
                                                          
    11 Rebecca Bailey, Matewan, Before the Massacre: Politics, Coal and the Roots of Conflict in a 
West Virginia Mining Community (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2008); Phil 
Conley, History of the West Virginia Coal Industry (Charleston: Education Foundation Inc., 
1960). For a notable exception, see V. B. Harris, Kanawha’s Black Gold and the Miners’ 
Rebellion (Ann Arbor, MI: Braun-Brumfield Inc., 1987). 
     12 The Salt Industry in the Kanawha Valley (South Charleston, WV: Chlor-Alkali Division of 
Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation, 1960); Bill Drennen, One Kanawha Valley Bank: A 
History (Charleston, WV: n.d.); Franklin Johnston, A Brief History of Chemistry in the Kanawha 
Valley (n.p.: American Chemical Society, 1977). 
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security, and the prospects of a better life. These pamphlets functioned primarily as 
public relations tools. Photos, which are included liberally, tend to be of factories and 
chart the growth of industrial complexes over time. Photos of industrial complexes 
generally provide little or no background for context. Factories fill the entire field of the 
photographs. Interestingly, they seem to include few photos of people, favoring 
expanding buildings and machinery as signs of their worthiness and place in the 
community. 
While not tied to a specific industry, Emory L. Kemp’s work, The Great 
Kanawha Navigation, focuses on industrial progress.13 Kemp charts the monumental 
efforts required to change the Kanawha into a river safely navigable for industrial 
shipping requirements. The Kanawha had long been part of prominent Virginians’ 
schemes to create an inland waterway through their state from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Mississippi River. Kemp, a professor of history and civil engineering at West Virginia 
University, created a detailed analysis that focuses almost entirely on the actual 
techniques and construction of the complex system of locks. The writing is nearly 
unintelligible to readers without a high degree of civil engineering knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the book conveys the extraordinary difficulty and expense involved in later 
efforts to subdue the river, efforts which began at the behest of the earliest salt 
manufacturers. 
While the importance of Kanawha Valley salt in the nation’s history remains 
largely unrecognized today, several historians have written on the subject. Most notably, 
West Virginia’s Shepherd University historian, John Edmund Stealey, wrote extensively 
                                                          
     13 Kemp, The Great Kanawha Navigation. 
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on every imaginable aspect of salt manufacturing in the Charleston area. His books and 
papers provide a deep understanding of the nature of life for settlers and salt-makers in 
the valley. In particular, Stealey’s use of the correspondence of salt firm Dickinson and 
Shrewsbury is enlightening. Joel Shrewsbury and William Dickinson, early settlers and 
partners, created the largest salt-making firm in the valley. Courts preserved their letters 
after they were required for a protracted lawsuit by Dickinson to dissolve the firm. As 
operators of a highly diversified firm, their letters touch on subjects pertinent to nearly 
every conceivable way to create wealth in the Kanawha Valley. Another useful facet to 
the body of Stealey’s work is his inclusion of slaves. His paper “Slavery and the Western 
Virginia Salt Industry” is remarkable for its specificity as well as its attention to a group 
that all too often fails to appear in the history of the industries in the area. Throughout 
Stealey’s body of work on the subject, he presents salt-makers as ingenious entrepreneurs 
who re-envisioned and reshaped their businesses and the valley as necessary in the 
pursuit of profit.14 
A survey of the historiography of the Kanawha Valley and the broader 
Appalachian historiography raises several questions which bear closer examination. The 
highly industrialized nature of the Kanawha Valley contradicts Appalachian stereotypes. 
However, once one moves past heavily covered ground, the industrialization of the valley 
still presents a quandary. Despite academics’ worthy efforts to prove that Appalachia is 
not a land apart within the nation’s midst, there remains an acceptance that it once was an 
isolated netherworld, violently ripped open by the Civil War. Such an assumption 
                                                          
     14 John E. Stealey, “Slavery and the Western Virginia Salt Industry,” The Journal of Negro 
History 59, no. 2 (April 1974): 105-131. 
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underpins the excellent books of historians John Alexander Williams, Altina Waller, and 
Ronald Lewis among others.15  
It may be argued that few better convey an understanding of what Appalachia is 
and what it means to be “Appalachian” than Williams does in his masterful work 
Appalachia: A History.16 Williams’ Appalachia is a varied, dynamic, and fluid 
environment rather than a region that moves more slowly through time. Williams is 
careful not to discount the economic motivations driving Appalachian history. Indeed, in 
his later work, West Virginia: A History, he presents the state’s past as a series of 
conflicts over control of its vast natural resources.17 Those wresting control generally 
appear as outsiders rather than Appalachians. Williams asserts that the antebellum 
leadership of western Virginia used its “control of the local political system to assert 
control over absentee-owned resources, which in pre-industrial times consisted primarily 
of wilderness land. The Civil War, the dearth of local development capital, and the work 
of the federal courts and local leaders who were content to serve only as middlemen, had 
negated much of this achievement.”18 While Williams does not suggest that local 
inhabitants were not economically motivated, he does stress that the history of West 
Virginia is one of industrially-minded outsiders seizing control from locals. 
                                                          
     15 John Alexander Williams, Appalachia: A History (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002); Altina L.Waller, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys and Social Change in 
Appalachia 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Lewis, 
Transforming the Appalachian Countryside. Robert Mitchell argues that while commercial 
motivations were present from early settlement, Appalachian development was not stopped in 
time, but was retarded in time. The title of his collection of essays reasserts the concept of a post-
bellum industrialization of Appalachia. See Robert D. Mitchell, ed., Appalachian Frontiers: 
Settlement, Society and Development in the Preindustrial Era (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1991). 
     16 Williams, Appalachia: A History. 
     17 John Alexander Williams, West Virginia: A History (Morgantown: West Virginia University 
Press, 2001). 
     18 Williams, West Virginia, 129. 
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Altina Waller’s excellent book, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys and Social Change in 
Appalachia, 1860-1900, presents Appalachians as enterprising mountain people who 
formed allegiances along economic lines rather than family lines.19 Waller’s book goes 
far toward undermining stereotypes of the clannish nature of southern highlanders, but it 
also depicts them as big fish in a small pond. While the Hatfields and McCoys appealed 
to state officials, they were largely ignored until the region’s natural wealth attracted 
outside capitalists. It was then, once external authority interjected itself that the full 
effects of a post-bellum, outside world wrought the deadliest and most socially 
destructive phase of the feud. 
Ronald L. Lewis’ impressive work, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: 
Railroads, Deforestation, and Social Change in West Virginia, 1880-1920, also stresses 
the story of local politics, economy, and culture snatched from local control and the often 
tragic ramifications for Appalachians.20 According to Lewis, his “book examines the 
post-bellum transformation of Appalachia from a rural-agricultural society dependent on 
virgin forests to a twentieth-century society denuded of the forest and fully enmeshed in 
capitalism…”21  Lewis assumes a pre-capitalist Appalachia prior to the twentieth century. 
This assumption recalls Williams’ suggestion that while antebellum Appalachians may 
have been capitalistic, they were small fish in a very small pond relative to outside 
enterprise. 
Not all historians base their constructions of Appalachia on a strong dichotomy of 
inside versus outside forces. Robert Mitchell suggests that Appalachian economic 
                                                          
     19 Waller, Feud. 
     20 Lewis, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside. 
     21 Ibid., 3. 
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development was not stuck in time, but experienced delayed industrialization. The 
subtitle of his collection of essays, Appalachian Frontiers: Settlement, Society and 
Development in the Preindustrial Era, endorses the belief in a simpler, pastoral, 
antebellum Appalachia.22 Some disagree, even with a somewhat less dichotomous 
interpretation. 
Wilma Dunaway stridently rejects suggestions that Appalachia was ever insulated 
from the outside world. She takes fervent exception to the suggestion that there was ever 
a European pre-capitalist Appalachia, questioning how such a place could have sprung 
directly from the capitalist society that was late eighteenth century America.23 Dunaway’s 
discussion of the southern fur trade reveals that in many ways, southern Appalachia was 
not a hinterland in the view of colonizers, but a focal point for powers with imperial 
visions. Southern Appalachians, whether Native American or European, were active and 
often enthusiastic participants in a global economy who established commercial 
connections over great distances in their pursuit of animal hides.24 
Dunaway’s discussion of the role of Appalachian Native Americans as willing 
participants in global commerce in the eighteenth century is illuminating. While 
highlighting early capitalist roots in Appalachia, she shifts the focus from Europeans 
solely and focuses on indigenous people. Dunaway sees Indians as often willing 
participants in mercenary empire-building. Native Americans exploited Kanawha Valley 
salt marshes for the game attracted to the salt licks and to extract the mineral. However, 
                                                          
     22 Mitchell, Appalachian Frontiers. 
     23 Wilma A. Dunaway, The First American Frontier: Transition to Capitalism in Southern 
Appalachia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
     24 Wilma A. Dunaway, “The Southern Fur Trade and the Incorporation of Southern 
Appalachia 1690-1763,” Review Braudel Fernand Center 17, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 215-242. 
16 
 
indigenous people do not seem to appear in the historiographic record involving the salt 
industry of the area. While Dunaway demonstrates the importance of indigenous people 
in the early European commercialization of the backcountry, the dearth of references to 
them in primary and secondary sources touching on the Kanawha Valley salt industry 
makes a worthy treatment of them in this paper untenable.  
Part of the discussion of Appalachian Virginia’s industrialization dating even to 
the John Adam’s presidency must include the enslaved. Again, while historians concur 
that Appalachia was not homogeneously white as popular stereotypes suggest, they 
disagree about the nature of slavery in Appalachia.25 In Mountain Masters: Slavery and 
the Sectional Crisis, John Inscoe examines antebellum western North Carolina finding a 
culture dictated, not by backwoods rubes, but by a “prosperous, ambitious and 
progressive middle class of business and professional men.”26 While Inscoe may not 
focus on individual blacks, he nonetheless provides a vision of the Mountain South which 
includes a significant population of enslaved blacks. Some may disagree with Inscoe’s 
presentation of paternalistic slave owners and mutual slave-master affection, but the 
examination of Appalachian slavery remains a valuable and thoughtful analysis for its 
challenge to traditional images of a white Appalachia. 
Wilma Dunaway takes a broader perspective on Appalachian slavery in her book, 
Slavery in the American Mountain South.27  While some have suggested that her 
definition of Appalachia is so broad as to render her quantitative analysis of questionable 
                                                          
      25 For a discussion of the multi-faceted nature of American slavery, see Ira Berlin, Many 
Thousands Gone: African Americans from Slavery to Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1993). 
     26 John C. Inscoe, Mountain Master: Slavery and the Sectional Crisis (Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1989), 7. 
     27 Wilma A, Dunaway, Slavery in the American Mountain South (Cambridge, U.K.: The Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003). 
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use, it remains relevant nonetheless.28 Dunaway’s work is particularly useful, not only for 
the extensive depth of her analysis, but also for the breadth of her exploration into the 
varied nature of slave work. Dunaway carefully examines not only the agricultural work 
on small farms, but also slave labor in the service and industrial realms as well, two fields 
which historians have, at times, omitted from slave studies. Her conclusion is that 
Appalachian slavery was not gentler than slavery of the lower South, but crueler due to 
cramped living and working environments in the narrow, isolated valleys. These 
constrained environments prompted slave owners to use greater force in order to maintain 
their ideas of supremacy.   
The Kanawha Valley, which in 1850 was home to the largest population of blacks 
west of the Alleghenies, also challenges assumptions of Appalachian homogeneity.29 
While Inscoe’s summation of white slave-holding western North Carolinians may bear a 
resemblance to the settlers of the Kanawha Valley in many ways, the nature of slave 
labor appears to have been quite different there with its focus on salt production rather 
than agriculture. The most recent general history of the area, Great Kanawha: An 
Historical Outline, published in 1976, fails to meaningfully include slaves.30 In a rare 
mention of their existence, author V. B. Harris offers, “The actual mining of coal was 
first accomplished in the Kanawha field by all hand—sometimes slaves—labor using 
crude mining tools.”31 Given the date that this work was published, the scant inclusion of 
slaves seems odd. John Stealey, however, thoroughly addresses slavery in the Kanawha 
                                                          
     28 John Alexander Williams, review of Slavery in the American Mountain South, by Wilma A 
Dunaway, Appalachian Journal 31, no. 2 (winter 2004): 230-234. 
     29 Stealey, “Slavery,” 112. 
     30 V. B. Harris, The Great Kanawha: An Historical Outline (Charleston, WV:  Jarrett Printing 
Company, 1976). 
     31 Ibid., 96. 
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salt industry, describing it as an offshoot of the Eastern Virginia slave markets, despite 
the vast differences between the labor involved in salt manufacturing and tobacco 
culture.32 Stealey suggests that Kanawha salt producers tended to rent 50 to 60 percent of 
their workforce from eastern Virginia owners. For this reason, Kanawha Valley slavery 
must be examined within the context of Virginia’s tobacco industry slavery.33 This does 
not, however, suggest that the slave experience was similar at opposite ends of the state. 
Overall, Stealey provides a vision of a valley heavily reliant on slavery, where the 
enslaved exercised considerable autonomy and ability to roam. The variety of tasks 
requiring movement between salt facilities and their suppliers up and down the river 
afforded slaves greater ability to come and go than did plantation life. Leased slaves’ 
opportunities to appeal to their owners for ill-treatment or for assignment to tasks deemed 
outside the lease agreement also added to the slaves’ power.34 
When taken as a whole, exploration by academics such as Stealey, Inscoe, 
Dunaway, Lewis, and others remind the reader that while there may be a common idea of 
Appalachia, the commonality exists only in the realm of myth. Appalachia defies 
attempts to encompass it with a single description or definition. The histories of the river 
plains differ starkly from those of more upland regions. The experiences of those in one 
valley resist comparison with others nearby. The Kanawha Valley, with its early, hired 
slave-reliant industrialization stands as a testament to the diversity of Appalachian 
                                                          
     32 Stealey, “Slavery.” 
     33 Ibid., 114. 
    34 While set in eastern Virginia, for an excellent exploration of the nature of industrial slavery 
in Virginia at one iron-works see, Charles B. Dew, “David Ross and the Oxford Iron Works: A 
Study of Industrial Slavery in the Early Nineteenth-Century South,”  The William and Mary 
Quarterly 31, no. 2 (April 1974): 189-224. For a broader discussion of the nature of industrial 
slavery see, Robert S. Starobin, “Disciplining Industrial Slaves in the Old South,” The Journal of 
Negro History LIII, no. 2 (April 1968): 111-128. 
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experiences. While the mountains that run through the region are real, the existence of a 
common people or society of that realm is an enduring fable. It is hoped that this study 
will reinforce this understanding and assist in breaking down stereotypical assumptions in 
the process. This examination of the salt industry in the Kanawha Valley can chip away 
at the assumption of a pre-capitalist or pre-industrial white Appalachia. In doing so, it 
could help to clear the path for a richer and more nuanced understanding of a region and 
its people. 
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Chapter 1: A Driving Vision for the Great Kanawha 
“…being the nearest, and easiest of transportation” 
 The origins of the Kanawha Valley salt deposits can be traced to the Pleistocene 
epoch, which dates between 2.5 million years ago and 12,000 years ago. At that time, 
retreating glaciers blocked the flow of the massive Teay’s River which, until then, had 
drained an area from what is now western North Carolina, northward through western 
Virginia, northwest through what is now West Virginia and then westward through 
current day Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Lakes were thus formed, one of which covered 
much of the current Kanawha Valley. As water levels dropped in the lake over the 
millennia, the water became super-saturated with salt, which eventually crystallized and 
deposited on the lake floor. Much later, water levels rose again, establishing an outlet for 
the lake, now known as the Kanawha River. The Kanawha’s sediment then gradually 
layered over the salt deposits, thereby re-shaping the geologic formations of the region.35  
 These saline deposits might not have lured animals and men to the Kanawha 
Valley were it not for the water that flows or migrates beneath and alongside rivers. The 
depth and width of this flow depends on the amount of water in the drainage and the 
porosity of the underlying and adjacent geologic material. Changing porosity can create 
an underground pool, or cause the flow to rise, spread, or contract. On occasion the pool 
can rise to the surface as an artesian well, or spring. In Kanawha County, the change in 
porosity of the underlying strata caused water that had been migrating through salt 
deposits to rise and form the valley’s salt marshes and springs. The salt marshes in 
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Kanawha County lie along the Kanawha River. The primary marsh extends from the 
mouth of Campbell’s Creek roughly six miles upriver although there are smaller salt 
marshes in the area.36  
These salt marshes attracted a variety of animals, including large populations of 
elk, buffalo, and deer. The main salt marsh became known as the Great Buffalo Lick and 
was part of a buffalo trail that led from the Valley of Virginia to the Ohio Valley. In 
places, these animal trails leading down the steep hillsides to the riverside marshes had 
been so heavily trod that they remained visible throughout the nineteenth century.37 This 
abundance of game attracted many other animals, including humans.  
The extent of Native American mineral exploitation of the Kanawha salt marshes 
is not well documented, as much of the historical record remains anecdotal. The rare 
inclusion of Native Americans with regard to the salt marshes appears to carry the biases 
of Victorian local color writers. The earliest stories contend that in 1755, French allied 
Shawnee warriors attacked Blacksburg, Virginia area settlers and kidnapped Mary Ingles 
Draper among others. On their retreat westward to Shawnee territory, the group stopped 
in the Kanawha Valley, where her captors taught Mary to make salt before continuing on 
to the Ohio Valley.38 Writing in 1876, historian George Atkinson offers that “there seems 
to be a general understanding among the old settlers that the Indians made salt from the 
water obtained from this spring and used it to cure the meat of the game which they killed 
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in great quantities by keeping their hunters stationed in the vicinity of the lick.”39 
Similarly, nineteenth century historian Henry Howe writes, “Remains of rude pottery are 
found in abundance in the neighborhood, respective which there is but little doubt that 
they are the remains of vessels… for the transportation of salt water.”40 Howe contends 
that Indians filled the “idle hours” while reducing brine by creating, “The Pictured or 
Calico Rock on which the natives sculptured many rude figures of animals, birds &c.”41 
The pictograph-covered boulder continued to serve salt-makers’ purposes as white 
settlers later broke Calico Rock into pieces and incorporated it into the chimneys of their 
early salt-works furnaces.42 Initial white incursions in the region were not led by hunters, 
salt-makers, or even farmers however, but by surveyors and land speculators. The initial 
white control of the region by these investors strongly influenced the nature of the 
valley’s economic and social growth in the coming century.  
One such investor in the frontier land, Thomas Bullitt of Prince William County, 
served under then Colonel George Washington on the expedition which ended with the 
Battle of Great Meadows in 1754. This marked only the beginning of a partnership 
between Bullitt and Washington. Following the Seven Years War, Bullitt led an armed 
party west at the behest of Virginia’s governor, Lord Dunmore. The Virginia governor 
charged Bullitt’s party with controlling the Indian menace and surveying Virginia’s 
backcountry. As payment for his lengthy services to the crown, Bullitt received a grant 
for 1,240 acres in that frontier. Bullitt chose the confluence of the Elk and Kanawha 
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Rivers, the site currently at the heart of Charleston, as the focus of his newly acquired 
western holdings.43 
Bullitt was not the only Virginian to accept Kanawha Valley land as payment for 
battling Native Americans. Colonel John Dickinson, a native of Bath County, Virginia, 
traveled through the Kanawha Valley en route to the Battle of Point Pleasant. A year 
later, Dickinson patented 502 acres at the confluence of the Kanawha River and 
Campbell’s Creek, six miles above Bullitt’s land grant. Dickinson’s acreage encompassed 
all of the Great Buffalo Lick.44  
One of the largest land holders in the area was George Washington, who owned 
over 30,000 acres on the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers. In 1775, Washington surveyed 
extensively in the region, parlaying his knowledge of the choice land parcels into 
ownership of vast portions of western Virginia. On his land roughly three miles above the 
salt lick, Washington, with an eye to the future, set apart the Burning Spring, one of the 
great natural curiosities of the region, for public use.45 This spring foreshadowed the 
intimate connection between salt-making and natural gas, which men would innovatively 
exploit in the decades to follow. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson 
described the natural wonder as “a hole in the earth of the capacity of thirty or forty 
gallons, from which issues a bituminous vapour in so strong a ‘current’ as to give the 
sand about its orifice the motion which it has in a boiling spring. On presenting a lighted 
candle or torch within 18 inches of the hole, it flames up in a column of 18 inches in 
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diameter and five feet high.” Jefferson goes on to comment that “the smell is like burning 
pit coal.”46 Jefferson’s olfactory assessment would soon come to be applied to the 
Kanawha Valley as a whole. 
In the opening years of the new republic, these large landholders from eastern 
Virginia saw their Kanawha holdings as central to visions of an empire of commerce. 
Jefferson, while not active as a private land speculator, (though his commitment to the 
Louisiana Purchase perhaps marks him as the largest land speculator in American 
history), made note of the Kanawha in the future of the commonwealth. Jefferson wrote, 
“The Great Kanawha is a river of considerable note for the fertility of its lands, and still 
more as leading to the headwaters of the James River.”47 Early Virginian leaders 
envisioned their commonwealth as the intellectual, social and economic leader of the 
burgeoning nation. Central to their plans for economic preeminence was a commercial 
thoroughfare stretching from the Chesapeake Sound to the Mississippi. Many wagered 
that with the investment of concerted effort, the Kanawha River would become an 
important section of that thoroughfare.48  
Washington, among others, sought to increase the wherewithal of his nation, state 
and personal fortune through the active promotion of a transnational route for commerce 
and migration. In 1784, Washington set out on a journey to “see the condition of my 
Lands which were nearest, and settled, and to dispose of those which were more remote, 
                                                          
     46 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, (East Rutherford, N.J.: Viking Penguin 
Books, 1998), 38. 
     47 Ibid., 15. 
     48 Kent Druyvesteyn “With Great Vision: That James River and Kanawha Canal,” Virginia 
Cavalcade 21, no. 3 (January 1972): 22-23. 
25 
 
and unsettled,” the latter category included his Kanawha and Ohio Valley properties.49 
While Washington may have been directly concerned with his private profit, his journey 
through the Kanawha Valley was also prompted by a higher purpose—nation building. 
Washington wrote to prominent Charleston, South Carolina lawyer Jacob Read of his fear 
that the western territories might settle “in the hands, either of the Spaniards or British. if 
[sic] either of these happen, there is a line of separation [sic] at once drawn between the 
Eastern and Western Country. The consequences of which may be fatal.” After this dire 
prediction, Washington went on to offer, “it is by the cement of interest only, we can be 
held together. If then the trade of that Country should flow through the Mississippi or St. 
Lawrence. If the Inhabitants thereof should form commercial connexions [sic], which 
lead, we know, to intercourse of other kinds, they would in a few years be as unconnected 
with us, indeed more so, than we are with South America; and wd. soon be alienated 
from us.”50 He continued that the only solution to the dissolution of the East from the 
West was to: 
extend the inland navigation of the Eastern waters, communicate them as near as possible 
(by excellent Roads) with those which run to the westward. open these to the Ohio, and 
such others as extend from the Ohio towards Lake Erie; and we shall not only draw the 
produce of the western Settlers, but the Fur and peltry trade of the lakes also, to our Ports 
(being the nearest, and easiest of transportation) to the amazing encrease of our Exports, 
while we bind those people to us by a chain which never can be broken. 51 
Washington regarded this matter was one of “vast commercial and political 
importance.”52 
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Upon his return, Washington wrote to Virginia Governor Benjamin Harrison, 
advocating the creation of an easy avenue for commerce through the state via rivers, 
canals and if necessary, turnpikes.53 After Washington appeared before the Virginia 
Assembly in November 1785, the governing body approved “An act for clearing and 
improvement of the navigation of the James River.”54 In doing so, the assembly enabled 
the creation of the James River Company and placed Washington at its helm. While the 
assembly charged Washington with improving navigation only along the James River, 
Washington’s letter to Harrison indicates a far larger vision for commercial waterways in 
Virginia. 
Washington was not the only member of the James River Company who foresaw 
the company’s mission as extending to the Ohio River. George Clendenin, a frontier 
politician, surveyor, justice of the peace, and extensive landowner in Greenbrier County, 
strongly supported the completion of westward transportation infrastructure as the key to 
his own and his state’s economic success. Clendenin used his past as a veteran of Lord 
Dunmore’s campaign as well as his experience in the state militia during the American 
Revolution to establish himself as a local leader in Greenbrier County. While 
representing his region in the Virginia Assembly, Clendenin and compatriot Andrew 
Donnally were placed in charge of monitoring the county subscriptions to the James 
River Company. The pair aggressively pursued the extension of the James River 
Company’s original mandate which did not include work past rendering the James River 
navigable. Clendenin and others argued not only for the commercial importance of the 
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improvements, but for their necessity in binding the frontier people together under the 
leadership of the eastern Virginia power structure as well.55 Sectionalism, arising in part 
from frontier isolation and the perception that eastern leadership offered little for western 
residents, spawned grumblings and unrest along the frontier. The North Carolina 
Regulator movement, Shay’s Rebellion, and efforts to create the State of Franklin may 
well have served as reminders that eastern leaders should not ignore western interests.  
In 1785, the Virginia General Assembly charged company leadership with finding 
the best route for a road running “from the highest navigable part of the James River, to 
the nearest part of the waters running into the Ohio…”56 Clendenin and five others bore 
the responsibility for notifying residents of Greenbrier, Rockbridge, Botetourt and 
Augusta counties that the assembly was accepting bids for a major undertaking. The plan 
was to create a wagon road 30 feet wide from Lewisburg to the Falls of the Kanawha, 
roughly 25 miles upriver from the Great Buffalo Lick and just over 60 miles from the 
Ohio River at Point Pleasant.   
Clendenin was probably motivated to some degree by concern for his 
constituents’ convenience, health, and economic well-being, but the success of the James 
River Company’s efforts very much precipitated his own personal gain. Clendenin held 
over 21,000 acres of Greenbrier country individually and he held another 9,000 acres 
with partners. Most of this land lay in river bottoms or other relatively level land.57 The 
construction of a road connecting Greenbrier County to the east increased land values in 
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the region steeply. Virginia lawyer and judge Archibald Stuart wrote to his friend 
Thomas Jefferson, “The Commissioners for the James River Company have made a 
favorable report” he begins. “They are of Opinion that the river may be rendered 
navigable One hundred miles beyond the Great Mountain to the mouth of Dunlap’s Creek 
and that a good wagon Road may be had from thence to Meadow Creek which Runs into 
the Kanawha below the great falls and that the portage by land will be about sixty miles.” 
Stuart goes on to assess that “In consequence of these Prospects Lands on the River and 
those adjacent have risen fifty percent in their Value.”58 Clendenin’s land acquisitions 
were not restricted to Greenbrier County. In 1787, Clendenin purchased for five shillings,  
1,030 acres at the confluence of the Elk River and the Kanawha River from Cuthbert 
Bullitt the original land grant holder.59 Clendenin was not buying the property sight 
unseen; he had made camp there during his service in Dunmore’s war.60 He was well 
aware of the value of the land where the two rivers met just 40 somewhat navigable miles 
from the Ohio River. 
The Virginia Land Acts of 1779 set the stage for speculators to gain control of 
vast tracts of the western Virginia wilderness. The Virginia Assembly had several goals 
in mind when it passed “An Act for Establishing a Land Office and ascertaining the terms 
and manner of granting waste and unappropriated lands.”61 Legislators sought to promote 
settlement, ascertain the validity of early titles to land, secure territory within the 
boundaries of Virginia rather than other states, and raise revenue for Virginia’s empty 
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coffers. The act established the Land Office to administer the program. One of the most 
influential aspects of the act allowed for any person to lay claim to as much “waste or 
unappropriated land” as they wished for a fee of 40 pounds for every 100 acres.62 A 
series of subsequent legislative actions supported the speculative efforts by allowing 
payment for the lands to be made in treasury warrants, allowing payments for the land to 
be borrowed, and even allowing them to be deferred for up to a year. These terms favored 
those with extra cash and those with access to credit. They were tailor made for those in 
power. 
It appears that with his Kanawha Valley purchase, Clendenin put a great deal of 
his considerable energy into ensuring that he benefited handsomely from his Kanawha 
lands. This required using his influence with other state leaders to tout the potential of the 
region. In December of 1787, Clendenin wrote to Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph, 
“I think Nature has formed this place for one of the richest Settlements that has ever Yet 
been made on any part of Our western territory; the River Kanawha affording such great 
quantities of the first rate Low grounds (with an excellent Salt Lick),  to which is added 
almost every kind of fish and wild fowls that are to be found on any part of the Continant 
[sic]…”63  Clendenin envisioned the valley not as an isolated town surrounded by farms, 
but as an important commercial hub in an inland Virginia empire. Clendenin predicted 
that a steady stream of people heading west to the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys would 
choose to travel through Virginia rather than Pennsylvania on their way to the Ohio 
River. His town, where the Elk River flowed into the Kanawha would grow rich as 
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settlers provisioned for the trip west and as goods flowed through the valley to meet the 
needs of the burgeoning communities of the Ohio Valley. In the process, he and other 
early speculators in the valley’s best land would grow wealthy. 
In the spring of 1788, Clendenin set about securing his investments with a 
protective fort on his Kanawha lands.64 Increasing his land values required the security of 
Kanawha Valley settlers, and equally important, of those travelling through the valley to 
Fort Pitt and eventually the Ohio Valley. The “numerous herds of Wild Game in the 
valley attracted a Set of Barberous [sic] Savages who make it a Hunting Ground and do 
Kill and plunder our Citizens at will.”65 Clendenin argued that mounted militia would be 
useless for protection in the region’s thick forests; instead he formed a company of 
mobile rangers and six scouts.66 At the same time the Greenbrier County Court, of which 
Clendenin was a member, appointed George Clendenin, his brother William, Andrew 
Donnally, and William Arbuckle to locate the best route from  Greenbrier County to the 
place where the Elk River fed into the Kanawha River (coincidently, this was the center 
of Clendenin’s holdings). The route proved daunting. The nearly impassable path wove 
over Gauley Mountain and along narrow trails clinging to the side of the steep gorges 
surrounding the turbulent New and upper Kanawha Rivers. Whether it occurred to 
Clendenin and his party that the treacherousness of the trail they blazed for the proposed 
road might hinder the extraordinary growth they envisioned for their Kanawha 
investment remains unknown.   
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Upon arrival, the party built a stockade at the confluence of the two rivers which 
came to be called Fort Lee. Clendenin then appears to have redoubled his efforts in 
pursuing funding for the development of his investment. Within a year of arriving in the 
valley, citing the impracticality of Greenbrier County’s Lewisburg as the administrative 
seat for the newly settled valley, Clendenin and his supporters arranged for the creation 
of Kanawha County from sections of Greenbrier and Montgomery Counties. He then 
sited his new county’s seat squarely on his property at the mouth of the Elk River. 67 
Clendenin also secured positions as magistrates in the new county for his brothers.68 He 
peppered the governor and Virginia legislators with letters touting the valley’s 
extraordinary potential in Virginia’s future. The large land holdings in the region by 
eastern gentry no doubt played some part in Clendenin’s success in securing state 
assistance. Clendenin’s frequent missives highlighting his fort’s crucial role in holding 
Indians at bay also may have played a role in the assembly’s willingness to foster 
development of the region. As the frontier legislator and businessman sought and 
received state support for his vision, Clendenin rapidly increased his investment in 
Kanawha Valley land. By 1795, Clendenin held an interest in 27,560 acres of land in 
Kanawha County.69 As he had done in Greenbrier County, and as others land speculators 
tended to do, Clendenin focused on what they considered the most valuable property, the 
river bottom land and gentle terrain with the best access to navigable water.  
Despite an exceptional bounty of natural resources, some saw challenges to future 
economic success on the Kanawha.  In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas 
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Jefferson wrote, “The Great Kanawha is a river of considerable note for all the fertility of 
its lands and still more as leading towards the headwaters of the James River.”70 Not only 
were the arable river bottoms promising, but the vast coal beds of the region awaited 
exploitation as soon as the transportation improvements that Clendenin and his 
compatriots sought were implemented. In October 1790, the Virginia Gazette advertised 
the sale of 10,000 acres on Kanawha Valley land “within easy distance of an 
inexhaustible quantity of coal.”71 The brine marshes attracted valuable game, but 
Virginians considered the brine too weak to justify the establishment of commercial salt-
works. This was especially true after England resumed exporting salt to her former 
colonies from Liverpool after the Revolution. Despite all these resources, Jefferson 
predicted that it was “doubtful whether its great and numerous rapids will admit 
navigation, but at an expanse which will require ages as to render its inhabitants equal.”72  
It may not have required the “ages” that Jefferson predicted for Kanawhans to be 
“rendered equal,” but the rapid growth that Washington, Clendenin, Lewis, and others 
hoped and labored for did not arrive as quickly as some wished. Land values in the valley 
failed to rise as rapidly as many investors hoped. Several factors contributed to the 
valley’s early failure to become highly populated even as some areas farther from eastern 
centers flourished. Jefferson was correct to a degree. Despite the vision of Virginia’s 
leaders for a commercial thoroughfare from the Chesapeake to the Mississippi, the 
Kanawha, and New Rivers remained steadfastly challenging to navigate eastward. The 
route that Clendenin’s party surveyed from Greenbrier County to the valley was far too 
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treacherous for easy use. The daunting trail presented serious challenges to immigrants 
and those hoping to ship large quantities of coal to the metal-works of eastern Virginia.73   
A second reason for the retarded development of the valley arose from the appeal 
of the Ohio Valley. The Ohio River Valley offered larger quantities of arable land even 
closer to the Ohio River than the Kanawha Valley. Settlers found it easier to cross 
Pennsylvania, bypassing western Virginia entirely. In the Ohio Valley, they hoped to find 
parcels of land on better terms from the government than was offered by land speculators.  
A third factor originated with the speculators themselves. While they may have 
sought tenants or buyers for their investments, they would not accept just any terms. 
George Washington directed his business agent, George Clendenin, not to rent to long-
term tenants because it might prevent him from selling or renting on better terms if the 
price were to rise. He was also prohibited from making any rental agreements during 
Indian scares for fear that such news would drive prices downward. Washington sought 
primarily to pay the taxes on the land. However, few if any chose to invest the 
tremendous energy required to settle the wild country on the property of an owner who 
would offer only a short-term commitment.74 In many ways, while Clendenin and other 
powerful speculators accomplished a great deal toward the development of the Kanawha 
Valley, they themselves proved to be significant barriers to Kanawha settlement. 
Clendenin, Washington, and their fellow early speculators made few leases on 
their Kanawha Valley properties. Washington sold his holdings there in 1791. In 1794, 
Clendenin created the town of Charleston. He sold 15 one acre lots for five shillings each. 
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He transferred nearly half the original 1,030 acre tract to his brothers. He then sold the 
balance of that parcel at the mouth of the Elk River to Joseph Ruffner of the Shenandoah 
Valley and moved on to the Ohio River in hopes of quicker rewards.75 The valley’s 
connections with the East were too difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, power brokers in 
eastern Virginia felt they held the key to opening the valley. They were correct, but it was 
not the key they expected. 
Generous land laws, sponsored by legislators desperate to raise funds, spurred 
interest in regions west of the Kanawha. In 1779, one writer commented on the popular 
reaction to Virginia’s land laws, it seemed that “half of Virginia intended to go to 
Kentucky.”76  While historians no longer tend to subscribe to Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
frontier thesis, the Kanawha Valley, in many ways falls into line with his description. 
Turner suggests that the buffalo created trails as they migrated between salt licks. Other 
animals and Native Americans followed the buffalo. White settlers followed in turn. The 
buffalo trail running from the Kanawha salt licks to the Ohio Valley was broad and well 
worn. The development of the valley relied on salt and access to the Ohio Valley. The 
Kanawha Valley flourished on the need for salt in the Great West. In suggesting that 
settlement patterns followed salt sources, Turner reminded his audience of what 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Americans would have found laughably obvious; life 
was impossible without substantial quantities of affordable salt.  
Settlers had multiple needs for the mineral other than its most basic function, 
maintaining chemical and electrical balances within the body. Poultices and medicines 
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often included it. Salt transformed soap from a liquid into a solid, thus eliminating the 
need for soap barrels. Salt softened and de-haired hides for the production of leather and 
so was necessary to the international hides trade. The mineral was essential in raising 
livestock. While pigs’ foraged diets generally supplied their bodies’ salt needs, cattle 
required supplemental salt in their diet in order to survive.77 Perhaps the mineral’s most 
important use, however, was as a food preservative.   
Prior to refrigeration, the mineral was the crucial element in preserving meats and 
vegetables. This applied to all livestock and their milk as well as game and fish. The type 
of salt employed for preserving a specific food was important as well. Various salts were 
deemed to have specific qualities, making them more suitable for some uses than others. 
Recipes often specified the type and consistency of salt to be employed. Ideally, butter, 
beef, fish, and vegetables were preserved in different types of salt.78 This preference for a 
variety of salts came to play a key role in the success of the Kanawha Valley industry. 
Men and women settling on or near the American coastline made procuring salt 
from sea water one of their early concerns.79 Some expressions of this early focus 
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revolved around salt as element of profitable trade rather than as a staple for life. In the 
late seventeenth century, Dr. Daniel Coxe, an English physician and speculator, held title 
to 95,000 acres around what is currently Cape May, New Jersey. He, “settled a Towne 
and Established a ffishing for Whales which are numberous [sic] about Cape May both 
within the Bay and without all along the seas coast…” The only hindrance that he saw to 
his plan for a great fishing and whaling town was a lack of salt. “We have over diverse 
ffrenchmen skillful in making salt by the sun in pitts or pans whoe assure us there are 
many convenient places upon the Coast over against the places of ffishing where millions 
of Bushells may be made at the expence of 4 pence per Bushell.”80 The requirement for 
salt in order monetize the riches of the New World was apparent regardless of the coastal 
settlement. 
 In Jamestown, Virginia, Captain John Smith also saw a bright future in the 
combination of salt and fishing. Smith declared, “never could the Spaniard with all his 
mines of Gold and Silver pay his debts, his friends and Army halfe so truly as the 
Hollanders still have done by this contemptible Trade of Fish.”81 Smith, like Coxe, 
recognized the essential connection of salt to the fishing industry: “Salt upon Salt may 
assuredly be made, if not at first in the ponds, yet till they be provided this may be 
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used…”82 Smith suggests that salt for the fishery could be made by boiling seawater until 
salt evaporation ponds could be created. 
Events across the Atlantic rendered salt-making efforts in the colonies 
inconsequential when miners discovered rock salt in England. Prior to 1693, men created 
most salt in England by reducing brine. This process stands in contrast to the mining of 
rock salt in Eastern Europe. Cheshire, near Liverpool, had long been the site of salt-
works. Years of wood-fired boilers reducing brine had deforested the region. Faced with 
the lack of timber and the expense of transporting firewood, excavations in search of coal 
began, a relationship between salt, timber, and coal that would resurface in Kanawha 
Valley just over 100 years later.83 Miners did not find coal in Cheshire, but in 1670, 
found rock salt. This readily available Cheshire salt hampered the early American salt 
production efforts just as it reduced the trade in sea salt in Britain.84 The Cheshire salt 
industry grew as ships left Liverpool laden with English goods using salt as ballast. Ships 
then departed the American colonies filled with materials such as salted cod to feed slave 
populations and salted deer hides for English tanneries. In this respect, British 
colonialism functioned much as was intended. Americans, both those who lived near the 
coast and those in the backcountry, relied on English salt for their farms, businesses, and 
households.  
As the relationship between England and her American colonies devolved into 
armed rebellion, Americans’ reliance on English salt quickly exposed a serious threat to 
rebel efforts. In March of 1776, the Pennsylvania Magazine published “The Art of 
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Making Common Salt: Particularly Adapted to the Use of the American Colonies. With 
an Abstract from Dr. Brownrigg’s Treatise  on the Art of Making Bay-Salt.”85 Along with 
diagrams and detailed instructions for making salt in the French manner using tidal 
marshes, the article suggested the reason why Americans produced little salt: 
The making of salt in America has been an object of attention to many persons in 
Britain for a long while past, arising from the favorableness of our climate to the 
operation. It has been too long neglected, from a prevailing disposition in the 
Americans to manufacture nothing, among themselves which could be imported 
from abroad: But it is now reasonably to be expected, that the necessity of America 
will induce the inhabitants, among many other useful manufactures, to establish the 
essential one of making into salt the sea water that washes their shores.86 
 
Regardless of American’s reported indisposition to producing salt domestically, the 
colonial assemblies and the Continental Congress immediately began serious efforts to 
cope with the severe shortage. 
Attempts by the Continental Congress and the various colonial assemblies to 
ensure a supply of salt in America were multi-layered, haphazard, and disorganized. 
Colonies sought to stimulate production through generous loans and other financial 
incentives, as New York did for producers of gun powder and musket barrels. Salt-
workers were often excused from military service. The incentives to produce more salt 
proved generally unsuccessful, perhaps due to salt-works serving as military targets. 
Perhaps the most controversial measures taken during the war involved 
limitations on the distribution and sale of salt. Nearly every colony took steps to prohibit 
the essential mineral from leaving its territory. Connecticut’s proclamation of May 16, 
1776, provides but one example. The general assembly passed “an act that no Rum, 
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Sugar, Molasses, Salt or other West-India Goods shall be exported out of this Colony, by 
Land or Water on or before the first day of November next.”87 As with other colonies, in 
response to rumors of salt hoarding, Virginia’s assembly established an allotment of salt 
per person or per household. Households discovered to have more salt than allowed 
found it confiscated.88 Merchants experienced the same circumstances and frequently 
discovered themselves accused of profiteering. 
 As stores of the commodity dwindled, prices in the colonies rose rapidly. In 1776, 
Virginians paid roughly one bushel of corn for a bushel of Bermuda salt. In late 1779, the 
price had doubled. By 1781, a bushel of salt traded for three bushels of corn.89 Colonial 
governments, concerned about civil unrest arising from the lack of salt, sought to avert 
disorder through price controls and distribution. The measures appear to have pleased 
few. Disputes over the price and control of salt arose throughout the colonies.90 In  
backcountry Virginia, where it was virtually impossible to obtain salt, settlers armed 
themselves and descended on Henrico County, convincing officials to share the mineral 
with their western countrymen.91 
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 Individual colonies as well as the Continental Congress wrestled with the 
competing salt requirements of undisciplined troops and an unruly populace. In the tug-
of-war over the mineral’s allocation, it was often perceived that the greater need trumped 
individual rights. Confusion ensued as ownership of the commodity was contested. 
Merchants, city and town councils, colonial assemblies, the Continental Congress, 
quartermasters for district militias, and individuals all laid overlapping claims to the same 
insufficient supplies of salt. Efforts to ensure availability for the general populace as well 
as the military forces often failed as leaders feared the complete loss of the war without 
salt. This struggle between military and civilian needs for the precious commodity 
reemerged in the Kanawha Valley two generations later in the Civil War.  
 Virginia and the rest of the colonies never solved, but only alleviated their salt 
shortages. Virginia constantly needed more salt than it could produce.92 The 
Revolutionary War had highlighted the dangers of relying on external sources of salt. 
Nevertheless, following the resumption of normal trade with England, inexpensive salt 
once again filled the holds of ships bounds for the American ports. Despite the 
resumption of plentiful supplies of inexpensive salt, the commodity was not well 
distributed across Virginia. Backcountry settlers found salt did not necessarily remain 
plentiful or inexpensive as they moved to more remote regions like the Ohio Valley. On 
the eve of the nineteenth century, Clendenin and other early speculators abandoned the 
Kanawha Valley, while those just arriving there found that they had better timing. With 
its brine springs and connection to the Ohio River, the Kanawha Valley was poised to 
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fulfill the ambitions of men like Clendenin as an industrial hub for the burgeoning Great 
West. 
  
42 
 
Chapter 2: The Undaunted Pursuit of Salt 
 
 
Early speculators’ dreams of Kanawha Valley fortunes dimmed near the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Land prices failed to rise as settlers eschewed the 
route west leading to the valley in favor of the Shenandoah Gap to the south and more 
northerly routes across Pennsylvania. While the Kanawha Valley enjoyed a direct linkage 
to the Ohio River Valley via the Kanawha River, the route from eastern Virginia to the 
Kanawha remained treacherous. In January 1814, Joel Shrewsbury wrote to his business 
partner back in Bedford County Virginia that the roads to the Kanawha from the East 
were “uncommonly bad perhaps the worst road you knew for waggons [sic] to travel and 
nothing but our team being uncommonly good & our forces very strong enabled us to get 
along.”93 Clearly, Virginia leaders’ hopes for a thoroughfare of commerce and migration 
failed to come to fruition. Some canals and roadways had been proposed and even begun, 
but the Kanawha Valley remained a difficult place to reach from the East. Whether due to 
inflated prices held aloft by speculative hopes, or dangerous terrain and topography, by 
1800, over 271,000 people had bypassed western Virginia in favor of settling in the 
newly created state of Kentucky, the Northwest Territory, and Indiana Territory.94 
Between 1800 and 1810, the population of Kanawha County rose from 3,229 to 3,866 
people, an increase of 19.7 percent.95 Meanwhile Kentucky, bordered by the Ohio River, 
experienced particularly rapid growth. Between 1790 and 1800, the western regions of 
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Virginia, which eventually became Kentucky, swelled from just under 74,000 people to 
over 221,000.96 By 1810, that number would nearly double. 
From the Bluegrass to the Northwestern Territories, raising, slaughtering and 
preserving livestock, as well as farming for outside markets drove the economy.97  
American markets made up only part of the commercial network that Ohio Valley 
residents served. Merchants in Lexington, Kentucky benefitted from lucrative contracts 
with the Governor of Spanish Louisiana to supply the Spanish government with salted 
meat.98 The Ohio Valley farmers and ranchers were creating tremendous quantities of 
provisions. In the Kentucky Gazette on May 18, 1795, James Morrison advertised that he 
had 30,000 pounds of pork “for the southern trade.”99 In 1801, a list of commodities 
shipped from Louisville included 92,300 pounds of pork, 91,300 pounds of bacon, 14,860 
pounds of dried beef, 2,587 pounds of butter and 8,718 pounds of biscuits (probably 
hardtack).100  
All these items required copious quantities of salt. Local newspapers often 
advertised large amounts of salt to be bought or sold. In April of 1788, Annie Christian 
advertised that she had a “large quantity of quality salt for sale in Lincoln County.”101 
The following month John Clerk announced that he needed four or five wagons to pick 
up salt from Bullitt’s Lick. In exchange for hauling the salt, the wagon owners could have 
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one third of what they hauled.102 As the abattoir for the United States, Spanish Louisiana, 
and the Caribbean, the Ohio River Valley required vast amounts of the essential mineral. 
By 1790, the major salt licks of the Bluegrass all had salt-works associated with 
them. At Bullitt’s Lick, probably the largest and most advanced of the Ohio Valley salt-
works at the time, brine flowed from shallow wells through wooden trenches to furnaces. 
The furnaces were long mortared slate trenches with a fire box at one end and a chimney 
at the other. Atop the furnaces sat up to sixty iron kettles holding twenty-two gallons of 
brine each. The success of the salt-works there eventually left the area devoid of timber, 
forcing workers to move the furnaces to a new location and pipe the brine to the more 
remote furnaces. A town sprang up on the site for the 800 employees who eventually 
worked there.103 At times, local salt suppliers sought to control the markets in their 
immediate vicinities by withholding supplies when the prices dropped.  
Kentucky lawmakers responded to the commercial demands for abundant salt 
supplies. On December 18, 1801, they created a law stating, “Whereas it is of the utmost 
importance to the good of this Commonwealth that the owners of saltlicks or occupiers 
thereof, should be able to manufacture salt with as much ease as possible and thereby 
have the power to sell it on good terms…”104 The act allowed salt-makers imminent 
domain to cross over privately owned lands in order to reach the closest suitable wood for 
their furnaces. It also allowed him the right to cross any private lands in order to ship his 
product.  
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Just upriver in the Kanawha Valley, population increases and commerce were less 
robust. As late as 1810, large land holders continued to hinder migration to the valley. In 
The Navigator, Zadok Cramer’s guide to traveling the major waterways leading to the 
Ohio Valley, Cramer noted that “The banks of the river (Kanawha) the bottoms on each 
side are rich and extensive and tolerably settled except for those large tracts of land 
owned by the heirs of the late General George Washington, which are held at ten dollars 
per acre, a price too high it is thought for advantageous purchases.”105 Ten years later, in 
1820, Andrew Parks and his wife Harriot agreed to pay Lawrence Augustine Washington 
$600.00 each January 1 for three consecutive years beginning in 1821, followed by a 
payment of $8,500.00 in 1828 in exchange for a significant land tract on the Kanawha 
River.106 George Washington’s niece and nephew Harriot and Lawrence were significant 
heirs to the late President’s estate.  
Despite the Washington family’s continued faith in the financial reward to come 
from the Kanawha Valley, some speculators’ hopes for profits faded in the face of 
disappointing demand and troublesome tax obligations. Still, some Virginians eyeing 
western counties found those large tract holders willing to sell at agreeable rates. One of 
the first to buy land for personal use rather than speculation was Joseph Ruffner. 
Following a disastrous 1794 fire on his Shenandoah Valley farm, Ruffner purchased land 
originally patented in 1775 by Colonel John Dickinson, a prosperous Shenandoah Valley 
neighbor of the Clendenin family who, like Clendenin, patented the land after his service 
at the Battle of Point Pleasant. 
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The terms of the sale, structured much like the later Parks-Washington bond, illuminate 
the sophisticated nature of the agreement and foreshadow the role of commercial salt 
production in the region. On October 13, 1795, Ruffner agreed to pay £600 in exchange 
for the 502 acres at the mouth of Campbell’s Creek, including a salt lick there.107 
Additionally, Ruffner agreed to three conditional bonds. In these, he committed to “exert 
all pains and Industry” to make salt at the spring. Each of these bonds required Ruffner to 
pay Dickinson, his heirs, or his executors £1,000 in salt at current values for every 10 
bushel amount up to 30, which could be boiled in a 24 hour period. If Ruffner produced 
more than ten bushels, he need not pay more than one bond annually, and interest would 
not accrue on outstanding bonds.108 Under such terms, the successful pursuit of salt could 
have created a significant liability for Ruffner. The bond in exchange for salt was not 
officially part of the sale agreement, which discusses only the exchange of £600 in 
Virginia money for the 502 acres. There is, however, little doubt that Ruffner dashed any 
hope of salt-based royalties for Dickinson.  
Colonel Dickinson’s estimation of the value of salt on the western frontier was 
prescient. His vision for the commercial future of the valley coincided with that of other 
early speculators. The importance that he placed on the role of salt in particular was 
informed by his own experience as a resident of the American colonial frontier. Unlike 
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other speculators such as George Washington, Dickinson was personally familiar with 
life removed from coastal salt sources, whether domestically created or imported. The 
indispensable commodity raised concerns and fanned the smoldering embers of sectional 
tension in the backcountry regions not blessed with salt licks. 
The divisive nature of salt distribution and pricing on the inland frontiers took 
center stage during the tariff debates of the first congress in 1789. While duties on 
imports to the financially troubled nation polarized federal representatives, the prospect 
of salt duties raised concerns great enough to precipitate predictions of civil disorder on 
the frontiers. South Carolina representative Aedanus Burke began his speech to the 
representatives by stating that he “need not remind the committee that this article is a 
necessary of life, nor that black cattle, sheep and horses do not thrive without it.” He 
continued, “likewise I know also that it is a tax particularly odious to the inhabitants of 
South Carolina and Georgia to whom the price is already excessively great.” The South 
Carolinian went on to argue that “The back parts of the state are obliged to haul all that 
they consume two, three or 400 miles in waggons [sic] for which they pay 7s 6d starting, 
add to this the first cost which is about 1s. though sometimes more and you will find the 
burden sustained by those remote from the sea shore sufficiently unequal.”109 Thomas 
Scott of Pennsylvania agreed, likening salt to water and common air. He suggested that 
such a tariff would “prove too much” and that transporting salt from the coast was a 
burdensome tax already born by frontier residents.110 John Lawrence (Laurence) 
responded that frontier denizens did not use imported candles, clothes, or tea, so they 
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avoided duties that coastal residents paid and thus should at least pay a salt duty.111 
Thomas Tucker pointed out another salt related reality of life removed from the coast. 
Inland cattle required more salt to thrive than their counterparts closer to the sea, as the 
vegetation upon which they fed contained less salt.112 William L. Smith of South 
Carolina announced that the frontier people of his state were suspect of the new 
government. For this reason, a duty on salt should be avoided in hopes of pacifying up-
country Carolinians. To this, the New Yorker Lawrence tartly suggested that since 
frontier Carolinians would not support the government either way, legislators may as well 
do what they pleased.113 As one of the earliest European residents settling the 
Shenandoah Valley, Dickinson knew the challenges and expenses involved in obtaining 
enough salt for his family, workers, and livestock to survive far from more plentiful 
coastal supplies. This also may indicate why he showed the foresight to arrange for 
mineral royalties in conjunction with the agreement to sell with his salt-laden Kanawha 
lands.  
Despite the threat of sectional unrest, the federal government instituted salt tariffs 
in an effort to raise crucial funds while promoting domestic production. In 1789, 
legislators levied a $0.06 per bushel tariff on imported salt. The following year, domestic 
producers were pleased to learn that the tariff had been doubled to $0.12 per bushel. 
Seven years later, Congress increased the tax to $0.20 per bushel, further rewarding 
American salt-makers for their industry with significant protection from English and 
Caribbean salt. Nevertheless, in 1790, as the import tax doubled, 2,337,920 bushels of 
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foreign salt entered the US through official channels.114  It is unknown to what degree salt 
smuggled from the salt-producing islands of the Caribbean would have increased this 
number. There certainly was incentive to smuggle Caribbean island salt since many 
considered Caribbean salt preferable to domestic salt for many purposes, as evidenced by 
the higher price it commanded in the markets.115 
White settlers of the Ohio River Valley may not have favored their legislators’ 
efforts to support domestic salt production, but the matter was complicated. Changes in 
tariffs had varying effects. Naturally, it elevated the price of salt. While residents of the 
towns and farms that grew in unison may have disliked the increased salt prices that 
resulted from the federal tariffs, drops in tariffs could have a troublesome effect as well. 
In a specie-short frontier, salt was a commodity that most readily converted to cash and 
oiled the wheels of commerce. Merchants and traders purchased supplies of salt at salt-
works prior to setting off on a trip much as one would stop at a bank before travelling 
today. At times, complicated deals required several trips to salt-works to exchange goods 
for salt before the final trade was actually made.116  The tariffs, in effect, held up the 
value of their frontier assets, especially relative to currency of the East. 
Despite the strong demand for salt and protective tariffs, Joseph Ruffner 
proceeded to farm the land he acquired from Dickinson as well as 900 acres he purchased 
from George and William Clendenin, allegedly failing to honor his obligation to produce 
salt.117 The elder Ruffner may have failed to pursue salt-making for a variety of reasons. 
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The 1801 Kanawha County tax records list six Ruffner households with only Joseph’s 
son David Ruffner owning a slave.118 The 1800 census for Kanawha County is 
unavailable, but the 1810 census lists six slaves and 17 prime working age white males 
spread among seven different households.119 Despite inevitable changes in the number of 
working age adults in that ten year span, it remains evident that while the Ruffners had 
been prosperous in the Shenandoah Valley, they did not control vast supplies of labor. 
Joseph Ruffner may also have held with the common belief that the brine that bubbled to 
ground along the Kanawha was too weak for commercial salt production. The hefty 
royalties that would be due Dickinson may also have led Ruffner to consider salt 
production a poor use of his resources. In 1876, local chronicler J. P. Hale suggested that 
the “attention to clearing and improving the farm diverted Ruffner’s attention for a time, 
from the salt project; the delay was fatal so far as he was concerned;  he did not live to 
execute his pet scheme or realize his cherished hopes.”120 Having been a farmer and 
miller in the Shenandoah Valley, he likely decided that farming the rich bottom lands 
surrounding the Kanawha River and Campbell’s Creek was a more immediate concern. 
The economic rewards probably seemed surer. He may also have calculated that keeping 
all the rewards of farming activities would prove more profitable than the less familiar 
work of salt-making and paying Col. Dickinson royalties. 
Not all subscribed to the notion that Kanawha brines were too weak to merit 
anything but household exploitation. In 1797, as salt tariffs rose to $0.20 per bushel, 
Ruffner leased at least part of the land he had purchased from Dickinson to Elisha 
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Brooks.121 Little appears to be known about Brooks. He shows up on the 1801 Kanawha 
County tax lists as having no horses, no slaves, and as the only adult male in the 
household. He later is counted in the 1810 Kanawha County census with a household that 
included what may have been his spouse, four young children, and no slaves.122 By 1820, 
there are no Brooks households listed in the county census. Regardless of the lack of 
information about him in the Kanawha County public records, Brooks made his mark on 
the region when he embarked on commercial salt production, despite ideas about the 
local brine’s commercial potential. Until then, local salt production had consisted of 
individuals digging pits or sumps near a salt lick to collect pools of brine that seeped to 
the surface. Settlers then scooped up the brine with buckets, boiled it in their household’s 
iron kettle, collected the residual salt, and sold any extra to their neighbors.123 Some 
exerted complete control over the brine seepages and monopolized the immediate area’s 
salt supply.124 In the first of many salt industry innovations to grow out of the valley, 
Brooks expanded on this model and developed a more efficient method of obtaining brine 
and creating salt from the riverside marshes. Brooks sank hollowed log segments into the 
salt marsh to a depth of approximately ten feet, where he found stronger brine than on the 
surface. After brine leached into the hollows, Brooks employed a sweep with a bucket to 
dip brine from the hollow of the logs.125 It is unclear if Brooks developed this innovative 
use of hollow logs to collect cleaner brine or if he appropriated practices employed by 
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Native Americans on the site. In 1837, the American Magazine of Useful and 
Entertaining Knowledge reported of the salt marshes, “at this spot, several hollow logs, or 
gums, were found sunk into the gravel at the margin of the river, and probably placed 
there by the Indians, as they had every mark of great antiquity.”126 It would require rather 
little time for hollow logs pressed into a marsh to weather thoroughly, so the gums may 
not have predated Brooks’ efforts. 
Regardless of the origins of the idea, Brooks created the valley’s first salt-works 
in the Kanawha region. Brooks built a long, stone, wood-burning oven with the fire box 
at one end and a chimney at the other end. Between them, he set two rows of kettles, 
eventually 24 in all, to reduce the brine that he had lifted from the logs using a bucket and 
sweep. Brooks made no efforts to clarify the brine or otherwise remove impurities in the 
liquid brought up from the gum. As a result, the salt contained the dried residue of 
impurities and minerals present in the brine. The resulting crystals were not white, but red 
due to the presence of carbonate of iron which turned blood red when heated.127 The 
carbonate of iron also imparted a decidedly metallic taste to the salt.128  
In this manner, Brooks created 150 pounds of salt per day, which he sold locally 
for $0.10 per pound.129  At a weight of approximately 50 pounds per bushel, Brooks 
created salt worth $15.00 per day from his two dozen kettles. There are no known records 
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suggesting that Brooks entertained ideas of holding a local monopoly on salt. Indeed, 
given that he did not own the land upon which he manufactured the red salt and that salt-
works soon arose five miles up and down the river, it seems unlikely that he could have 
realistically planned a local monopoly.  
It also remains unclear whether Ruffner collected a dividend on Brooks’ 
production. With production between two and three bushels of salt per day, Brooks’ 
operation clearly fell well short of the production targets that Dickinson had in mind for 
Ruffner. Ruffner may have realized that a salt-works on the scale of the bond to which he 
had agreed would have been a significant undertaking that left him parting with a good 
deal of any profits in the form of royalties to Dickinson. 
After Joseph Ruffner died in 1803, his will pressed his sons to earnestly set about 
salt-making within one year of his death on the property purchased from Dickinson. This 
enjoiner could be construed to support Hale’s suggestion that the more immediate need to 
produce food postponed the salt-making dreams of the elder Ruffner.130  Regardless, 
Joseph Ruffner specified in his will that if salt-making attempts proved profitable, the 
money was to be divided into six shares, one going to each of the four younger sons, two 
shares to be given to the eldest son, Abraham. If unprofitable, the land was to be sold and 
£750 of the proceeds given to Abraham.131 Younger brothers David and Joseph made 
some apparently desultory efforts to find strong brine and soon declared the property 
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worthless. Nevertheless, executors would not sell the land, possibly to protect themselves 
from liability in the future.  
In October 1805, the executors of Dickinson’s estate sued Joseph Ruffner’s estate 
alleging that he willfully failed to meet the terms of the bond that he had signed as part of 
the land purchase agreement with Dickinson. Ruffner’s children defended their father’s 
estate, arguing that he had expended great efforts to extract profitable brine from the 
property. Dickinson’s executors produced a deposition from a Brooks employee stating 
that Brooks had actually produced between seven and nine bushels of salt every twenty-
four hours, and that with a larger furnace, twenty or more bushels could have been 
produced daily. Furthermore, Brooks’ employee claimed that the departed Ruffner had 
obstructed Brooks’ extractive efforts in small ways with Joseph Ruffner Sr. supposedly 
claiming that Brooks’ success would “ruin him.”132 Presumably Ruffner feared that 
Dickinson would offer Brooks’ success in finding brine and manufacturing salt as 
evidence that Ruffner intentionally failed to honor the terms of his commitment to 
Dickinson. In 1806, Abraham Ruffner, despite the legal wrangling, sold his portion of his 
father’s estate to Andrew Donally Jr., including the Dickinson tract, for £750. This was 
exactly the amount that Joseph Ruffner Senior’s will specified for Abraham if salt water 
was not found on the property.133  
The importance of the sums at stake in the original agreement is underscored by 
Colonel Dickinson’s will which reinforces Dickinson’s attainment of some degree of 
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wealth in Bath County. The document, written July 3, 1797, arranges for the dispersal of 
household goods and other property including, “7 featherbeds, kitchen and household 
furniture, old waggon [sic] and 4 pair gears, 4 ploughs, horses 6, cattle 34, hogs 11, sheep 
6, Negroes Harry, Bill, Tom, Peter, Bill and Jonathan.”134 Dickinson also arranged to 
divide over 3,700 acres of farm and timber tracts between his wife and children. These 
lands did not include the various farms and fields that he specified by name rather than by 
acreage. Even in the estate of a man as prosperous as Dickinson, the Ruffner debt was 
significant enough to merit specific attention. The will articulates this as such: 
Joseph Ruffner’s bond: 1) 400 pounds to Adam and John each to build a house, 
with their mother to have a convenient part of either of the m as she may chose to 
live in; 2) bond of $1,000 pounds worth of salt [sic], 300 pounds to my sopoesed 
[sic] daughter Catherine Humphries and 100 pounds to her son John, to my sister 
Mary Davis or to her grandson John Littlepage 100 pounds, to niece Abigail 
McClung 100 pounds if in case her husband William makes me or by heirs any 
reasonable part or satisfaction for my former right of the meddow [sic] lands where 
he now lives, if not to daughters Nancy and Jean, balance of bond to the daughters 
and Adam and John; bond of 1,000 pounds worth of salt, 700 to wife and six 
children, balance to grandsons John, son of Samuel Shrewsbury, John son of John 
Shrewsbury, and John son of Joseph Kinkade.135  
 
Colonel Dickinson’s will offers a number of insights. Dickinson’s aspirations for 
Kanawha Valley salt extended beyond serving as a local salt producer or even the local 
producer. Even for a prosperous man, the payoff was large. The will also suggests that 
Dickinson held doubts about the likelihood that Ruffner would keep his word. Whereas 
bequests to his “trusty son” and his “dear and loving wife” are made from proceeds 
outside of the Ruffner debt, “supoesed” children and relatives who fail to offer 
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satisfaction for the loss of use of meadows are paid only if Ruffner pays. The will also 
provides a clue as to why some of the Ruffner children may have finally sought salt so 
intently. If Ruffner’s salt was to provide multiple houses and various payments in cash 
and salt to Dickinson heirs, the obligation Joseph Ruffner had left his children could have 
been troublingly significant.  
After Brooks’ proven success at salt-making, the sale of the Dickinson tract 
coincided with the emergence of the Ruffner brothers’ serious pursuit of salt on their own 
land.136 In their quest for the mineral, Joseph Ruffner’s sons, David and Joseph, created 
what oil drilling expert John Brantly described in his 1971 compendium of the oil drilling 
industry as “one of the three most important wells drilled in America.”137 The Ruffner’s 
efforts earned such lasting importance for multiple reasons. Earlier wells had been dug, 
not drilled. Their Kanawha brine well is the first known well hemisphere to have been 
drilled rather than dug.138 The second reason for the extraordinary nature of their 
industrial achievement rests on “the ‘invention’ and development of well drilling tools 
and practices, which became almost immediately the standard used by many other well 
drillers in the new salt industry.”139 A mere dozen years after George Clendenin became 
the first white settler to move to the valley, Joseph and David Ruffner embarked on 
industrial developments which propelled the valley to a status even greater than the 
commercial dreams of the original Kanawha investors. Moreover, they began a pattern of 
industrialization and technological innovation which persisted until the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
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On a parcel of land adjoining the Dickinson tract that Ruffner Sr. had purchased, 
the brothers finally began pursuing salt in earnest. The increased diligence in pursuit of 
salt arose from the economic health of the father’s estate. David Ruffner’s son Henry, 
who eventually became president of Washington College (now Washington and Lee), 
recalled that his family had worked “at sinking hollow sycamore trees into the mud, until 
we were all sick of it, but my father was deeply in debt and it was sink or nothing.”140 It 
is little wonder that Ruffner remembers the exhaustion of sinking gums, for it was 
arduous and unpleasant work. 
A gum was a large sycamore log, which men laboriously hollowed out. Earlier in 
his salt-works, Brooks made use of ten-foot long sycamore logs. The Ruffners used 
longer logs, fifteen to eighteen feet long. Regardless of the log length, creating gums 
required sycamores of considerable age. Throughout the length of the log, the interior 
space needed to be large enough to accommodate a man and his tools, approximately 
three and a half to four feet in diameter. Men chipped and bored at the inside of the tree 
until its walls were a mere three to four inches thick. Workers beveled the ends of the 
gum outward to help it cut into the riverbed. Thus prepared, the gum was ready for the 
arduous process of sinking.141 
Even years later, the process of sinking gums remained much as it had been when 
Brooks and the Ruffners made their first efforts. Ann Royall, in her 1826 book, Royall’s 
Sketches of History, Life and Manners in the United States, gives a detailed explanation 
of the process of gum-sinking. Royall explains, “about twenty hands repair to the place 
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where it is to be sunk, which is at the ledge of the low water on the river.”142 Men heaved 
the gum into place and held it standing upright on its wide end. A series of parallel beams 
were crisscrossed to hold the gum upright. Workers then constructed a platform which 
rested on the gum. This served both as the work platform and as a weight which helped 
force the log into the earth. Next to the platform, a sweep of approximately fifty feet 
balanced on a forked post. To the sweep, workers attached a large bucket suspended from 
a slender pole which would reach down into the bottom of the gum. At this point the truly 
arduous work began.143 
According to Royall, “a man is then let down into it by windlass, and digs around 
the edge with an instrument suited for the purpose; when he fills his bucket with sand, 
gravel or earth, which he meets in succession; the bucket is immediately drawn up, 
emptied and let down again, and so on till the gum descends to a rock, which is uniformly 
at the same distance.”144 If the dark and claustrophobic working environment inside the 
tree trunk was not troublesome enough, the cold added to the misery. Royall wrote that 
“no man can remain in it longer than twenty or thirty minutes, owing to the excessive 
cold that exists at the bottom…”145 The cold was undoubtedly exacerbated by the 
constant flow of the Kanawha River and icy brine spring water into the hole. When 
diggers emerged from the gum after their brief shift, Royall reports that they were 
“unable to stand, and shiver as if they would shake to pieces; it can hardly be told 
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whether they are black or white, their blood being so completely chilled.”146  Sinking 
gums was arduous work to be dreaded. 
There appears to be little evidence to suggest whether blacks or whites were more 
likely to work beneath the river, inside the gums. The nature of the work might suggest 
that it was more likely relegated to slaves. Royall’s statement that she could not 
distinguish between the races of the diggers suggests that men of both races toiled within 
the gums. Tax records indicate that Brooks owned no slaves. 147 Census records indicate 
that of the seven Ruffner households in the county, one household owned a single slave. 
148  This suggests that perhaps whites performed the cold and unpleasant work. However, 
as historians Charles Dew, Robert Olwell, Robert Starobin, and others have illuminated, 
slavery was a flexible institution, capable of being manipulated to suit the specific and 
immediate needs of those in control.149 Slaves may well have been rented locally on a 
short term basis for the grueling work.  
In November 1815, David Ruffner described his and Joseph’s initial search for 
brine after their father’s death. “We were desirous to see the effect of sinking large 
sycamore gums as low as we could force them. We found great difficulty in this on 
account of the water coming in so rapidly. When we got eighteen feet below the surface 
of the river, we discovered that our gums lodged on a solid smooth freestone rock- and 
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the water was but little improved as we descended.”150 The significant investment in 
sinking gums down until they reached solid rock did not assure men of rewards. The 
brothers would come to find that sinking the gum was only the beginning of the quest for 
stronger brine. In the dogged pursuit of salt through solid rock, the Ruffners and other 
Kanawhans developed tools and techniques which remain the technological base of oil 
and gas exploration.151 
The initial challenge in pursuing salt through rock was presented by the 
subterranean fresh water that flowed into the gum because they could not seal the gap 
between the gum and the rock. It was impossible to determine if they were encountering 
saltier water as fresh water flowed in between the gaps between the gum and the rock. By 
cutting, trimming, wedging, and shimming around the bottom of the gum, the Ruffners 
managed to stop the flow of water through the gaps.152 As water seeped slowly from the 
rock below, David and Joseph were disappointed to find that it was fresh, not salty. After 
this setback, the brothers began the arduous task of sinking another gum 100 yards away, 
but this too yielded water of insufficient salinity. 153 
On their third attempt at a site far closer to the original Brooks salt-works, the 
brothers finally met with some hard earned success. They sank their gum until they hit 
solid rock.154 After sealing the gaps between the gum and the rock, the brothers 
determined that the liquid seeping from the rock beneath was indeed saltier. Despite the 
lack of precedent for piercing rock eighteen feet below a river, the brothers pressed on. 
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Their predecessor, Brooks, had already created a salt-works capable of significant brine 
production given sufficient boiler capacity. Nevertheless, the Ruffners persisted, driven 
by debt, and perhaps by a larger commercial vision that required greater efficiency than 
that needed to supply merely the isolated Kanawha Valley community. 
The Ruffner brothers appear to have had some rudimentary knowledge of stone 
quarrying. At the time, quarry workers were capable of gouging holes in stone several 
feet deep to receive explosives. The brothers deduced that they could drill deeper into the 
rock in a similar fashion by creating longer drill bits. They fashioned a long iron shaft 
with a 2.5 inch chisel bit and then attached the end of the shaft to a spring pole which 
supplied the upward power. Men with ropes assisted by gravity provided the downward 
thrusts which dug away at the stone at the bottom of the gum.155  
At 17 feet below the gum, they struck a fissure in the rock that prompted an 
encouraging increase in the salinity and flow of the brine.156 Encouraged by this 
development, they welded longer shafts of iron to the drill shaft and continued drilling 
until the hole extended 28 feet below the gum where they obtained samples of even 
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stronger brine. 157 Finally, at a depth of 58 feet below the top of the gum, the Ruffners and 
their crew struck a level at which strong brine flowed freely.158  
Faced with retrieving brine from such a depth through a shaft only inches wide, 
the Kanawhans had little choice but to devise their own methods of bringing the brine to 
the surface. The solution they found was to create two, forty-foot long wooden half pipes, 
which they placed together to form a tube and wrapped the entire length tightly with 
twine. They fashioned a sealed plank cap for the bottom of the gum. After fitting the cap, 
they drilled a three inch diameter hole through it. The Ruffners then inserted the pipe they 
had created through the hole and down into the shaft they had so laboriously and 
ingeniously drilled. In order to keep fresh water from flooding into the brine at the 
bottom of the well, the brothers devised a method of sealing the bottom of the pipe in the 
base of the well. They filled a small leather bag with seeds and wrapped it around the end 
of the pipe. When the bag was in place, the seeds absorbed waters and swelled, sealing 
the gaps between the pipe and the hole they had drilled.159 The brothers’ inventive 
solution succeeded admirably. Strong cold brine flowed freely up through the tube and 
filled the gum. On the site of their first successful well, the Ruffner Brothers built a 
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furnace much like the furnace Brooks had earlier, only larger. On February 8, 1808, the 
brothers harvested their first batch of salt, and sold it for $0.04 per pound, roughly half 
what Elisha Brooks had sold his salt for nearly a decade earlier.160 
The Ruffners achieved extraordinary accomplishments. One historian of the 
region observed, “Thus bored and tubed and rigged and worked, the first rock bored salt 
well west of the Alleghenies if not the United States. The wonder is not that it required 18 
months or more to prepare, bore and complete this well for use, but rather that it was 
accomplished at all under the circumstances.”161 The remarkable depth to which David 
and Joseph pursued stronger brine suggests that perhaps the vision toward which they 
labored lay beyond the narrow Kanawha River Valley. While their motivation was 
clearly economic in nature, the brothers also drove forward pressed by a sense of 
curiosity and a zest for problem solving. Ruffner’s achievements are indicative of a 
broader vision of technological and economic possibilities. Their realization of these 
possibilities created the platform on which industrial technologies would be built for 
more than a century. Of more immediate importance, their work served as the foundation 
from which the Kanawha Valley salt-makers influenced the growth of the American 
Great West. 
While the supply and value of salt fluctuated with the changing tariff policies of 
the federal government in the decades to come, the real impetus to the Ohio Valley salt 
economy came not from Washington D. C. but from the Kanawha Valley. While the 
Ruffner brothers’ advances in drilling technology and salt-making became a standard in 
the industry regardless of where Americans created salt from brine, the Kanawha Valley 
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enjoyed advantages which would, in time, allow it to dwarf and often destroy salt 
producers elsewhere. Its workers were generally the enslaved, offering Kanawha Valley 
producers labor cost advantages. The valley also had a readily available, inexpensive, and 
plentiful alternate supply of fuel available when men exhausted the supply of timber. 
Perhaps more than anything, as the Ruffners had fervently hoped, they had stronger brine. 
Kentucky brine generally required 1,000 gallons to make a bushel of salt. Ohio’s 
significant Scioto Salt-works required only 500 gallons to produce a bushel. The U.S. 
Saline in Wabash required just 180 gallons of brine per bushel. After the Ruffner 
brothers’ drilling achievement, they reached brine which required only 100 gallons to 
create a bushel of salt.162 These advantages, some detestable, others natural and 
fortuitous, gave the Kanawha Valley’s budding industrial captains a significant advantage 
over their competition. However, these advantages alone did not propel these 
Appalachians to the forefront of the industry. The Kanawha Valley salt-makers’ pattern 
of relentless innovation in technology, the environment, and commerce indelibly shaped 
their valley and the nation. 
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Chapter 3: Relentless Innovation 
 
 
 On February 25, 1829, the Western Virginian announced, “By throwing bodies of 
salt water and coal of very good quality together upon a navigable stream leading to an 
almost illiqutable [sic] future market for salt, nature has provided to a certain extent, an 
exclusive staple…already in demand to the west.”163 With this pronouncement, the 
Western Virginian added to the steady stream of enthusiastic assessments touting the 
remarkably rich opportunities offered by a valley holding extraordinary natural wealth. 
Newspapers trumpeted the valley’s nearly supernatural good fortune, blessed with 
“inexhaustible” mineral wealth, sited just upstream from urban centers with equally 
boundless needs for Kanawha Valley products.164 While those who promoted the natural 
wealth of the Kanawha Valley may have gushed a bit, valley landowners did indeed 
control great mineral wealth on the fringes of Ohio Valley commercial and industrial 
centers. However, these odes to the valley’s natural bounty fail to account for the human 
component that forced commercial visions into reality, namely, tenacious and restless 
ingenuity.  
 The Kanawha salt industry thrived, nourished by an environment of unflagging 
commercial flexibility, imagination, and innovation. Salt-makers there carried forth these 
same qualities that the Ruffner brothers relied on when they became the first to drill 
through solid rock beneath the powerful river. The emerging industrialists constantly 
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scanned their surroundings for opportunities. The reconnaissance of their environment 
stretched from broad horizons to intimate minutia. Their appraisals of and responses to 
threats and opportunities showed the disregard for convention which often marks the 
entrepreneurial spirit. However, salt-makers just as quickly resorted to extreme 
conservatism when they felt that it would suit their purposes best. They were, above all, 
opportunistic businessmen.  
 The early industrialists applied their commercial efforts across a wide variety of 
fields, seeking to influence their legislative, legal, social, technological, natural, and of 
course, economic environments. They took broad, inclusive, and flexible views of their 
assets, and more importantly, potential assets. This perspective predominated as they 
encountered problems and sought solutions to those problems. Economic concerns drove 
much of the innovation. At the same time, salt-making, as an extractive industry, 
unsurprisingly fostered innovations which responded to environmental challenges and 
opportunities. Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis effectively conveys the ubiquity of the 
environment in the development of the Great West. In light of this book, one could argue 
that Kanawha Valley innovation arose from the environmental influences as much as 
economics.165 
Despite the challenges involved, some framework for examining Kanawha Valley 
innovation must be imposed in order to derive a focused impression. To this end, the 
examples of flexibility and ingenuity may be categorized by the origins of the challenges 
and opportunities that prompted the changes or innovations. Innovations and novel 
approaches that developed in response to challenges presented by natural resources or the 
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mechanics of reducing brine tended to be production-oriented. Innovations that 
responded to legislative and transportation related catalysts tended to involve the sales 
and distribution of the finished product. This correlation does not always hold true. 
Several areas from which catalysts arose, including competition and labor, staunchly defy 
this trend. Challenges originating from these areas prompted innovative developments 
and flexible responses in every arena. Indeed, it would have been uncharacteristic of 
valley salt-makers to fail to take a holistic approach to any challenge or opportunity. Like 
Joel Shrewsbury, who left Bedford County Virginia intent on salt-making, but equipped 
to engage in farming, milling, timbering, iron smithing, and tobacco brokering, Kanawha 
businessmen rarely viewed threats, solutions, and opportunities in narrow or 
compartmentalized spheres.166 Exploring innovations and creative solutions that 
responded to events in the technical, legislative, competitive, and labor arenas provides 
an understanding of the context in which early Kanawha salt-makers operated, and thus 
illuminates the scope of their perspective. 
While the process of salt production may have been simple at its core, scooping 
up brine from the marshes and boiling it down in iron pots, the drive for the greater 
efficiencies required for large-scale production necessitated tremendous technological 
ingenuity and flexibility. One of the earliest troubles salt-makers faced involved drilling 
for brine. As the Ruffners showed, reaching strong brine required considerable 
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determination and risk. Patience, time, and capital often stretched thin as drillers sought 
strong brine flowing at a rate sufficient to support one or more furnaces.167 In 1810, the 
Kanawha Valley produced 740,000 bushels of salt.168 At an average of 100 gallons of 
brine per bushel, this required 74 million gallons of brine even as the industry was in its 
infancy.169 After drillers guessed at the correct location to drill, often incorrectly, the 
drilling process could yield more problems than brine. A correct guess as to where brine 
lay might not remain correct as brine flow increased or decreased with rises and drops in 
river levels. Returning to drill a formerly productive well was no small task.  Drillers 
required an array of bits which they constantly exchanged and carried to the closest 
smithy for reshaping and sharpening. This was laborious, but there were far more 
troublesome aspects to the drilling.  
 On June 13, 1815, Joel Shrewsbury wrote to his partner, William Dickinson, 
“Boring proceeds well cutting [sic] from one to two feet per day.” However, he 
ominously added that the person who sold them their interest in the land “had struck no 
water for thirty or forty feet previous his quitting the gum, his parade was to get us to buy 
him out at a high price.”170 Shrewsbury deemed the efforts at that particular gum fruitless 
and moved to a different site. On September 29, he reported, “The old Englishman 
commenced boring last Monday as is very masterly fixed, boring from 12 to 15 inches 
per day.”171 Throughout October of 1815, Shrewsbury reassured his partner that drilling 
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was proceeding with promising signs of salt water. In November, signs seemed so 
promising that Shrewsbury purchased tin with which to line the well before testing the 
brine strength. Shrewsbury wrote, “The old man is going to make a tube and try the 
water, which if good shall sell the tin tube and procure a copper one.”172 Valley salt-
makers who had begun excluding fresh water by making wooden tubes bound with twine 
had upgraded to tin tubes which were riveted together and just as quickly progressed to 
using copper tubing with screw joints. Tougher steel pipes with screw joints eventually 
followed the copper tubing.173 Frustratingly for Shrewsbury, the tubing did not proceed 
well. The tubing lodged in the well and was subsequently damaged.174 Once they had 
managed to remove the mangled tubing and refashion the metal to fit, it seems likely that 
Shrewsbury deemed the water not salty enough and chose to drill deeper. 
 On January 2, 1816, Shrewsbury reported, “River is over the gum- auger 
stuck.”175 After months of difficult and costly efforts sinking the gum and drilling the 
well, the drill became lodged in the solid rock and could not be dislodged, for on April 
15, 1816, Shrewsbury wrote that the “old gum is troublesome” and the “auger is stuck 
fast.”176 Into the spring, they struggled to remove the bit from the stone far below the 
river. On May 20, Shrewsbury finally conceded defeat and wrote to Dickinson “we will 
never be able to get the sinker bit out.”177 Drillers realized that removing the stones and 
gravel chipped off by the auger made the auger less likely to become wedged. To this 
end, the salt-makers created a primitive sand pump which evolved to entail copper tubing 
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with a one-way valve at the bottom. This allowed the stone to enter the tube and not 
escape, clearing the hole of debris. Despite the innovations, this problem continued to 
plague Kanawha Valley drillers until 1831 when local resident William Morris, “Uncle 
Billy” invented the slip jar bit, which remains integral to drilling to this day.178  
The slip jar bit consisted of two interlocked lengths of steel which could slide 
along each other’s length without separating, allowing the bit to contract and extend its 
length. On the downward thrust, the bit contracted, allowing for a strong strike which 
pierced the rock below. On the upward thrust, the slip bit helped avoid a bane of drillers 
work, wedged augers. The foot or more of play that Morris engineered into the bit 
through the sliding motion of the two steel pieces allowed the upward motion to gain 
momentum and roughly jerk the bit out of the stone.179 This small innovation highlights 
the ingenuity of early valley salt-makers. Like the transition of the man-powered spring 
pole to the horse powered treadmill to drive the drill, they were often evolutionary in 
nature, the culmination of frequent tinkering rather than radical, paradigm-shifting 
inventions. While improvements in the mechanics of salt-making served as the impetus 
for some Kanawhans’ creative innovations, environmental changes prompted what may 
have been the most radical developments in Kanawha salt-making.  
The earliest visitors to the Kanawha Valley marveled at the unspoiled beauty 
surrounding the river.180 However, by 1815, less than twelve years after their initial 
lifting of salt, David Ruffner bragged, “There are now established in operation here fifty-
                                                          
     178 J. P. Hale, “Salt” in Resources of West Virginia, ed. M.F. Maury and William M. Fontaine, 
(Wheeling, W.V.: Register Company, 1876), 286-287. 
     179 E. T. Crawford, “Salt-Pioneer Chemical Industry of the Kanawha Valley,” Industrial 
Engineering Chemistry (October-December 1935): 1112. 
     180 “A Description of the Valley of the Kanawha, by a Lowlander, in a Letter to a Friend,” 
Farmers’ Register, (January 1834); “Kenawha Salt-works” Niles Weekly Register 8, 1815. 
71 
 
two furnaces (and many are erecting) containing 40-60 kettles of 36 gallons each-all of 
which make 2500-3000 bushells [sic] of salt per day.” Ruffner then predicted that 
“Firewood, in the course of time, must become scarce or difficult to get-but stone coal 
may be used instead of it, and of this our supply is inexhaustible.”181 Ruffner did not have 
to look far into the future. By 1819, workers had stripped the hills of trees for twenty 
miles up and downriver from the salt-works. 182 Visitor Anne Royall described the scene 
around the Kanawha Valley and the salt-works, finding them “dismal looking places; the 
sameness of the long low sheds; smoking boilers; men, the roughest that can be seen, 
half-naked; hundreds of boat-men; horses and oxen, ill-used and beat by their drivers; the 
mournful screaking of the machinery, day and night; the bare, rugged inhospitable 
looking mountain from which all the timber has been cut, give it a gloomy 
appearance.”183 The deforestation of the valley held serious consequences for industry 
there.  
A variety of ancillary industries relied on timber as a primary resource. Hundreds 
of men worked in cooperages creating the white oak barrels into which men packed salt 
for shipment to the Ohio River Valley and beyond.184 Others worked as boat builders, 
creating the flatboats that carried the essential mineral downstream. The boats were 
subsequently sold downstream. Boatmen then trekked, often for weeks, back upriver after 
selling their cargo and their crafts.185 Hundreds more worked as carpenters building and 
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maintaining the salt-making facilities that included sheds, troughs, pipes and sluices, 
scaffolds, docks, and warehouses required for the growing industry.   
The letters of Joel Shrewsbury to William Dickinson repeatedly highlight the 
supreme importance of timber.186 Despite the fact that Shrewsbury left Bedford County, 
Virginia with the intent of farming, making salt, and opening a smithy, upon arrival he 
immediately put the slaves to work cutting wood for the salt furnace he anticipated 
operating. Shrewsbury reported to Dickinson, “I have taken our four fellows, viz Ben, 
Jim, David and Abram and have them employed at this time cuting [sic] up wood that is 
fell down on our lower place, which if we should ultimately fail to get Salt water I can 
sell at $2 per cord: I task them 1 ½ cords per day each…”187 Salt manufacturers often 
used their own workers to supply wood, but they also relied on teams of timber cutters 
who worked in exchange for salt, specie, credit, or bank notes.  
Even as he delayed building a furnace due to post war drops in salt prices, 
Shrewsbury continued to accumulate land for its timber. He amassed hundreds if not 
thousands of cords of wood which he refused to sell in preparation for salt-making. 
Competitors offered him the $2.00 per cord he had hoped for, still, he did not sell.188 It 
was not until cords of wood were beginning to rot that Dickinson and Shrewsbury agreed 
to sell any of it.189 Indeed, Shrewsbury indicated that ownership of a salt furnace required 
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ownership of enormous quantities of wood.190 Other salt-makers similarly sought control 
of timber and stored massive quantities of wood. 
The value of timber made it the object of theft and disputes. It should be noted, 
even given the value of timber, there are no evident records of disputes over timber 
devolving into the violence with which central and southern Appalachia is popularly 
credited. Rather, even early in the valley’s white history, salt-makers resorted to the 
courts to settle disputes. Shrewsbury reported that he “commenced suit …here vs. John 
Newgen, John See and Jarrett See for trespassing in cutting timberwood [sic] upon the 
2000 acres survey. They will pay whatever damages might be judged by disinterested 
men.”191 Just as Altina Waller found it important to point out that the Hatfields and 
McCoys used non-violent,  legal systems to work out their differences in order to dispel 
seemingly undying ideas of isolationist Appalachian violence, it is worth saying that the 
same was true in the Kanawha, even a half century earlier than Waller’s subjects.192 
Leases, sales, and agreements to operate salt furnaces generally included specific 
arrangements for firewood. After several failed attempts, Dickinson and Shrewsbury gave 
up on the site they had been drilling for brine. They purchased two acres nearby from 
Shrewsbury’s brothers and met with success on their third drilling attempt. After building 
a furnace, Dickinson-Shrewsbury chose to lease out their first salt furnace to several 
brothers named Leftwich. In the lease arrangement, Dickinson-Shrewsbury supplied the 
brine from their well and wood from their land. In exchange, Dickinson-Shrewsbury also 
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took a hefty percentage of the salt produced, 1,200 bushels of salt per month for each 50 
kettle furnace.193 In the end, Dickinson-Shrewsbury fared well in the arrangement. 
Shrewsbury, who had long been aware that his was the only side profiting from the 
agreement, seemed surprised and disgusted when the Leftwichs deserted the furnace in 
disarray and headed west before the lease’s term had finished.194 The Leftwich’s lease, 
which carefully described provisions for fuel and brine supplies yet left furnace owners 
Dickinson-Shrewsbury free from the actual salt production, provides another example of 
flexibility of the Kanawha businessmen. 
Some believed that owning the wood was not sufficient if it was not close to the 
river and close to the furnace. Wood cutters began cutting the timber closest to the 
Kanawha. Eventually, when they were compelled to cut farther afield, cutters sent wood 
tumbling down troughs to the salt-works.195 When Shrewsbury eventually decided to 
move their company’s drilling operation and construct a furnace, the new site lay a mile 
from their wood supply. Shrewsbury took pains to explain to his partner that though the 
distance to ship the wood seemed great, it would still be economically feasible. The 
proposed site was close to the cooperage and Shrewsbury argued, “I am not insensible of 
the cost attending to a furnace where wood is to be boated, but it is far better than to sell 
our wood.”196 The price offered was a secondary concern though. His primary reason for 
not selling the wood resonates with themes of land ownership and civil worth that have 
long held sway in America. Shrewsbury preferred not to sell his wood because “those 
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characters that generally buy wood here are renters and debts due them unsafe.”197 It 
seems that men who owned property could be trusted, those who rented could not. 
As Ruffner predicted in 1815, firewood did indeed become scarce. As he also 
foresaw, salt-makers turned to “stone coal” for their furnaces. Virginians had long known 
the value of the coal in the Kanawha Valley. On October 20, 1790, the Virginia Gazette 
announced for sale 10,000 acres of land on the Kanawha River “within an easy distance 
of an inexhaustible quantity of coal.”198 Salt-makers had been relying on surface coal and 
opening small banks of the combustible for use in the salt-works’ smithies for years, 
however, burning it in salt furnaces was not as simple as Ruffner had suggested. Cinders 
from the stone coal tended to fuse together in the extreme heat and form solid masses 
which were nearly impossible to remove from the furnaces.  
Virginians such as Harry Heth, whose family had operated coal mines and metal 
foundries in the Richmond Basin, and Beverly Randolph of Manchester, Virginia, a 
descendent from one of the first governors of the Old Dominion, formed a partnership to 
enter the salt business by constructing a coal-fired salt furnace in the Kanawha Valley. 
Virginians of the highest social ranks, Heth and Randolph hired New Englander 
Nathaniel Bosworth to produce his design for a coal-fired furnace in March 1815, just as 
the valley’s available supply of wood began to dwindle. Shrewsbury reported to 
Dickinson that “Their [sic] is another formidable attempt to manufacture Salt with Coal, 
made by Adams, Heth and Randolph… under the superintendence of a man by the name 
of Bozworth who is the inventor…”199  Shrewsbury and other salt-makers were clearly 
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watching this experiment closely. He continued, “the apparatus was very costly the 
boilers made of Sheet Iron in the shape of a gum about 3 feet in diameter, through which 
went a copper tube about 6 inches in diameter, the two boilers about 60 feet long, the 
steam that went thro [sic] the tubes in the boilers was to operate on two large copper pans 
for graining off the Salt in shape and size like a Billiard Table.” Despite the wherewithal 
of the backers, Shrewsbury tersely expressed other salt-makers’ predictions of failure, 
writing, “The plan is thought wilnot [sic] answer.”200 Even the smallest details of the 
enterprise were seemingly common knowledge, as Shrewsbury reported, “the 
preparations is very costly, will if completed cost $5000. to get into operation[sic], I was 
informed yesterday that the man who made the machinery at fort Pitt applied for payt 
[sic] his bill was about $3000. The company refused payt alledgeing[sic] if it should not 
answer,  Bozworth must pay. The grand effort Bozworth refused payt or being bound, the 
maker brot [sic] suit vs them.”201 The “formidable attempt” did not “answer” as salt-
makers predicted. The entire effort devolved into rancorous legal wrangling. A 
disillusioned Randolph complained that salt would never be profitably made using coal. 
Shrewsbury’s close attention to the enterprise and his understanding of how Bosworth 
intended the furnace to function suggest that others’ interest in the effort was not simply 
the scoffing curiosity of naysayers. Shrewsbury’s understanding of the experiment’s 
mechanics indicates an interest in technological change even if it was compelled by 
environmental exhaustion. 
In the end, salt-makers made the leap to coal-fired furnaces not due to ambitious 
and well-funded plans of the Tidewater gentry, but thanks to the practical tinkering of the 
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Ruffners once again. Earlier attempts at using coal in grateless furnaces consisted of 
shoveling coal into the furnaces at the opposite ends of the furnaces from the chimneys, 
resulting in large, fused masses of slag that workers could not remove. David and Tobias 
Ruffner developed the use of grates for the coal, but it was Henry Ruffner who truly 
solved the problem by injecting steam beneath the grates upon which the coal burned.202 
The small jets of steam prevented the slag from forming an impenetrable mass. Instead, 
the spent coal formed into gravel-like clinkers, easily shoveled out of the furnaces.203 
Over the next six years, valley salt-makers adapted their furnaces to burn coal. The 
transition did not occur until they had nearly deforested the valley. By then, the price of 
wood would have climbed to prohibitive price levels. The imminent lack of wood 
suggests that the switch to coal burning furnaces could not be described as a proactive 
move. Nevertheless, faced with few viable alternatives, Kanawhans invented the solution. 
 The switch to coal marked a major change in the valley environmentally, as the 
deforested hillsides, which had become largely valueless, proved valuable again for the 
ore they held. While initial efforts at coal removal consisted of men scrambling up the 
slopes and collecting it in baskets, workers soon developed systems of chutes or troughs 
to slide the coal down to the furnaces.204 One observer wrote that “by suitable platforms 
and in lined culverts, it (coal) is thrown from the mountain-side immediately to the door 
of the manufactory, or when more remote from the place of consumption, it is transported 
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with equal ease…”205 The inclusion of provisions for access to coal in salt furnace lease 
and purchase agreements underscores coal’s importance as timber’s replacement.206 Had 
salt-makers been in charge of the geology and geography of the area, they could hardly 
have created a more convenient arrangement. 
In response to the greater capacity of coal to reduce brine, salt-makers increased 
their operations’ capacity to match. Furnaces which had reduced brine in between 30 and 
60 pans of 35 gallon capacity grew to five or six pans of 150 to 200 gallons each.207 
While the increase in gallon capacity was not great, the production capacity was much 
larger. The hotter burning coal allowed workers to boil the brine in much shallower, 
broader pans. Eventually the cast iron pans weighed up to 2,200 pounds each, stretched to 
twenty-five feet in length, six and one half feet in width, but only two to three inches in 
depth.208 With the Ruffner’s development of the coal-fired salt furnace, roughly 20 years 
after they lifted their first batch of salt, they and other Kanawha salt-makers were 
producing nearly one million bushels of salt each year.209 
Since allowing these larger furnaces to cool down and then heat back up again 
wasted large quantities of fuel and increased operating expenses, they operated around 
the clock, seven days a week, despite local statutes against work on Sunday.210 They 
voraciously consumed the easily accessed surface veins of coal. As early as 1820, the 
easily had coal was exhausted. On August 21, 1821, the Kanawha Spectator announced 
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under the title “Colliers Wanting,” that a Dr. Putney sought “From 10 to 20 steady 
industrious men who understand digging coal.” It goes on to offer that “these men may 
obtain high wages in Kenawha [sic] for that business, if immediate application made to 
Dr. Putney, or other manufacturers of salt who use coal at their furnaces.”211 This 
advertisement for skilled colliers suggests that the remaining coal was no longer easily 
accessed and its removal lay beyond the skill level of the valley’s labor force, generally 
leased slaves. Once excavated, the coal no longer travelled in baskets on the heads of the 
enslaved or even in chutes but on rail lines propelled by humans initially, then by oxen, 
mules, or ponies.212  
By 1827, 67,800 tons of coal were being mined in the Kanawha Valley, almost all 
burned by the salt industry or its ancillary businesses such as copper smithies and metal 
foundries.213  In 1836, a report to the state of Virginia estimated that the Kanawha 
industry used double the coal output of the entire eastern portion of the state.214 In 1830, a 
report to the US treasury estimated Kanawha coal usage at 63,200 net tons.215 Ten years 
later, Professor William Barton Rogers reported that 90 salt furnaces along the Kanawha 
incinerated 200,000 tons of coal annually.216 Much of this coal went to metal-works. It 
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was estimated that after the conversion to coal, each salt furnace required eight to ten tons 
of cast iron, one half ton of bar iron, and as much as one ton of wrought iron.217  
The dramatic growth in salt production and the use of coal had immediate, 
deleterious effects on the environment. In September of 1832, less than 25 years after the 
Ruffner's first harvest, the Kanawha Banner reprinted the impressions of a New England 
traveler who observed, “The many factories are at short intervals on either side of the 
river for ten miles from Charleston. The very air for this distance is blackened and 
rendered unpleasant to the lungs and senses by the fumes of decomposed salt and pit 
coal.”218 Another chronicler offered a less repulsed view when he observed, “the 
chimneys of the salt manufactories pour forth at short intervals of space, their curling 
masses of black vapour, while swarms of laborers and others connected with the 
establishments are continually passing to and fro.”219 These assessments might appear 
more aptly applied to cities of the East than to a valley on the western fringes of Virginia.  
Cities such as Lowell, Massachusetts have been viewed as the cradle of the 
American Industrial Revolution. Historian Paul Johnson, for example, chronicled the 
exploits of Sam Patch the “Great Jumper” against a backdrop of the beginning of the 
industrial revolution in the mid-Atlantic. As Patch jumped into cataracts in a show of 
power amidst the disenfranchising forces of rising industrialization in the East, the air of 
the Kanawha Valley was already black and foul.220  
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The adjustment to coal was but one significant, early step in Kanawhans’ 
profitable adaptation to environmental influences. The geology of the region offered 
other valuable commodities. Petroleum and natural gas often form in conjunction with 
salt domes, with natural gas often layering on top of them. While each of these resources 
may have held value individually, when located together with brine and coal, the value of 
these four commodities increased drastically. Salt-makers considered the natural gas and 
petroleum as annoying, often dangerous byproducts. Well-drillers rightly thought the 
natural gas dangerous. Striking and releasing a layer of compressed natural gas could 
yield explosive results. In 1843, drillers for Dickinson and Shrewsbury hit gas of such 
pressure that a 500 pound auger and an estimated 1,000 pounds of pipe shot out of the 
hole like an arrow, followed by a 150 foot high column of water. The explosive force 
echoed for miles.221 On another occasion, a visiting academic from New England, curious 
to test the flammability of the byproduct ignited the gas emitting from a Dickinson and 
Shrewsbury well. The resulting fireball incinerated much of Dickinson and Shrewsbury’s 
equipment and did considerable harm to the curious visitor.222  
Salt-makers understood the dangers posed by natural gas, but with characteristic 
ingenuity, they learned to turn the natural resource to a profit. They soon harnessed the 
propensity of natural gas to lift the brine to the holding tanks far above the river’s 
surface. Since the drillers could not control the pressure of the gas, salt manufacturers 
ingeniously adjusted the height of the tubing through which the water rose from the well. 
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Workers raised or lowered the tubing height until the height of the column of brine lifted 
by the natural gas matched the flow of brine required.223 The natural pressure alleviated 
the need for the horse-powered or steam-driven pumps upon which manufacturers had 
relied. The natural gas pressure could not be counted on, and this use of natural gas was 
not as common as other uses Kanawhans developed. By 1836, the Kanawha Valley salt-
works operated 36 stationary steam engines, comprising half the stationary engines in the 
state of Virginia- more than existed in 15 other states.224  
In 1842, a salt-maker named Thompkins managed to extend a well 1,000 feet 
below the river, far deeper than the usual 600 to 700 feet. Thompkins initially used the 
natural gas to illuminate his salt facility at night.225 Observers reported that a man could 
read a newspaper at night 30 yards from the wellhead.226 Given that the furnaces operated 
around the clock, this nearly free source of light was extremely valuable. Thompkins was 
not content to use the natural gas solely for illumination though. As a salt-maker, 
Thompkins would have been more aware than many of the potential value of combustible 
substances. Releasing the natural gas into the air must have seemed tantamount to tossing 
money into the sky and watching it disappear. Thompkins devised a system for natural 
gas to flow up from a well through tubes fitted to a large hogshead. A hole in the bottom 
of the hogshead allowed the brine to escape, but trapped the natural gas. Pipes conducted 
the natural gas to the furnace where it “mingled with the blaze of the coal fire. It so 
increased the heat as to make very little coal necessary…”227 Virginians Job English and 
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his partner George Warth exploited natural gas to the extent that they pumped their brine 
from the well to the furnaces and reduced the brine to salt, relying entirely on natural 
gas.228 
While English and Warth made use of natural gas, it was not until after Kanawha 
salt had faded from prominence that interest in natural gas came to the fore. The failure to 
exploit natural gas fully may be fairly attributed to the proximity of easily accessed coal. 
Moreover, while coal required digging and natural gas presented itself as a natural 
byproduct of drilling brine wells, the flow and supply of natural gas was somewhat 
uncontrollable. Even when it did flow as desired, the corrosive effects of the natural gas 
quickly deteriorated the primitive pipes salt-makers used to direct the flow of the gas. 
Were it not for inexpensive coal that salt-makers often already owned, perhaps 
Kanawhans would have applied their ingenuity to solving the problems inherent in 
harnessing natural gas’s power. However, just as they did not make the change to coal 
until they had exhausted their timber, thoroughly exploiting natural gas was unnecessary 
as long as coal was inexpensive and easily obtained. 
Oil, the other flammable byproduct of brine well drilling remained almost 
completely unvalued by Kanawhans for several generations after the reign of salt as the 
valley’s primary export. The oil that rose from the wells initially polluted the area 
immediately around the wellhead. Workers learned to shunt the oil away from their work 
site and eventually arrived at an expedient solution to the problem of what to do with the 
viscous and foul smelling fluid. They piped it directly into the nearby Kanawha River. In 
1876, historian George Wesley Atkinson reported that “Nearly all the Kanawha salt wells 
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have contained more or less petroleum oil, and some of the deepest wells a considerable 
flow. Many persons now think, trusting to their recollections, that some of the wells 
afforded as much as twenty-five to fifty barrels per day.” Atkinson goes on to explain that 
the oil was “allowed to flow over from the top of the salt cisterns, on the river, where, 
from its specific gravity, it spread over a large surface, and by its beautiful iridescent 
hues, and its un-savory odor, could be traced for many miles down the stream.”229 The 
environmental degradation of the Kanawha River due to valley industrialization was so 
complete that even in 1876, Atkinson reported that the river had long been familiarly 
known as “Old Greasy.”230  
The environmental destruction had indeed been occurring for a long time. In her 
book published in 1826, Sketches of History life and Manners in the United States, Anne 
Royall noted that above the salt-works, the Kanawha river water, “if sat in a shade or in a 
cellar, it is very pleasant to drink the whole seceeding [sic] day.” However, she goes on 
to offer that she “did not stomach it so well below the salt-works, particularly as I saw 
several carcasses of dead horses floating on the surface of the stream.231 Observers 
mentioned that the beasts of burden that labored in the salt-works were often ill used. 
Apparently, the bodies of animals that could not survive were left for the river to carry 
away. Kanawhans had long been developing and adapting to changes in their 
environment in pursuit of less expensive salt. The salt-makers’ exhaustive approach 
toward the exploitation of natural resources and the environment helped them increase 
production drastically, even as they drove the cost of production downward. However, 
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throughout their relentless drive for profit, the salt-makers failed to count environmental 
degradation as part of the cost. 
The Kanawha River itself acted as an environmental impetus for innovation, 
offering both opportunity and challenges. Much of the innovation spurred by the river 
arrived from elsewhere. This grasping of solutions to environmental challenges, 
regardless of origin, further illustrates the macroscopic vision of the Kanawha Valley’s 
early industrialists. Without the transportation connection to the Ohio River and the 
booming Great West, Kanawha Valley salt may have remained untapped. The river was 
troublesome though. It tended to be navigable only six months of the year. Even then, 
fluctuating water levels might not support shipping traffic. In September 1818, 
Shrewsbury complained that the river was so low that even the largest salt companies had 
run out of money, “not having it in their power to send off the salt, the River is Lined 
with boats and great quantity of Salt on the Banks.”232 While far from predictable, the 
river tended to allow flatboat traffic in the winter and spring.233 Even then, the journey 
was far from easy. Salt-makers sent their product downstream with trepidation. Joel 
Shrewsbury himself admitted, “I have much fears [sic] about the Salt sent off with Morris 
(tho hope he will go safe) the last accts from the Boats was very alarming, two of 
Vaught’s Boats was seen by Mr. Scales pass the mouth of Big Sandy overtaken by Ohio 
Ice and boats completely surrounded with the Ice and the Ohio Blocked up clear across a 
few miles below.” Shrewsbury continued that “Mr. Scales writes the hands was upon the 
Top of the Boats imploring assistance from God, that man could give none…the whole 
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river is a bustle some about their Children, Brothers and Husbands and the rest of us 
about our salt.”234 Even with the addition of wing dams and other improvements to the 
river through the auspices of the James River and Kanawha Company as well as other 
transportation improvement companies, river transport remained a dangerous undertaking 
for salt factory owners and apparently for boatmen as well.  
Those in the salt industry responded to these challenges in a variety of ways. As 
was not uncommon for backcountry settlers, Kanawha salt-makers vigorously sought 
improved transportation infrastructure. Not only did they continue lobbying Virginia 
government officials as Clendenin had done decades earlier, they raised private money to 
take on improvements themselves. In 1816, a subscription to improve a road along the 
Kanawha raised $1,000.00 immediately.235 The James River Company, charged by the 
state assembly with improving the navigation through Virginia, served as a source of 
hope and annoyance. Their progress proved agonizingly slow while the improvements to 
the rivers never seemed to meet the demands of the local communities they were intended 
to serve. Indeed, in a lawsuit against the James River Company directors in 1828, a grand 
jury found that the “Kanawha river [sic] is in a worse state, and more difficult of 
navigation than when they commenced working upon it.”236 The tolls which accompanied 
the improvements met with outrage. The Western Virginian reprinted a piece first 
published in the Richmond Enquirer complaining, “The Tolls imposed on the trade of the 
Great Kanawha during the last Winter are very generally regarded, by the people of that 
quarter of the State as exorbitant and consequently unjust. Grand Juries have presented 
                                                          
     234 Joel Shrewsbury to William Dickinson, February 15, 1820. In possession of author. 
     235 Joel Shrewsbury to William Dickinson, October 28, 1816. In possession of author. 
     236 Stealey, Antebellum, 74. 
87 
 
the Works executed on that River as a nuisance and the laws imposing the tolls as a 
grievance of a very serious magnitude.”237 Many resigned themselves to the idea that 
navigation on the Kanawha River to the Ohio River would remain substantially 
unchanged. Reliable and relatively safe transport routes to the East remained elusive for 
Kanawhans as well. The route eastward was improved, allowing for better commerce 
with Greenbrier County, but it was not until the railroad arrived in the valley in the 1830s 
that efficient transportation to the east was established. 
Salt manufacturers also quickly embraced the steamboat. As wood became scarce 
in a valley that continued to require large quantities of it for salt’s auxiliary industries it 
became less and less economical to send wooden flatboats downriver and then sell the 
boat downriver. The steamboat allowed for more consistent travel. It also brought 
commodities into the valley. Goods such as grain had been perennially short in the 
Kanawha where the scarce, flat land was often devoted to industry.238  Salt-makers 
Andrew Donally and Isaac Noyes sought to capitalize on the potential commerce derived 
from upstream traffic in conjunction with their shipments of salt to the Ohio Valley. In 
1823, barely a decade after the steamboats began plying the Mississippi River, Donally 
and Noyes contracted to have the steamboat Eliza built in Wheeling at a cost of 
$35,000.00.239 By 1830, steam-powered towboats with names such as Enterprise worked 
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the Kanawha, hauling the wooden flatboats back upriver to Kanawha Salines and nearby 
Charleston to be reloaded with salt.240 Despite the marginally successful improvements to 
the Kanawha River and the consistency offered by the steamboat, the rivers continued to 
offer challenges that technology had yet to answer. 
The improvements made by the James and Kanawha Company made the 
Kanawha more accessible, but it remained useful for commerce only half the year. 
Manufacturers shipped salt only in the months when the river ran high enough. In 
September 1818, low river levels wreaked havoc with salt production and shipping. 
Shrewsbury reported, “We have not had a rise in the River as yet and out water is very 
scarce- not more than runs one furnace, a great number  of wells on the river in the same 
situation-some quit work and gone to boring.”241 This resulted in periods of excess supply 
and depressed prices followed by months when supplies were tight and prices elevated. 
These fluctuations opened opportunities for salt-makers from competing regions that 
were unrestricted by the seasonal nature of Kanawha River navigation. Salt-makers 
responded by setting up storehouses for their product. They subsequently released the salt 
more gradually throughout the year, leveling out the peaks and troughs in supply, and 
consequently the price. This solution was not without disadvantages, which would haunt 
salt-makers in the form of resentments and accusations of hoarding by western settlers in 
years to follow. These resentments would surface in the competitive and political arenas, 
which in turn, prompted even greater flexibility and innovation by the Kanawha salt 
industry.242  
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Separating the political and competitive arenas as sources of innovation is 
particularly challenging. Salt manufacturers worked assiduously in political channels for 
the competitive benefit of the domestic salt industry as a whole and for their region in 
particular. Moreover, political events far beyond the scope of Kanawha salt producers, or 
any other salt industry for that matter, dramatically and frequently changed the 
competitive environment. The Kanawha salt industry arose in a period of relatively weak 
competition during the War of 1812. English harbor blockades and the cessation of 
inexpensive Cheshire salt imports created salt shortages reminiscent of the hardships 
during the American Revolution only a few decades earlier. More crucial to the Kanawha 
salt markets, the British presence hampered distribution from the major western salt-
making area, the Onondaga region of New York. Shortages in western salt supplies and 
the resultant elevated prices attracted Virginians to the Kanawha Salines, as the region 
was then known. With the end of the war, Onondaga salt once again flowed west, but by 
then, Kanawha Salt was firmly established in the market. Salt from the East Coast failed 
to compete for western markets due to transportation costs. Even with the advent of the 
railroads, Kanawha salt-makers could produce so inexpensively, that salt from the eastern 
coast remained uncompetitive. Indeed, Kanawha Valley producers saw the advent of 
practical rail traffic as the key to opening eastern salt markets to Kanawha salt, not as a 
threat that eastern salt could invade their markets.243  
Other salt producing regions of the West offered some competition for Kanawha 
Red Salt. Kanawha producers were aware of these regions and watched their production 
and prices carefully. Even fledgling salt-works like the Big Sandy area on the border of 
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Virginia and Kentucky were noticed as Kanawha producers surveyed the markets. In July 
1818, Shrewsbury warned his partner, “There is much doing at this time on Big Sandy 
respecting Salt water and much I fear will get as good there as it is on this river. They had 
bored last week 170 feet—water in the gum quite Salt [sic] without Tubing and am 
informed that the water drawn out in the sand pump is as good as ours. They have erected 
furnaces and are making 30 to 40 bushels of Salt in each per day.”244 Later in April 1819, 
he wrote, “They will have it is said Twenty furnaces in blast there this summer –the water 
will make about 200 bushels per week to each furnace which will put in the markets from 
150,000 to 200,000 bushels this season…”245 For months, even years, Shrewsbury 
informed his partner of progress on the Big Sandy in detail. Shrewsbury commented on 
their transportation assets, their timber supplies, their brine strength and the personal 
character of those working there. Shrewsbury’s scrutiny of developments on the Big 
Sandy underscores the broad vigilance the Kanawha industrialists maintained. Despite 
Shrewsbury’s detailed knowledge and concern that the Big Sandy region could produce 
as much as a quarter of Kanawha Valley production, the Big Sandy did not seriously 
threaten the Kanawha’s rise to preeminence as a western salt supplier.  
Several factors unrelated to the Kanawha manufacturers contributed to the Big 
Sandy’s failure to compete in western salt markets despite their better access to the Ohio 
River. One cause was their weaker brine.246 Another may follow Shrewsbury’s prediction 
that commercial efforts there would be hindered for years by uncertain land ownership. 
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Shrewsbury suggested that the titles to the land in the Big Sandy region, once granted to 
soldiers, were resold by those same soldiers a dozen times over.247 Still another factor 
may have hindered Big Sandy salt producers’ competitive efforts. Shrewsbury assessed 
that “much of the Rabble of the Salt makers have gone to that place.”248 By contrast, 
Shrewsbury was pleased that men such as Randolph and Heth had begun operating in the 
Kanawha. These were trustworthy men of property. Their appearance in the Kanawha 
added a level of respectability to the region and to their vocation. This detail may seem a 
bit of insignificant nineteenth century class discrimination, but Shrewsbury’s assessment 
may hold some merit. In a capital-intensive industry, credit-worthiness mattered. Just the 
process of purchasing and sinking the gum could cost thousands of dollars.249 Once 
drillers hit saltwater, the expenses of building a furnace quickly mounted. Shrewsbury 
listed “Negroe houses, machines house, machine driver’s house, timbers hewn from 
around the gum, pipe logs, sheds, dweling [sic] houses for white furnace workers, smiths 
shop, stables” as but a few of the support facilities and expenses attendant with a salt-
works.250 If salt-makers could not secure credit to cover the thousands of dollars in 
expense involved in sinking gums and drilling for brine, their commercial efforts would 
have likely been doomed. 
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The Caribbean islands offered some competition for Kanawha Salt, especially for 
markets to the south. Steamboats increased the reach of Caribbean salt-makers 
considerably. The bounty of the Ohio Valley filled the cargo holds of steamboats headed 
downriver. Shipping agents often found themselves at a loss as to how to fill those holds 
for the trip upriver. Accordingly, prices to haul cargo upstream experienced downward 
pressure, which helped Turks Island salt compete in the West.  
As has been noted, specific types of salt had long been preferred for specific uses. 
Instruction for cooking and food preservation often specified the types of salt preferred. 
Kanawhans took advantage of this predilection by positioning their salt as the preferred 
salt for the preservation of meat, pork in particular. Kanawhans suggested that the 
minerals in the red salt allowed the salt to permeate the meat more thoroughly and thus 
preserve the meat better.251 Their success in convincing the public that Kanawha salt 
cured meat better may have been mixed though. Meat processors often used a mixture of 
Kanawha salt and Turks Island salt, even though Turks Island salt generally cost more 
than “local” salt.252 One Missouri resident reported that he had heard that an entire 
boatload of pork had spoiled on the trip down to New Orleans, which he attributed to the 
meat processor trying to save money by packing the meat entirely in Kanawha salt rather 
than using enough Turks Island salt.253 
 It is difficult to narrow causes of innovation to one specific sphere of influence. 
Developments often resulted from a variety of catalyzing influences. It may be safely 
said, however that the role of state and federal governments in commodities markets, and 
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perhaps even more importantly in credit markets, played an extraordinarily important role 
in the strategies and innovations of the Kanawha Valley salt industry. Indeed, an 
understanding of gymnast-like contortions and machinations that salt-makers developed 
to respond to, intervene in, or anticipate moves by federal and state governments should 
dispel notions that early Appalachians in the Kanawha felt disconnected from traditional 
centers of power. 
On October 24, 1813, as prices for goods climbed amid wartime economic 
stresses, Joel Shrewsbury wrote of the Kanawha Valley, “there is no place in my opinion 
in the Western Country, where business can be done…to greater advantage than 
Kanawha, money is plentiful and goods are a ready sale at good advance, more so than 
any place I was ever acquainted with, and firmly believe there is no more ready money 
on our river of any place of the same extent in Virginia except perhaps towns.”254 What is 
noteworthy in Shrewsbury’s paean to the Kanawha Valley is not the effusive praise of the 
valley, but the repeated reference to money. References to money reappear consistently in 
Shrewsbury’s letters. This is not surprising in the correspondence of two business 
partners. On closer reading, it becomes evident that money had a great number of 
meanings and values ranging from nearly worthless to precious. 
Kanawha salt-makers sat in a unique position in the business world. They 
operated a capital-intensive business requiring large purchases on credit. Massive pieces 
of iron equipment came from Pittsburgh or other urban centers to the east, other business 
and household goods came from the commercial centers of eastern Virginia. The funds 
borrowed to finance business and personal expenses initially flowed from eastern 
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sources. Perhaps most importantly, the slaves that cut the timber, dug and hauled the coal, 
made the barrels, worked on the river, and otherwise operated as integral cogs in the salt-
making machine were purchased or rented farther east in Virginia where soil exhaustion 
and slave reproduction created an excess supply of labor.255 All these expenses tended to 
be incurred in the notes of eastern banks which enjoyed more stable values based on the 
specie the bank held, the confidence in the bank’s stability, and supportive state and 
federal monetary policies. 256 
At the same time, valley salt-makers sold their products in the Great West where 
banks in places like Nashville and Cincinnati held less specie in reserve to back up the 
value of their notes. Easterners deemed these notes far less valuable.257 This left 
Kanawha salt-makers in the unenviable position of incurring all their debts in relatively 
stable, high value notes and receiving payment with which to pay their debts in unstable, 
untrusted western currency that easterners often discounted in value heavily and, in some 
periods, did not accept at all. Their monetary environment consisted of not just a two-
tiered currency system, but a system based on a near infinite number of discount or 
exchange rates which fluctuated constantly depending on the time, place, and personal 
perspective of the individuals involved. The only constant was that the Ruffners, 
Shrewsburys, and other salt-makers’ customers could generally pay them with money 
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that the Kanawhans’ creditors did not want. William Dickinson wrote from eastern 
Virginia to Shrewsbury of the dire fate he foresaw for the highly successful business they 
built. After failing to secure slaves for the upcoming year, he wrote, “Negroes cannot be 
bought hear [sic] without money that is current hear [sic].” Dickinson states that “he used 
all possible exertions to hire to no effect,” adding that “slave owners commanded from 
$70.00 to $90.00,” but would not let their slaves leave the area. Dickinson lamented that 
at least 70 plantation hands had sold for $500.00 to $600.00 each in cash at a recent 
sale.258 Dickinson summarized their plight writing, “so long as we receive in payment for 
salt, western notes, so long we shall be compelled to give present prices for the hire of 
hands, it matters not about the quantity made.”259 Apparently, he met with similar failure 
in his search for free laborers, as he further complained, “workers from east will not go 
west for Western Currency.” He reiterated that he had “no doubts Western Currency will 
get worse,” and that “as long as we receive payment for salt in western notes all will be 
destroyed.”260 Among the solutions Kanawha salt manufacturers sought for this and other 
problems arising from government policies, or lack thereof, include political activism on 
local, state, and federal levels, organized civil disobedience, and the creation of what is 
often described as the nation’s first business cartel. 261 
 The Dickinson–Shrewsbury Company, as a leading salt-maker in the valley, but 
one that had a tendency to go it alone, offers a particularly useful perspective from which 
to review the ingenuity and flexibility required to respond to such challenges. This 
propensity to go it alone may have arisen from Dickinson’s nature. Letters and lore of 
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William Dickinson describe a man of a demanding and contrary nature. One story tells 
that upon the death of his estranged partner Shrewsbury, he purchased Shrewsbury’s 
mulatto valet. The valet was reputed to be Shrewsbury’s illegitimate son, who Dickinson 
thought insolent. Dickinson is then said to have put upon him a heavy wooden yoke with 
a long projecting bar such as jumping cattle wear and set him to hoeing corn next to the 
public road. Dickinson is reputed to have worked the former valet there without rations 
until he died in sight of the Shrewsbury house in a matter of weeks in order to avenge 
slights by both the slave and the deceased partner.262 One result of this attitude is that 
Dickinson and Shrewsbury often observed and commented on the combined efforts of the 
salt-making community to meet shared challenges, but did not hesitate to take a different 
path if they felt it better suited their needs.  
 Joel Shrewsbury and William Dickinson ranked among the most prosperous men 
in the valley. Their company quickly became the largest slaveholder in the valley.263 
While certainly not of Virginia society’s upper or even a secondary tier, they were men of 
considerable property and could be counted among the local gentry. So, despite their 
willingness to go it alone, Kanawha businessmen often included Shrewsbury in their 
plans and recruited him to be their official voice. Shrewsbury’s recruitment as the speaker 
or writer for the Kanawha Salines industry may also reflect a pragmatic attempt to avoid 
significant postal charges, as Shrewsbury held the position of local postmaster and thus 
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paid no postal fees.264 This combination renders the Dickinson-Shrewsbury company 
particularly valuable when examining salt-makers’ efforts to contend with these larger 
challenges. 
 While local salt-makers had little trouble using their wealth and control of labor to 
dominate local affairs, they achieved less success at the state level, albeit not for lack of 
effort. Like Clendenin, they constantly sought transportation and banking improvements. 
State effort to control the salt industry began early in the Kanawha’s reign, as eastern 
legislators appeared to have understood salt’s necessity as a guarantee of tax income. In 
1814, the Virginia General Assembly levied a 12.5 cent per bushel tax on commodities 
such as salt, iron, and lead, confident that the tax would be viewed by producers as a cost 
to be passed on to the consumer.265 Even before the law was instituted, salt-makers had 
full understanding of the discussions to the east and were working to find creative 
solutions. Shrewsbury wrote to Dickinson that “the salt makers are very much displeased 
at the tax the assembly has laid on, they are waiting with great anxiety, to see the law, if 
they find it is to be a lien on their salt-works, I expect a great  many furnaces will lye 
[sic] idle, if the renters are only bound, they will rent to such hands as they can command 
and the law cannot.”266 The initial effect of this law was chilling. Salt-makers delayed 
making commitments until they better understood the law. Shrewsbury wrote that he 
“was offered a continuance of the furnace until March or till we had worked her a year in 
steady work, but on the 10th last the tax of 12.5 cents took place on every bushel made. 
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That together with the scarcity of provisions induced me to settle up and quit.”267 Soon 
though, Kanawhans found that despite very specific statutes in the law which required 
stringent reporting and payment schedules with specific penalties for nonpayment, failure 
to pay would not result in any liens against the salt-makers’ property. Rather than leasing 
their furnaces to a third party as salt-makers initially thought they might, they simply set 
up dummy corporations to be legally responsible. Unsurprisingly, the tax on salt 
remained uncollected. After the War of 1812 ended, restrictions on salt supplies eased, 
even as the Kanawhans produced more. Salt-makers argued that capacity now exceeded 
postwar demand. Those that had failed to avoid the tax argued that not only were they 
being penalized unfairly; they were in no position to pay the back taxes in the depressed 
economic environment. In the end the state relented.268  
 Kanawhans showed equal zeal for protecting domestic salt industries through 
tariffs. As has been discussed, tariff discussions were exceedingly contentious affairs. In 
1827, merchant marines sought a repeal of, or deduction in salt duties. Naturally, salt-
makers sought to uphold tariffs on every possible level. Tariff supporters adopted a 
martial tone as they appealed to patriotism and the virtue of freedom in support of their 
cause. A writer in Charleston’s The Western Virginian calling up the patriotic cause and 
even perhaps General Washington asked, “How can a patriot slumber when the 
fundamental rights and interests of the people are trecherously [sic] invaded and 
wantonly sacrificed?” Even though “memorials and protests were despatched [sic] to 
Washington; and the whole artillery of paper war was directed against the opposed 
repeal,” the enemy had yet to “surrender the contest.” He then entreated patriots not to 
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“mutiny against a brave and faithful general.”269 An article in The Banner confidently 
predicted that if the tariff were repealed, foreign suppliers of salt would quickly 
“overwhelm our infant establishments, so as to put down competition.” America would 
then be powerless as the prices doubled and, “shall again be engaged in war.” The writer 
suggested that the enemy “will find us as it did in the past when a barrel of flour would 
not command a bushel of salt on the Eastern frontier. A nation might well be destitute of 
the implements of war, of attack and defence [sic], as of the sources of sustinence [sic].” 
The writer finished by warning “innovation-loving politicians” that the “distress 
experienced during the last war for this article should be remembered.”270 The rhetoric 
may have been extreme, but the message of the writers was not mere hyperbole. 
 One part of the “whole artillery of paper” fired at Washington was the Memorial 
of Salt Manufacturers of Salt in the County of Kanawha Virginia Against the Repeal of 
the Duty on Imported Salt.271 In this lengthy letter, Shrewsbury cites Thomas Jefferson’s 
argument that independence required self sufficiency in agriculture.272 Shrewsbury then 
argues that the essential nature of salt requires that they “now place the manufacturer by 
the side of the agriculturalist.” He then states that “the grand enquiry now is shall we 
make our own comforts or garnor [sic] them at the will of a foreign nation.”273 In the 
pursuit of his arguments, Shrewsbury proceeds laying out the history of salt tariffs in the 
past and the critical role they played in fostering domestic industry. He then carefully 
offers his evidence of the extent to which other industries, such as the iron industry, rely 
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on the salt manufacturers’ economic health. Shrewsbury’s thoughtful and methodical 
arguments to the United States Congress reveal their understanding that Kanawhans were 
not isolated on the fringes of the nation but at the growing country’s epicenter. Decades 
before the Civil War, these Appalachians viewed their natural resources and their 
region’s industrialization as key to the success of the farms and packing houses of the 
Ohio Valley, the foundries of Pittsburgh, and even the self-sufficiency of the nation.  
 Probably few things reminded Kanawha manufacturers of their centrality in 
United States commerce more than the lack of a unified currency. Perhaps it was the 
sense of doom such as Dickinson expressed when he predicted the complete ruin of his 
company due to disparate currencies, but some of the more interesting innovations and 
displays of flexibility were derived entirely or at least partially in response to the nation’s 
currency chaos. While Dickinson and Shrewsbury formed a particularly vibrant company, 
their solutions designed to alleviate their financial squeeze underscore the propensity for 
finding creative solutions which marked Kanawha Valley businessmen.  
 The letters of Dickinson and Shrewsbury reveal the constant pressure to be paid in 
specie or at least in the notes of trusted banks from eastern urban centers. After receiving 
payments with which to pay debts in the East from his long suffering partner, William 
Dickinson wrote, “Sir, your favour of inst by William Slack came safe to hand with the 
money mentioned and the specia don’t hold out by my Scales and Weights by about one 
dollar and as they have not been used much lately they may not be correct.” Dickinson’s 
statement that his scales had “not been used much lately” is likely to be offered less as a 
reason that his scale may be off, and more as a jab at Shrewsbury for not pushing their 
customers harder to pay in cold, hard cash. Dickinson then continued, “the North 
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Carolina, Columbia U State and Virginia notes all shall be able to pass without a 
discount. The Georgia, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Jersey and New York I have put 
off at five to ten percent discount.”274 Worse still, some of the notes Shrewsbury accepted 
as payment held no value and would “not pass at any discount.”275 As if this were not 
confusing enough, the values of the banknotes shifted with time, location, and size of the 
note. Dickinson attempted to illuminate the then current discount rates for Shrewsbury. 
“The South Carolina and Georgia notes are as good as the North Carolina, but cannot be 
put off in payment hear [sic] especially when the notes are small. Those New York and 
Jersey notes of small banks in the back Country will not pass in the City of New York or 
Philadelphia unless at a considerable discount there, and they are much worse hear [sic] 
especially when the notes are small.”276 If Shrewsbury felt that he was getting a handle on 
this currency exchange miasma, Dickinson’s next advice that “North Carolina notes are 
becoming current hear [sic] except with Banks and Sheriffs” may have left him 
wondering if he had even a remote chance of ever being paid in full for salt or timber.277 
It may also have left him wondering if he would ever be able to do anything that left his 
brother-in-law business partner satisfied. It appears that, at least on the latter question, the 
answer was a resounding no. Dickinson’s discussion with his partner about the 
fluctuating discount rates for the various regional bank notes indicates a detailed 
understanding of the nation’s financial exchanges. While Dickinson-Shrewsbury was a 
particularly vibrant Kanawha company, and thus might have a slightly different 
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experience than other salt-making firms, all Kanawha salt-makers faced this same 
complex problem. They needed to understand the confusing and chaotic currency 
exchanges on a national level.  
 Finances proved challenging for the capital-intensive firms from the beginning. 
The Ruffner brothers borrowed heavily to finance their drilling efforts leaving them in 
troubling financial straits. The sources of capital lay to the east. Even if banks or 
individuals from the Ohio Valley had been willing to loan to salt-makers, their currency 
lacked sway in the East. As Dickinson complained, the eastern slave-owners, upon which 
the Kanawha industrialists depended, would not accept western notes. Even without 
issues of discount rates and devaluation, salt-makers required a large amount of capital, 
which was often difficult to raise. Dickinson and Shrewsbury, despite good standing in 
the Shenandoah Valley community as merchants and tobacco brokers, experienced 
difficulty financing their initial Kanawha efforts even before the troubles that became 
known as the panic of 1819.278  
 Regardless of the causes, the sectional tension between forces arguing for easy 
credit and unrestrictive fiscal policy tended to arise from the West. Fiscally conservative 
power brokers, generally of the East, became equally concerned about the ill effects 
arising from plentiful currency with specie backing it. Fiscal conservatives were equally 
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distressed by the ease with which credit was extended to finance land purchases and 
speculative ventures in the West. Kanawha businessmen rankled by what they considered 
overly restrictive policies of the nearest two banks in Lynchburg sought the requisite state 
approval for a bank in the Kanawha Valley. Perennially short of funds in a seasonal 
business, salt-makers required a bank to loan them funds based on future sales of salt that 
they had already produced. Without this, they were compelled to dump their salt on the 
market quickly, regardless of price, in order to discharge debts.  
As early as 1816, valley salt-makers organized their efforts and formally lobbied 
the state legislature for their own bank. As was often the case, Shrewsbury was on the 
committee to represent the salt-makers. Shrewsbury wrote that they “prepared a very able 
memorial to lay before the state legislature praying for a Branch of one of the chartered 
Banks or an Independent Bank whose capital to be $256,000.00 which will be warmly 
attended before the house.”279 The Kanawhans’ efforts were not rewarded quickly 
though. Banking in Virginia at the time, not surprisingly, was a confusing and highly 
partisan business. Factional fighting between supporters of Farmers Bank and the Bank 
of Virginia ensured that Kanawhan efforts to gain a local branch of a bank made little 
headway. Finally, in 1839, when the legislature finally approved the Bank of Kanawha, 
efforts still bogged down in disputes over the level of the bank’s financing and the 
institution’s location. Salt-makers refused to support a bank located in Charleston while 
legislators refused to support placing the bank in the Kanawha Salines, where the feared 
salt-makers would exert complete control over the institution. In the end legislators 
placed the bank in Charleston. However, salt-makers clearly held the reins of the new 
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bank. Fifteen of the twenty-three bank commissioners engaged in the salt business, 
including Joel Shrewsbury, his son Joel, Andrew Donally, and Lewis Ruffner.280 
While the crisis may have been named the Panic of 1819, the roots of the financial 
collapse were established as salt-making in the valley began to grow rapidly, due in part 
to the ease with which Ohio Valley men gained access to credit to finance the purchase of 
farms and livestock. During the War of 1812, the economy boomed and salt supplies 
shrank as demand rose. Kanawhans sought to take advantage of the lean salt supplies. 
Indeed, this is what drew men like Joel Shrewsbury, William Dickinson, and many others 
from the Shenandoah Valley to the Kanawha Valley. They not only sought to take 
advantage of higher salt prices, in a version of early Appalachian arbitrage, some like 
Dickinson sought to take advantage of the discount rates on notes. He ventured that the 
notes would retain their value and accepted notes rather than specie which others were 
requiring, while selling at a lower price. Dickinson wrote to Shrewsbury from Richmond 
in November 1817, “The banks of Virginia and all north of this have stopt [sic] the 
payment of specia. Their notes of course is on the depreciation, but as yet are received in 
payment for almost all debts and appear as current as ever in this place.” Despite the faith 
in Virginia bank notes, Dickinson continues, “I am told salt is worth 5 to 6$ per bushel in 
Lynchburg. King has none on hand and sells as fast as they can make it for specia. 
Whoever goes there with notes have to go to Abinton (Abington) and make a discount of 
12.5 cents before they can get salt.” Always on the lookout for an opportunity, Dickinson 
suggested, “it will turn them to Kanawha which I should recommend the receiving the 
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notes as yet for salt, they will remain to be good as all such as owe the banks.”281 
Dickinson would come to reverse his suggested course in short order. 
The hope of taking advantage of the discount rate to convert notes to cash soon 
evaporated as salt-makers found their creditors, free workers, and slave owners reluctant 
to accept western notes. Even methods that had successfully raised secure money in the 
past for Dickinson and Shrewsbury faltered. Having been tobacco brokers in the 
Shenandoah Valley, Dickinson and Shrewsbury kept a hand in that business, growing and 
selling tobacco themselves and brokering it for others as well.282  Pent up demand in 
Europe after the war kept tobacco prices high and helped keep strong currencies flowing 
into Dickinson-Shrewsbury coffers. However, this avenue for good currency apparently 
became insufficient as western currency lost value relative to specie or eastern notes. 
Shrewsbury complained to his partner, “When your father was here he was very pressing 
for the hiring of his negroes last year. I proffered to pay him such notes as we have in this 
country would answer him.” This apparently did not suit the elder Dickinson, who 
responded that he “would not have western money even at home as a gift.” Even then, 
Dickinson Sr. continued that he would not accept it from Shrewsbury unless Shrewsbury 
provided him “with enough to burn a plant bed.”283 Dickinson senior clearly valued 
western money very little indeed. 
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As the economy sank into dysfunction in 1819, a letter from Shrewsbury to 
William Dickinson reveals that the latter had come to hold the same regard for western 
money as his father. He also appears to have inherited his father’s lack of patience or tact. 
Pressed to settle the company debts, Dickinson wrote to his partner for funds. 
Shrewsbury responded that the firm had only been paid in Kentucky and Ohio bank notes 
which would not suit Dickinson’s creditors. Dickinson-Shrewsbury’s major buyer of salt 
maintained good credit, so Shrewsbury assumed that he could pay Dickinson-Shrewsbury 
debts by issuing drafts on the money they were owed by that primary customer. This, he 
thought would leave their best customer and “creditors  [to] fight out the bad currency of 
our country which I have done.”284 What Shrewsbury did was not unreasonable. Trapped 
in a national currency mess, he sought a stable place to store the company’s liquid assets; 
their account receivables. Shrewsbury decided that rather than hold quickly devaluing 
western notes or paying the hefty discount to turn them into eastern currency, he would 
keep his assets in the form of credits with what he considered a stable and trustworthy 
company. They remained liquid, and as far as Shrewsbury could judge, at least postponed 
the financial hit. It seems that Shrewsbury did not figure on Dickinson demanding eastern 
currency when there was none to be had. Shrewsbury finished his letter assuring his 
brother-in-law that all sales in the future would include eastern bank notes. 
The new policy involving eastern currency as part of all future sales either failed 
completely or fell short of Dickinson’s requirements. Given Shrewsbury’s letter to 
Dickinson of April 7, 1819, it seems more likely that it failed completely. Shrewsbury 
informed Dickinson he had “laid aside every other exertion to procure the sums that you 
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wrote for and have as yet failed, the Eastern funds is not in this country, and the business 
of the West is and has been done generally upon a Nominal Capotal [sic] by application 
to the Banks—and since the deranged state of the banks, no US paper or Eastern funds 
can be procured in this section of the Country.” Shrewsbury goes on to offer that 
“Kentucky and Ohio money has been offered at 20 to 25 percent discount without 
success, and since the decision of the Superior Court US, a great number of the Western 
Banks will fail and personal property and Real Estate is fast declining.”285 This passage 
further reveals a man who understood his position in the midst of competing national 
banking and economic policies. Shrewsbury’s reference to the US Superior Court 
decision likely refers to the US Supreme Court case McCulloch vs. Maryland, which was 
handed down only a month earlier. In it, the Supreme Court blocked the State of 
Maryland from laying a tax on the Second Bank of the United States. The ruling removed 
an important tool that states used to thwart the federal government’s control over banking 
in the states. In effect, the court told the states that federal banking policies held sway and 
enjoyed constitutional protection from the states.286 Shrewsbury’s understanding of its 
ramifications should further dispel any ideas that these Kanawhans held a narrow scope. 
Valley salt-makers saw themselves at the center of the nation, and as such kept their 
sights on the horizon in all directions.  
In response to their need for eastern capital, Dickinson and Shrewsbury found two 
unique solutions which do not appear to have been followed by other salt-makers; one 
long term solution and one to meet immediate financial needs. Nashville served as a 
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strong market for Kanawha salt. In 1819, after predicting a tough year for Kanawha salt 
amidst the national financial meltdown, Shrewsbury wrote, “Col. Donally thinks 
Kanawha Salt can be sold and has been gone some time to Cincinnati, Louisville, 
Nashville…etc to try to sell out the different markets viz. Nashville 175,000 bushels, 
Cincinatte [sic] 125,000 bushels, Kentucky and Illinoues [sic] 120,000 which would take 
all the Salt manufactured herein some section of the country.”287 In thinking about their 
liquidity and currency challenges Shrewsbury mused, “There ought to be some place to 
deposit the salt in some section of the country where money could be got of a kind that 
could be converted into a currency that would pay debts or buy Negroes, and Nashville 
has always been the favorite spot with me, the currency in that country could be 
converted at less discount than is common in the west.”288 This is precisely what 
Dickinson and Shrewsbury proceeded to do. Rather than broadly sell their product 
throughout the West, as Col. Donally sought to do, Shrewsbury and his partner focused 
on penetrating one market deeply. Dickinson even moved from Bedford County to 
Nashville in an effort to dominate one smaller local market with a better discount rate and 
more access to eastern notes.289 While this may not be truly ingenious, Dickinson and 
Shrewsbury’s choice to deeply penetrate one market with good currency, rather than 
continue to sell across the entire Ohio Valley underscores the Kanawhans’ savvy and 
comprehensive business perspective. 
 By the summer of 1819, the western currency debacle appears to have reached 
critical levels and severely cramped salt-makers’ efforts. The letters of Shrewsbury 
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reflect the desperate stage that credit markets reached. Shrewsbury complained, “I have 
been running everywhere from the mouth to the falls…I have offered Negroes and land at 
a sacrifice in bonds and still have failed. The truth is, their [sic] is no money in the 
country either to buy lands or negroes at a sacrifice that is worth anything in your 
country.”290 In another letter he informed his partner,“$1,000 has not in my opinion been 
received in good money on the Kanawha this spring and summer…” He went on to 
explain that the lack of acceptable currency had reached a point where none of the salt-
makers could pay their kettle tenders the $6.00 to $12.00 per day they earned.291 Not only 
was Kanawha business crippled by the crisis, Shrewsbury reported that: 
Mr. Lowry came on immediately from Vincenns [sic] [Vincennes, a Wabash River town 
in current day southern Indiana] and had more money than possibly suted [sic] in your 
Country, but when he got to Kentucky the suspension of specia had there taken place—he 
paid nearly all his Bonds leaving about $150 to $200 (providing the money can be got off 
at par) he seemed honest and fair and declared to me that Eastern money was not in the 
Country, the Vaults of the Banks shut and merchants perfectly heartless.292  
Shrewsbury predicted that “the currency of the Western States will not get better for 
several years till the Debts to the East is wiped off and the produce of the West in exports 
exceed the imports.”293 Unable to raise the funds in the Kanawha to satisfy business 
debts, an exasperated Shrewsbury threatened to send the slaves they owned east to 
Dickinson to see if he could fare better. While one senses that Shrewsbury’s offer held a 
component of “If you think you can do better…” it was nevertheless, a significant 
statement. Salt-makers were constantly short of help. Selling slaves indicates that times 
were desperate. 
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 It has been said that desperate times call for desperate measures, but the partners 
hit on a brilliant temporary solution—pigs. Pigs, as a valuable asset and business 
commodity, were very much a part of the salt-makers’ environment. Kanawhan business 
men were used to scrutinizing the national market for pork products and making 
decisions informed by far flung markets. In August 1818, Shrewsbury wrote, “owing to 
marketts [sic] in New Orleans and other places being good for Bacon it will be very 
scarce here from this time till the pork market commences, which will operate a little 
troublesome to me as well as others.”294 The partners decided to become swineherds. 
Since they already acted as salt-makers, tobacco-brokers, millers, and smith-owners, this 
continued lateral expansion of their business was not uncharacteristic. Shrewsbury 
arranged to purchase 500 hogs from a Mr. Evans in September 1819. All October the two 
planned for Dickinson to come west and drive the hogs back to eastern Virginia to sell for 
“good money.” As October passed into November, Evans finally announced that he could 
not get them the swine until December, far too late for the animals to make the trek east. 
Shrewsbury quickly made new arrangements with local farmers for 500 hogs. By mid-
November, Shrewsbury gave Dickinson the word to come get 400 of the animals to herd 
across the mountains and down into eastern Virginia to sell for the scarce eastern 
currency.295  
 Dickinson and Shrewsbury were hardly the first or last to herd swine east from 
Appalachia. Nevertheless, their decisions underscore the relentless opportunism, broad 
perspectives, flexible views of resources, and creative thinking that marks Kanawha 
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Valley salt-makers. The choice to drive swine also reflects attitudes about credit and 
reputation. Dickinson and Shrewsbury, while not among Virginia’s gentry, were born far 
above the station of drovers. Indeed, they had increased their status and wealth even by 
1819, yet they themselves drove hundreds of pigs across difficult terrain in the middle of 
winter rather than not meet their obligations to creditors. Either the partners held little 
regard for social conventions surrounding status, or a reputation for credit-worthiness was 
indispensable for men of business.  
 Like other Kanawha innovations, it is difficult to attribute the development of 
what has been called the nation’s first business cartel to any one set of factors. While 
clearly economic in nature, the move toward an organization acting as one unit and 
thereby controlling availability and price of salt in the Ohio Valley was a crowning 
achievement. However, in some ways, the cartel which salt-makers are credited with 
forming was the least innovative development of all. The Kanawha cartels, or business 
combinations, as Stealey prefers to refer to them, were the evolutionary product of a 
number of small agreements that salt-makers took to gain a competitive edge.296 This 
development was in keeping with the nature of Kanawha innovation, which rarely bore 
the mark of radical new thinking. Progress tended to arise from a series of smaller 
adjustment or modifications. It was supremely practical. 
 The cartel evolved in response to the Kanawhans’ other successful innovations. 
The development of the coal furnace, the utilization of natural gas, the shift to enormous, 
wide boiler pans, the drilling breakthroughs, the early embrace of  the steam towboats; all 
these innovations allowed Kanawhans to create and deliver large amounts of salt to the 
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markets of the Ohio Valley quickly and inexpensively. In 1808, Kanawha businesses 
produced 25 bushels of salt per day. By 1814, the region produced 600,000 bushels per 
year, just less than 1,650 bushels per day. By 1827, 787,000 bushels of salt packed in 
white oak barrels floated down the Kanawha to awaiting markets. Just eight years later in 
1835, the amount of salt produced in the Kanawha had climbed to nearly two million 
bushels, nearly 20 percent growth per year.297 Consequently, while the cost of producing 
salt dropped to between $0.16 and  $0.25 per bushel, the price in western markets 
hovered little above that and at times sold for as little as half the cost to produce it.298 
Salt-manufacturers who had high fixed costs and low variable costs responded by 
producing more salt in order to drive their cost per bushel further down. This, in turn, 
increased supplies even more and placed more downward pressure on the price. The 
tension between efficiency, overproduction, and price drops, exacerbated by the seasonal 
nature of the business as dictated primarily by the Kanawha River, drove the salt-makers 
to take the small steps that led to the organization  known as a cartel.  
The evolution of the cartels began with an attempt by a few of the principals of 
the larger salt companies to buy some of their less established competitors. Many 
producers who flocked to the valley, encouraged by high wartime salt prices, were 
undercapitalized and disheartened at the post-war economic decline. Not all agreed to be 
part of this scheme. Dickinson-Shrewsbury began a long pattern of tagging along with 
Kanawhan cooperative salt organizations when it suited, without ever becoming 
completely connected with them. In 1817, Shrewsbury wrote to his partner, “the salt 
makers here Donally and Steel, Ruffner, Grant, Morris being the principal [sic] owners of 
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the salt works have concluded to buy out the small establishments on the river and raise 
salt to $1 per bushel [sic]. They have bought several and I believe will buy out the 
whole.”299 Shrewsbury, in a move designed to have his cake and eat it too, went on to tell 
Dickinson, “I encourage them all I can tho [sic] not join them, and inform them your and 
my article of partnership prevents my becoming one of the contracting parties, but should 
we get to making salt, they can have it at $1 per bushel so long as the company sells at 
that price and pay us for it punctually.”300 Given that Dickinson and Shrewsbury had not 
actually created their own salt at that point (they owned a great deal of timber, a well, and 
a salt furnace which they leased to others), it would be interesting to know the response 
of the major salt manufacturers to this somewhat impertinent offer. Shrewsbury’s 
prediction proved wrong. They were never able to gain more than approximately 25 
percent of the valley’s salt production.301 The leading salt-makers did not, however, 
abandon their efforts. 
The very next year, 16 men agreed to form the Kanawha Salt Company,  
including Joel Shrewsbury, who must have found advantages to joining that he had failed 
to see before. This company represented the first of a number of iterations designed to 
impose quality control and production level restrictions.302 Often the cooperative 
agreements lasted a finite period, sometimes as little as one year, allowing the firms to 
reevaluate the circumstances and needs of the members frequently. In the original 
organization, the 16 primary salt producers agreed that the firm would begin existence on 
January 1, 1818 and cease on December 31, 1822. Twice a year, the members met and 
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held elections for the five directors, though meetings could be called when at least two-
thirds of the members desired it. They agreed that the Kanawha Salt Company must buy 
all the salt the members produced at a price set by the company. Dividends were paid to 
members based on the size of the participating operations. Members agreed to restrict the 
membership’s total salt production to 450,000 barrels. Salt was to be packed in barrels 
without the use of tallow, a trick used to speed crystallization and increase the salt’s 
weight. The salt was required to sit in barrels for one month under cover before the salt-
maker presented them for sale. The firm could buy or lease rival salt manufactories with 
profits from them to be divided by the members. Directors could discount the price paid 
to a member if they deemed the quality of the salt or the barrel inferior. By operating 
under this agreement, members sought to buoy prices by standardizing quality, restricting 
production, and controlling the release of the product into the market.303 
While the West Virginia Geological Survey discusses the Kanawha Salt Company 
as having existed for 60 years, this is unintentionally misleading.304 The original 
Kanawha Salt Company did not survive until 1822 as planned. Five manufacturers 
refused to join and thus undermined the organization’s efforts while taking advantage of 
the temporary price increases that resulted from the members’ production restrictions, 
just as Shrewsbury had originally intended. Shrewsbury informed Dickinson, “John 
Warth would not come into measures with them nor sell them his salt. Warth wanted to 
sellout [sic] for 20,000 what was worth $10,000.”305 Pre-existing contracts also 
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undermined the fledgling cooperative’s efforts.306 After one year, the organization fell 
apart under the destructive forces of a declining economy. The Kanawha Salt Company 
can be seen as a failure due to its inability to last the five years of its charter. In another 
light, however, this can be seen as a successful opening effort. The idea of regional 
quality control became established. It was an initial version which served acceptably in 
some ways and provided a base for decades of future versions of cooperative agreements. 
The lack of longevity of the Kanawha Salt Company may be seen as a failure, or a 
reasonable, though unintended, response to an extremely fluid business environment. The 
basic tenets of the Kanawha Salt Company: limit production, control releases to the 
market, and control quality, appeared again and again, often still under the name 
Kanawha Salt Company. Other than the rare occasion when investors from outside the 
valley sought to buy the bulk of the salt facilities outright, the same members formed the 
core of each new version. 307 
The salt cooperatives to follow often failed to meet with approval inside the 
valley. They found even less favor outside of the valley. Discord arose between cartel 
members and those who profited from cartel restrictions without joining. Several cartel 
policies particularly rankled salt consumers. As part of their efforts to restrict production, 
cooperatives not only restricted members’ production, they also paid members and non-
members to plug their brine wells. This practice was referred to as dead-renting. The 
cooperative determined the dead-rent paid by assessing the outflow and strength of wells 
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operating nearby.308 One Kanawha resident reported that “dead wells are now common at 
the Kanawha Salines and are giving to the place a dilapidated and melancholy appearance 
and doing real injury to the country. There are many dead wells, and monopolizers pay 
the owners for letting them remain idle and receives about $1500 per annum for one and 
$1500 per annum for another. Besides dead wells, there are also unborn wells, whose 
owners are paid for not letting them be dug.”309  
Another practice that many found particularly offensive developed in part due to 
seasonal market cycles determined by the river flow and the cooler fall temperatures, 
which heralded the season to slaughter livestock. In order to avoid dumping all the salt on 
the market during the months when the rivers flowed, salt cooperatives over the years set 
up storehouses in various sites along rivers in the Ohio Valley. Salt was shipped there and 
released when supplies dwindled and prices rose. Locals likened this practice to hoarding 
or war profiteering. One resident of Pike County, Missouri complained of the Kanawha 
salt cooperative, “so adroitly do this company manage their operation, that in the spring 
season, when the waters are flush, and the navigation easy, they, by means of their own 
boats, deposite [sic] with some one house, at the most prominent points along the river, a 
quantity of their salt, sufficient to meet the want of the country; where it most usually 
remains on deposite [sic] until the late fall, or closing of the river by ice.”  The Pike 
County residents continued that after the rivers closed to navigation, “if the stock of other 
varieties  (of salt) happens to be light, this company never fail to turn their forecast to 
profitable  account, and avail themselves of the necessities of the people to obtain 
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exorbitant price for their salt.”310 Having the necessity sitting in their neighborhood, but 
being unable to purchase it struck local settlers as deeply wrong. 
Perhaps the most troubling policy for the average western consumer of the 
Kanawha salt cooperatives was the policy they developed of selling their salt on 
consignment. Another Pike County, Missouri resident, William Sitton, summarized, “In 
the sale of Kenawha [sic] salt, the usual (credit) upon goods and groceries is not 
extended, as it is an established rule that this article is to be sold for ready money 
only.”311 In Cape Girardeau, Missouri, a Mississippi River town where competing salt 
shipped up from New Orleans would have been more likely to be available, resident John 
Webb complained of similar policies. In a letter to his senator, Thomas H. Benton, Webb 
recreated a typical conversation with a storekeeper about Kanawha salt. “Go to a 
merchant and ask if he wants any kind of produce. If he says yes: Well I will bring it on 
such a day. I want some salt to pickle up my meat; for I have got no money. His reply is, 
My salt is a cash article; I cannot sell it for produce.” Webb continued that if the shopper 
offered to pay later or asked for credit the storekeeper would reply, “I only bring in the 
salt for accommodation; —or otherwise will reply, I am selling on commission, and am 
obliged to have the money.” Webb summarized, “On these terms I have known men to do 
without salt until they have suffered considerably for want of the article.”312 In a society 
where cash came to hand infrequently, demanding cash for a necessity of life was a 
radical departure from the norm. This policy was understandably unpopular and perhaps 
even insulting at a time when worthiness of credit stood as a significant component of a 
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man’s worth as a citizen. Nevertheless, from the salt-makers’ perspective, this policy 
served as one of the surest methods to maintain price controls. 
The salt cartels, combinations, or cooperatives, depending on the phrase one 
prefers, resembled the bulk of Kanawha Valley innovations. While significant in the end, 
they resulted from a series of modifications and adjustments meant to alleviate a problem 
or take advantage of an opportunity in some small way. Regardless of the venue, these 
innovations shared certain characteristics. Rather than emerging from some wild dream to 
radically change the game, they tended to be the culmination of a series of small problem 
solving steps. For example, the Ruffner brothers professed no dream of extraordinarily 
strong brine 400 feet below the river; they just wanted to see if the brine would become 
stronger a little farther down. As such, these innovations tended to be imminently 
practical. They reflected a certain disregard for convention, such as selling salt for cash 
only. They commodified nature ruthlessly, tirelessly, and never by halves. They 
approached problems and opportunities from the perspective that they sat at the center of 
a growing nation. Indeed, as producers of an essential mineral, they were a linchpin in the 
growth of the nation. The salt cooperative’s operations throughout the Ohio Valley reflect 
this comprehensive vision. All these traits came into play when they approached one of 
the most crucial components of their organizations; the enslaved. 
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Chapter 4: Bending Agricultural Slavery 
 
 
The antebellum Kanawha Valley economic engine rested on the backs of the 
enslaved, an unusually high proportion of which labored hundreds of miles from their 
owners. In his work on slave hiring, historian Clement Eaton described slave hiring as 
“the main method of introducing the slave into southern industry and city life—an 
important step toward freedom.”313 Historians have since debated the extent and nature of 
slave-hiring. Some have argued that leased slaves formed a crucial cog in the antebellum 
South’s wheels of industry and as such, supported slave-holding. Others agree with Eaton 
that the higher degree of independence, greater mobility, and the opportunity to pit white 
slave owners against white slave-renters weakened the institution of slavery.314 While 
Eaton may have been taken to task for suggesting that a slave could experience any 
degree of freedom while being owned by another, this was not his point. Eaton explored 
degrees of autonomy and the ability to exercise power and individual choice within the 
bounds of slavery. He did not suggest that slaves were in any respect free, but that slave 
leasing allowed extra room for the slave to exercise power.315  
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The salt-making industry, which relied heavily on leased slaves, substantiates 
Eaton’s conclusions.316 Not all Kanawha slaves were leased, but the practice was 
prevalent enough to partially define the nature of Kanawha Valley work regardless of 
whether salt-makers leased their laborers and craftsmen or owned them outright. Some 
estimates suggest that as many as half of the Kanawha workers were hired slaves.317 
Kanawha industry’s need to compete for hired slaves even as they responded to pressure 
to produce salt more efficiently, greatly influenced the nature of the Kanawha salt 
industry and  highlights the dynamic, flexible, and outwardly-focused perspective held by 
these Appalachian industrialists. 
 The rapid growth of the salt industry during and after the War of 1812 put salt-
makers on a constant search for labor, free or enslaved. Newspapers such as the Western 
Virginian frequently featured advertisements for workers who had the skills needed to 
support the salt industry.318 The January 28, 1829 issue announced, “Coopers wanted 5 or 
6 steady hands to make salt barrels- for which  liberal price will be paid in cash”319  The 
offer of payment in cash rather than in notes or local credit underscores the urgency of 
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the advertisers’ need. Drillers found themselves in particular demand. Shrewsbury 
complained to his partner of the dearth of drillers and of having to wait weeks for drillers 
to finish meeting their commitments to others searching for brine.320 In a letter, after 
asking his partner to once again make every effort to get him workers, he complained, 
“hands are hiring very high hear [sic] $15 to $20 per month to safe hands, out of which 
their clothing, taxes and [?] time is to be deducted.” The scarce men who had the freedom 
to work where they chose charged a premium in the Kanawha for their efforts. 
Even if white laborers hired on, they could not be relied on to remain in the 
valley. While river conditions constrained the shipping of salt to six months of the year, 
salt production and its supporting industries, like cooperages, operated year-round. 
Shrewsbury’s letters indicate that free labor showed a troubling propensity to move on in 
the autumn months. The Leftwiches, who had agreed to lease the Dickinson-Shrewsbury 
furnace, deserted as winter approached. Likewise, Shrewsbury lamented in September 
1818, “our force is lessening at the furnaces. Aliff has started home and Crump talks of 
starting in a few days and am compelled to supply there [sic] places with a part [of] our 
plantation hands.”321 Crump led a team of enslaved sawyers.322 William Aliff’s departure 
must have been particularly troublesome. A lead kettle-tender and lead sawyer, he bore 
dual responsibilities. A furnace required six kettle-tenders who ensured that the expensive 
boiling pans shipped in from Pittsburgh never ran dry. Kettle-tenders worked in pairs on 
eight hour rotations.323 The quality and quantity of the factory’s salt depended heavily on 
how well the kettle tenders performed. These were positions given to more trusted 
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workers, but trust only went so far. By January, Shrewsbury had found John McConahay 
to “work among the woodcutters,” but it was still “necessary for some person at the 
furnaces to be up all night among the kettle tenders to see they do their duty.”324  
Free workers who failed to hear the call of home from the East might have found 
themselves beckoned by the West instead. Salt-workers generally occupied the lowest 
rungs of the white, socio-economic ladder. While the owners of the salt-works were the 
elite of the valley, common salt-workers could claim no such status. The promise of 
better fortunes in the Great West, the burgeoning Ohio Valley and other salt producing 
regions like Big Sandy lured free workers; those Shrewsbury had referred to as “the 
rabble.” The scarcity and migratory nature of free labor led Stealey to summarize, 
“Historians usually pose the question about the alternative use of free white or slave 
labor—a choice not confronted by western Virginia entrepreneurs. In the Salines, there 
was never enough free labor available for employment in all phases of the salt industry. 
The real choice was between no or insufficient labor or slave labor.”325 Shrewsbury’s 
letters rarely fail to support Stealey’s assertion. 
Western Virginians’ 1861 decision at the Wheeling Convention to separate from 
the Old Dominion and remain with the North should not give the impression that 
Kanawha salt-makers resorted to exploiting slave labor reluctantly.326 Of the salt-makers, 
only the Ruffners were known to openly oppose slavery, though it is not known to what 
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degree they relied on the enslaved.327 Salt-makers appear to have experienced little 
dissonance of conscience regarding slavery. They may not have had enough free labor to 
meet their needs but there is little indication Kanawhans would have chosen free men 
over the enslaved even if enough free workers had been available.  
Not only was slave labor less likely to leave at will, though the Ohio River and 
freedom must have seemed torturously close, manufacturers carefully calculated that 
enslaved workers cost less than free labor. In a January 27, 1835 petition to the state 
assembly, salt-makers wrote, “Slave labor is usually cheaper than free and for the 
business in which we are engaged it is believed to be the best.”328 This judgment rested 
on economics and availability rather than on moral arguments. Based on diaries and court 
depositions, Stealey calculated that the cost to rent, feed, house, clothe, pay taxes on, and 
care for a slave was $275.00 per year. The wages and board for a free worker cost the 
employer over $575.00 per year.329 Even if free labor was available, most salt-makers 
believed using slaves a better choice.  
The nature of the work in the Kanawha varied, as might be expected in a valley 
where men pursued industries as diverse as farming, boat-building, mining, salt-making, 
and other activities. While it is difficult to apply sweeping generalizations to the work 
environment, some descriptions may be applied. Salt companies did not make up the 
entire industrial landscape, but they did dominate it. Moreover, hierarchically structured 
salt companies often owned the region’s ancillary industries and would have maintained 
similar attitudes in the supporting concerns as in the salt manufactory. Whites generally 
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occupied positions of authority, just as Crump and Aliff led Dickinson-Shrewsbury’s 
timber-cutters and kettle-tenders. This should not suggest that slaves did not hold 
positions of authority though. Given the shortage of white labor and the disdain which 
salt facility owners seemed to hold for itinerant free labor, it is not surprising that slaves 
worked their way into positions of authority over other slaves. In 1811, at the Oxford Iron 
Works near Lynchburg, of the nearly 220 men working at the foundry, only three were 
reported to be white. The four furnace keepers, positions of extraordinary importance at a 
foundry, were enslaved. Moreover, the man responsible for all the day to day operations 
of this important industrial concern was a slave named Abram.330 To Kanawha 
businessmen already well aware of the large Lynchburg foundry and its inner workings, 
slaves in positions of responsibility would have been nothing unusual. 
Salt-making was a high-volume, low- margin industry, with labor, even slave 
labor, constituting a significant expense for Kanawha industries. In 1814, the Kanawha 
Valley produced 640,000 bushels of the essential mineral, twice the amount of any other 
state. Thirty-two years later the Valley generated over three million bushels.331 Despite 
the efforts of salt-makers to organize, limit production, and dictate prices, the price of salt 
often hovered little above production costs. With production limitations eliminating the 
ability to make more salt to boost the revenues needed to offset the high fixed costs, men 
like Shrewsbury and the Ruffners felt tremendous pressure to cut expenses. Even small 
increases in efficiency yielded significant savings. The airline industry offers a modern 
day equivalent in the now well-known story of American Airlines’ removal of one olive 
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from its salads and the $40,000.00 per year savings the cut is reputed to have yielded.332 
It is fitting that this parallel should arise from the commercial aviation industry, another 
field with high infrastructural and fixed costs combined with low margins that has also 
been accused of price collusion.  
Low margins in salt-making did not spawn the idea of cost-cutting, but it certainly 
pushed Kanawhans to innovatively use all their resources, including slaves. Like other 
valley innovations, Kanawhans adapted, tweaked, and refined the jobs and the work 
environment to best meet their needs. As Virginians, tobacco agriculture formed the 
backdrop to which early salt-makers were accustomed. This was also the industry in 
which most of the slaves were inculcated. However, tobacco was a waning crop in 
eastern Virginia. In Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia 
and Maryland 1606-1820, Avery Craven offers, “The statements of both planters and 
travelers in the period from 1785 to 1820 bear witness of the continuance of exhausting 
cultivation, of wasted lands, abandoned fields, neglected stock and shifting 
crops.”333Amidst this troubling agricultural landscape, falling tobacco prices, and 
aggressive competition from new tobacco-growing areas such as Kentucky, slave owners 
in eastern Virginia and Maryland deemed a portion of their slaves to be assets that they 
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could no longer afford to work themselves. Selling their excess slaves was an option, but 
some owners felt a reluctance to sell their human property.334  
Given the complicated nature of slavery and the myriad slave-owner 
relationships, attitudes toward selling slaves could be complex. Reasons for hiring out 
rather than selling slaves varied. Some owners suggested that personal concern prompted 
their reluctance to sell. One Virginian wrote, “I send Letitia to you for hire—she is smart 
and active but obstinate, obtain for her a strict but humane master.”335 At times, 
discomfort with permanently breaking family units may have contributed to an 
unwillingness to sell slaves. This need not have been based on paternalistic or even 
humanistic concern for the security of the slave family. Owners could well have deemed 
the slaves more productive and less prone toward recalcitrance if slave families remained 
relatively intact.336 
On occasions, recalcitrance served as a reason not to sell a slave. Owners, fearing 
that a rebellious slave might fetch little in sales, chose instead to lease their challenging 
property to a master known for breaking slaves’ will. Slave owners hoped that after 
hiring out insolent or otherwise uncooperative property to slave-breakers for a year, the 
slave would return docile and productive. One such man figured prominently in the life 
of Frederick Douglass. Douglass wrote of Edward Covey, “he enjoyed a reputation of 
being a first rate hand at breaking young negroes. This Covey was a poor man, a farm 
renter; and his reputation for being a good hand to break in slaves was of immense 
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pecuniary advantage to him.” After this introduction, Douglass offered the slaveholder’s 
perspective, “Some slaveholders thought it an advantage to let Mr. Covey have the 
government of their slaves for a year or two, almost free of charge, for the sake of the 
excellent training they had under his management.” Douglass then continued of Covey, 
“Like some horse-breakers noted for their skill, who ride the best horses in the country 
without expense, Mr. Covey could have under him the most fiery bloods of the 
neighbourhood [sic] for the reward of returning them to their owners well broken.” 337 
For some whites, slave ownership correlated to concepts of success and social 
stature. Selling slaves outright could lead to a decline in community position. Historian 
Jonathan Martin summarized this well in Divided Mastery. “Property in slaves was a 
touchstone of both patriarchy and whiteness in the South, and as such it was fundamental 
to constructions of self-worth and personal identity.”338 This may account for the 
transition at the Oxford Iron Works in central Virginia. In February 1777, David Ross, 
the iron-works owner, advertised that he wished to hire “50 or 60 Negro men for one, 
two, or three years.” By 1812, Ross proudly announced, “…every branch of the business 
is carried on by Servants belonging to the Estate, we have no hirelings above the rank of 
woodcutter.”339 Ross shows evident pride in owning all the significant tools of production 
in his large iron foundry, having risen above the need to rent workers. Ross’ pride 
substantiates Martin’s assertion that owning slaves carried a higher civic worth than the 
ability to hire them for some nineteenth century Virginians.  
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In simple economic terms, some slave owners may have viewed their situation as 
a temporary imbalance between their labor resources and their labor needs. Since surely 
an imbalance would right itself in time, they felt selling slaves an unwise choice in the 
long term. Still others weighed the profits from selling against the profits from leasing. 
These slave owners judged leasing their slaves a more profitable affair than selling them 
or personally working them. In one letter asking an owner to lease his slaves, Shrewsbury 
wrote, “I think your own hands would meet (sic) you more than to keep them on your 
farms, as their wages would be valuable and worth a good price to you and the profits 
resulting also would more than double your farm profits and would be humanely 
treated.”340 As slave owners contemplated whether to sell the property that they often 
long sought to amass, the suggestions of whites seeking to lease slaves for a year must 
have seemed the perfect solution. Regardless of the causes for motivation or hesitation, 
hiring out slaves offered an honorable and profitable compromise.341 
Budding salt industrialists often found themselves less troubled by complicating 
factors in decisions of slave ownership versus slave hiring. The capital outlays required to 
purchase the land for timber, pay a well driller for his costly exploration, and buy the 
expensive equipment including steam engines, pumps, and the massive iron reduction 
tanks, generally left little in the coffers for the outright purchase of slaves.342 Salt-makers 
carefully weighed all the known costs of owning versus hiring slaves. Kanawhan 
industrialists generally used a rule of thumb that if a slave could be leased for no more 
than 20 percent of the purchase price, they were better off hiring. When Dickinson wrote 
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to Shrewsbury “the customary price for hire is $70 to $90 but the owners will not 
permeit[sic] them to out of the neighborhood, I am told there was upward of 70 sold at 
Rivers for Cash, 500  to 650$ [sic] common plantation hands,” he was conveying far 
more than price.343 Shrewsbury would have interpreted Dickinson’s message to mean 
several other things. First, without cold hard cash, obtaining labor of any sort was 
unlikely. He would have also understood that renting was a far better option than buying 
if they could find owners who would let them leave central Virginia. If owners would not 
lease their slaves to work out of that area for $70.00 to $90.00, they would have to pay a 
premium. Shrewsbury would have quickly figured that they could pay owners an 
additional $30.00 to $40.00 per slave in exchange for allowing the slave to work in the 
Kanawha Valley. Above that, it was preferable to buy them outright.  
Some businessmen could ill-afford the dozens of slaves it would require to 
operate a salt-works. As the wealth of the salt firms increased, the propensity to purchase 
rather than hire slaves seems to have increased, suggesting that owning slaves was 
considered more advantageous than renting if finances allowed the heavier initial 
outlay.344 Convenience and economy, no doubt lay at the forefront of industrialists’ 
minds as they made their labor decisions. It was difficult to separate the two concerns. 
The saying “Time is Money” is particularly apt in this case. Dickinson-Shrewsbury 
correspondence almost invariably contains passages entreating the letters’ recipients to 
reply quickly, send workers, send equipment, and make decisions hastily. The letters 
convey frustration with the speed of communication and an urgency that time lost 
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equated to money lost. Renting slaves required time. It consumed additional precious 
time every year. 
At the end of November 1816, Shrewsbury wrote Dickinson, “you will please 
provide for to send to me some hands either by purchase or hire if we could possibly 
procure some by purchase it would sute [sic] us much better the trouble, expence [sic], 
and loss of time in hiring and sending them home is considerable.”345 Shrewsbury’s letter 
illuminates that while hiring slaves required less money initially, there were not-so-
hidden costs inherent in the arrangement. While Shrewsbury’s call for more hands must 
have seemed incessant to his partner in Bedford County, the timing of this particular 
entreaty is noteworthy. As Shrewsbury wrote, looming in the forefront of his mind must 
have been the concern that, in just one month, as much as half of his enslaved workforce 
would put down their tools and begin walking eastward out of the valley. Salt-makers 
like Shrewsbury were not only powerless to stop this mass exodus, they had agreed to it 
in advance.  
The agreements made between slave owner and hirer primarily reflect concerns of 
the property owner. Foremost among the provisions of slave hiring agreements were 
arrangements to ensure that the slaves were returned in good condition.346 With this in 
mind, the standard hiring agreement was for a period of nearly one year, beginning on the 
first day of January and ending on the following Christmas. Slaves were to return to their 
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owners by Christmas in good condition. The time between Christmas and New Year was 
generally considered a holiday for hired slaves.347 Not only did this slash the workforce, 
but if slaves were thought at all prone to heed a call of freedom from nearby Ohio, whites 
had to be hired to escort them to their owners in the East. In 1818, Shrewsbury delayed 
returning Mrs. Williamson’s slave back, writing to his partner, “I have kept Tom, 
Spencer and Abram a week longer than I shd [sic] expecting some information from you 
and receiving none, have started them home with a pass and money to bear their expences 
[sic] and as they are sensible negroes and desirous to get home have thought it not 
necessary to be at the expense of hiring a hand to go with them.”348 This sort of delay 
would not have been unnoticed by the slaves’ owners. One slave owner wrote to 
Dickinson, “Col. Dickinson. I want to know what is the reason my Negroes has not got 
home against your promise. I have been looking for them several days. I am geting verry 
[sic] uneasy about them. Please write to me when they started home and oblieige. Betsy 
Stratton.”349 Stratton’s curt note dispensed with niceties. She bluntly informed Dickinson 
that he had broken his word and failed to honor his part in their arrangement. 
Unfortunately, no record of Dickinson’s response exists to enlighten as to how the 
Colonel responded to this woman’s accusation that he had failed to honor his word. 
Interestingly, while Shrewsbury wrote about keeping Williamson’s slaves longer than he 
should, he made no mention of Stratton’s slaves. Shrewsbury also failed to write that 
Williamson’s slave Abram was not only late returning, less of him was returning than had 
departed a year earlier. In April 1818, “Williamson’s Abram…fell down and cut two of 
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his fingers off and the other two nearly off his left hand which has rendered him of no 
service and never will be of much service again.”350 There is no record evident of what 
negotiations ensued after Williamson’s (or perhaps Abram’s) loss. Presumably the lack of 
fingers is why Shrewsbury specified to Dickinson that he would like to have 
Williamson’s Tom and Spencer back in 1819, but failed to mention wanting Abram 
again. 
Those hiring slaves not only found returning the hired slaves to their owners a 
troublesome arrangement, but slave owners also became increasingly specific about the 
care and working conditions of their slaves. While it has been suggested that slave 
owners included few provisions to protect the welfare of their property, other historians 
have found just the opposite.351 The variance probably reflects an evolution in slave 
hiring contracts. Early arrangements may have included few restrictive clauses as farmers 
leased field hands to each other or as the owner of a stone mason or carpenter rented their 
skilled artisan to a neighbor for duties related specifically to that specialized skill. As the 
practice expanded, agricultural slaves became more likely to find themselves laboring at 
unfamiliar industrial pursuits. Industries like the Kanawha salt concerns pulled workers 
far afield from their owners. Unfortunate accidents also provided often painful lessons to 
slaves and slave owners. All these served as stimuli for additional stipulations to protect 
their property. Hiring agreements from the Kanawha provide an example of this. After 
cholera epidemics rolled though the Kanawha, killing a far higher proportion of blacks 
than whites, stipulations for evacuating slaves in the case of cholera became more 
                                                          
     350 Joel Shrewsbury to William Dickinson, May 12, 1818. In possession of author. 
     351 Marcus Christian, Negro Ironworkers of Louisiana: 1718-1900 (Gretna, Louisiana: 
Publican Publishing, 1972), 199. 
133 
 
common. John Cabell wrote in December 1832 that “a great many Negroes have been 
taken away by their owners on account of the Cholera being hard last fall, thinking it may 
come again next year. I have not hired half as many as I want.”352 By 1849, slave rental 
agreements generally contained provisions for the slaves’ safety in the case of a cholera 
outbreak.353 
Later hiring arrangements seem to more freely present the concerns of the 
individual owners. Clement Eaton highlights the correspondence of Virginians that 
stipulate special care be taken when hiring out their property. Owners carefully specified 
that the slaves were to be well cared for, and even allowed to visit their families 
periodically. These examples, however, were almost unfailingly concerns over house 
slaves. 354 Well trained house slaves were unquestionably valuable. Their demeanor 
would have been of particular importance to masters and mistresses. Frequent interaction 
with and working proximity to whites gave greater reason for masters and mistresses to 
see to their slaves needs. Whether this stemmed from a genuine concern for the slaves’ 
happiness or simply an understanding that slaves who saw their families worked better 
and were more pleasant to interact with probably varied by individual master-slave 
relationship.   
This level of concern for slaves’ happiness is not evident in Kanawha slave hiring 
agreements. One such contract was typical for its careful terms in which it was written. 
These were Virginians well versed in the state’s legal conventions. The contract states: 
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And the said William doth hereby surrender and hire to said Henry W. four negroes 
belonging to said William for the year 1859 at the price of five hundred dollars to be paid 
by said Henry to said William at the end of the year and then according to the usage of the 
country, pay their taxes and doctors bills, which negroes are named as follows, Bob, Sam, 
David and George—and the said William B. doth surrender and hire to said furnace for the 
year 1859 on the same terms and conditions and at the same prices given by said William 
and under control as trustee afore being Bill, Moka, Peter, Paris, Edmund, Abraham, Allen, 
Isaac, seven negroe men; at the hire of one hundred fifty dollars each and also to clothe 
them as aforesaid, pay their taxes and doctors bills.355 
While some had more specific provisions regarding slave treatment this example is 
typical in that they agreed only to maintain the slave in good, healthy condition, pay their 
taxes, and for their physicians. It reflects little overt regard for their state of contentment. 
The distances from the Kanawha to the agricultural centers of Virginia precluded family 
visits, so provisions discussing familial visits would have been pointless, even if they had 
been considered. The bottom line of the agreement was to make certain that the taxes 
were paid and that the slaves were returned with the same capacity for work that they had 
a year earlier. 
The broad and powerful Kanawha River, an industrial thruway teeming with boats 
and wharves, posed multiple dangers. A slave drowning in the strong currents was not an 
uncommon event. Perhaps of more concern to whites was the river’s obvious 44 mile 
path to Ohio. Unlike the Low Country rice plantation slaves who fled their masters, found 
survival in the fetid swamps unbearable, returned to those masters, and often received 
harsh punishments for their bid for freedom, slaves in the Kanawha saw a clear, close, 
and comparatively easy route north.356 The steamboats carrying salt provided constant 
opportunities for a short ride out of bondage. Notices of runaway slaves appear in the 
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Kanawha papers, but those newspapers do not seem to have been rife with runaway 
advertisements.357 This may be because masters assumed that their property had headed 
west, and chose to advertise for their return directly across from Ohio in Point Pleasant, 
Virginia.  
Given visitors’ unpleasant descriptions of Kanawha Salines as a sooty, foul, 
deforested environment punctuated by factories with furnaces that boiled enormous vats 
of blood-red brine crowded along a greasy river replete with rotting animal corpses, it 
seems a wonder that slave owners would rent to Kanawhans at all. The significant 
premium they gained by agreeing that their slaves work in this environment convinced 
many though. In 1838, slaves hired to work in eastern Virginia fetched $90.00 per year. 
To work in Kanawha County, eastern slaves leased for $150.00. 358 Likewise, a Virginia 
Supreme Court heard an appeal in which it was introduced and accepted as evidence that 
slaves hired to the Kanawha Valley at a 25 to 30 percent premium.359 On occasion, some 
sought to protect their property by specifying their slaves not labor in mines or should be 
put to work in cooperages, reputedly the safest place in the salt industry to work. It is 
questionable to what degree the slave owners actually believed that salt-makers would 
follow their specifications. One Bedford County resident, the same county in which 
William Dickinson resided, complained that it was common knowledge in the area that 
the juries were “gotten up by Salt makers and Men of influence at the Salines—who 
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never fail to hang the jury or find against a foreigner.”360 The validity of this complaint is 
unknown. However, it would have been uncharacteristic of Kanawhans to fail to use, 
manipulate or adjust every tool at their disposal to render them useful to their purposes. 
The nature of slavery in the Kanawha, like slavery elsewhere is difficult to 
characterize. Nevertheless, for slaves working in the industrial sectors of the valley, some 
descriptions can be offered. The predominance of hired slaves and the seemingly 
perennial shortage of workers in the early decades of valley salt manufacturing combined 
to significantly influence the nature of slavery. While it may not have not have comprised 
an actual step toward freedom, these circumstances favored a curtailing of masters’ rights 
and a corresponding ability to exercise somewhat greater power by the slaves. In an effort 
to standardize the production for greater efficiency, to minimize fluctuations in quality, 
and to manage formerly agricultural slaves more efficiently, work was “routinized” to the 
highest degree feasible. Standardization resulted in an environment where slaves received 
specific repetitive quotas or repetitive work shifts. Masters encouraged slaves to labor 
after their shifts, and paid them for this work. This system called “overwork” allowed 
slaves to earn credit for working on Sundays or holidays. This increased production, kept 
slaves busy during any non-productive hours, and provided the opportunity to earn 
money for themselves rather than for others. Masters carried these credits on the books 
until the end of the year and paid them out at Christmas. As Shrewsbury sent Mrs. 
Williamson’s slaves back to Bedford County, he sent with them a note, “Please pay the 
negroe boys in Store Goods as follows viz Spencer Nine and half dollars, Tom Six and 
half Dollars, Abram four Dollars for labour of Sundays and Christmas.”361 It seems likely 
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that Abram’s loss of his fingers prevented him from working as many Sundays and 
holidays as his compatriots. Holding pay until the end of the year encouraged obedience. 
This was particularly important in an environment where slaves were numerous and 
exercised considerable ability to move about the countryside without supervision.  
The nature of Kanawha industry itself led to greater degrees of slave autonomy. 
The Kanawha Salines was a veritable hive of activity around the clock. Salt-works sat 
close together along the river. Multiple cooperages, smithies, foundries, boatyards, 
warehouses, mills, and other commercial efforts packed the narrow river plain. The hills 
on either side swarmed with workers hauling timber and coal to feed the insatiable 
furnaces. Farms dotted the narrow strips of flat lands between the river industries, hillside 
mines, and remaining timber tracts. Amidst all this, slaves moved with relative autonomy 
within the bounds of their tasks. Additionally, the enslaved were permitted considerable 
ability to roam when they finished their shifts or met their daily quota.362 In a narrow 
valley of crowded factories where thousands of slaves toiled, it would have been difficult 
to ascertain that each slave was where they should be. Brine-works and their ancillary 
industries maintained a constant flow of barrels, tools, wood, coal, salt, and other goods. 
The Kanawha environment had much more in common with the bustling Charleston, 
South Carolina described by Robert Olwell than the Virginia tobacco planting country 
from which the slaves of the Kanawha tended to be pulled.363  
The heightened ability to travel is underscored by Shrewsbury’s choice to send 
Mrs. Williamson’s slaves unescorted on the days long walk back to Bedford County. 
Another letter reflects this same level of trust. Mr. Lewis writes, “This letter will be 
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handed to you by negro, Stephen, who belongs to my son-in-law, Mr. Floyd, and who 
brought down a family of negroes, and is returning empty, but Mrs. Floyd recollected that 
Shepherd Brown of Wythe, wanted Salt hauled, and has proposed that her man goes by 
the Saltworks to take a load up to Brown.”364 Wythe County and Kanawha County 
Virginia lie roughly 130 miles apart. In a valley with the highest concentration of slaves 
west of the Allegheny Mountains, most working within and between numerous salt-
works and their ancillary industries, monitoring the movements of slaves would have 
proved extremely difficult. Carrying “overwork” credits on the books until the year of 
work finished served as a useful tool of control in a bustling area so close to freedom.  
Salt-makers also sought to promote a willingness to work through competition. 
Inter-company rivalries proliferated. Workers competed with rival company workers 
boasting that they could out-produce them individually and as groups. Competitions 
extended to contests to see which furnaces could produce the most salt in the least 
amount of time. Bragging if not outright lying about productive capabilities was 
reported.365 Also in the spirit of competition, Dickinson-Shrewsbury Company owned 
two slaves listed as “race-riders.” One wonders if the horse and jockey owners such as 
Dickinson and Shrewsbury intended horse racing merely for the entertainment of the 
owners or if this also served as a tool to manage black workers.366  
Inter-company rivalry was not the only and certainly not the most serious 
competition occurring. Salt-makers were hardly the only businessmen seeking to hire 
workers for a year. In years when agricultural prices rose, owners had less incentive to 
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hire slaves out to industries. Iron-works, railroads and canal companies, mines, and other 
industries vied for the right to control others’ slaves for a year. Amidst this strong 
competition to hire slaves, Kanawhans paid premiums to mitigate the problem of distance 
and location. They had a strong incentive to treat the slaves well. If they failed to treat 
them well, the slave could tell their owner of it. The owner could then decide to hire his 
slave out to someone else next year. In a valley seemingly always short of workers, it was 
very much in the salt-makers’ best interests for the slave to want to return for another 
year.367 
The ability to influence their owners’ decision regarding to whom they should be 
rented, if at all, was among the strongest tools in the hired slaves’ arsenal. Often slaves 
needed to acquiesce to being sent to the Kanawha, if only half-heartedly. Iron 
manufacturer, Davis Ross lamented having to use a white miller at his iron-works after 
his slave miller, Billy Bacon, insisted on being hired out. Ross wrote, “if I could have 
prevailed on him to have gone to my mill at the Iron Works, I would not have taken forty 
pounds a year for him.”368 While hired slaves could exercise power based on the shared 
knowledge that they were a prized commodity to be treated relatively well in hope they 
would return, this should not be stretched to the point to suggest that these slaves wanted 
to be in the Kanawha. Many may have preferred the relatively greater ability to roam, the 
opportunity to earn money for themselves on a regular basis, and the bustling slave 
community, but the Kanawha was probably just the lesser of the evils. 
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It would also be wrong to suggest that slaves on the Kanawha felt that theirs was 
the best of situations for a man owned by another. Many undoubtedly preferred to remain 
on the tobacco farms of eastern and central Virginia. On their 1814 trip from Bedford 
County west to the Kanawha, Shrewsbury, with then partner Pleasant Dickinson and 
several hired slaves made the dangerous journey in the winter on “the worst road you 
ever knew for Waggons [sic] to travel.” Shrewsbury pointed out that “William Terry’s 
negroes was loth [sic] to go—but have had no trouble with them and believe they will 
sute [sic] us extremely well.”369 They had good cause to fear the trip. On the journey a 
tired slave Jim, mangled his leg. Shrewsbury described that Jim had his “foot slip from 
the Swingletree and the Waggon [sic] wheel caught his foot and leg and hurt him 
tolerable bad…”370 The party proceeded on the days long journey despite Jim’s injured 
leg. Given the dangers of the journey, it seems little wonder that Jim was “loth to go.” 
Why Ross’ miller prevailed in his wish to be hired out in Richmond and Terry’s 
slaves were coerced to the Kanawha anyway cannot be pinpointed. William Terry may 
have had debts with Dickinson and Shrewsbury that had to be cleared (as local 
merchants, that was certainly a plausible situation). In 1814, when the Shrewsbury-
Dickinson party moved west, the demand for hired slaves was likely less strong than it 
became, leaving the slaves with less power to argue for a better position. Certainly at that 
early stage, the Kanawha salt industry was young and the work more likely to involve 
arduously sinking gums in the wilderness than “routinized” work in an established 
industrial hub. William Terry’s slaves notwithstanding, the enslaved operated within a 
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system that favored the slaves’ ability to influence their work by complaining to their 
owner of poor treatment and misuse of their property. In a competitive hiring 
environment, this was a powerful tool. 
The enhanced opportunity to pit whites against whites was not the only arena in 
which to exert power. Kanawha slaves in the first few decades of the 19th century 
possessed other methods to make their presence felt without overtly challenging authority 
or running away. Even as they completed assigned tasks, slaves showed they could work 
within the rules and still express power. Describing the Leftwichs, who rented Dickinson 
and Shrewsbury’s first furnace, Shrewsbury wrote, “the Renters goes on of late tolerable 
smooth. I believe they find it best as their complaints has produced a hatred from the 
wood cutters of Burke and when they complain they send in all sweet gum which is hard 
to make burn when first cut, When they go on properly they forward the wood as it 
comes to hand.”371 Burke’s slaves, while remaining within the expectation of their tasks, 
managed to convey to whites that it was best to take what wood the slaves offered or they 
receive worse. Judging from Shrewsbury’s comments, it seems that the whites complied. 
Not all slave resistance was as benign as that of Burke’s wood cutters. In April 
1818, when Williamson’s slave Abram fell while cutting timber and cut two of his 
fingers off and the other two nearly off his left hand, some thought it intentional. 
Shrewsbury observed, “I will miss his services very much as he was more handy than the 
rest and a good chopper. He is much suspected by Aliff and all of doing it willfully, tho 
[sic] I think it was an accident.”372 The unfortunate description of Abram as “handy” 
aside, Shrewsbury’s comments about the conjecture surrounding Abram’s intent 
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provokes thought. That it was suggested that Abram, a capable and “handy” slave would 
permanently and painfully render himself useless, raises questions. If Abram did indeed 
remove his digits he knew that he was risking infection and death. Perhaps worse, as a 
vastly devalued slave, there was far less incentive for his owner to retain him and far 
more likelihood that he could be sold into even worse circumstances. This presents a 
picture of an environment which Abram found so unbearable that he was willing to risk 
illness, death, or unknown fates to end his Kanawhan situation. This seems extreme, and 
is impossible to know, but it calls into question the degree to which slaves felt that they 
could exercise other forms of power. 
Just the existence of the conjecture about how Abram’s injury came about speaks 
to white perspectives. Either they were blind to the realities of Abram’s existence, or they 
were inclined to think the slave so lazy that he would dangerously and painfully maim 
himself to avoid work. Presumably, whites who thought his amputation self-inflicted 
assumed that only laziness would drive the slave to such an action and disregarded the 
possibility that the Kanawha existence they created for slaves was unbearable. This 
ventures into the complex web of rationalizations that whites created to uphold slavery, 
and is far beyond the scope of this exercise. It does however, highlight the difficulty in 
summarizing the labor experience even in a region as small as the Kanawha Valley in the 
first few decades of the nineteenth century. Dickinson and Shrewsbury themselves, 
underscore the variable nature of the slave experience. In the lists of Dickinson-
Shrewsbury Company’s nearly 150 company owned slaves, Dickinson claimed 18 as his 
personal property. Among those listed were four coopers, each described as a “fair hand”,  
Grundy, a “race rider”; Yellow Morris, a barber; Yellow John, a Horse Trainer; and 
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others who merited little or no description. Among those slaves who earned Dickinson’s 
descriptive notes  were Big Will, “a drunkard and a fiddler” as well as Washington, a 60 
year old who Dickinson noted “will steal more in one week than he can earn in 12 
months.” Also noteworthy were Dennis, “an unmanageable negro—not valuable” and 
Joseph, described as “sickly and afflicted.”373  
These tart assessments of nearly one third of those Dickinson claimed, contrast 
strongly the attitude Shrewsbury evinced in a May 1819 letter in which he wrote, “I am 
this day imployed [sic] in Burying my negro boy LUKE he died last night after about six 
days sickness, was taken violent inflamatory Feaver [sic] which would yield to no 
medicine, bleeding, blistering nor anything the best Phicisians [sic] in this Country could 
do, which Phicisians I had to him the day he was taken and remained till he died without 
leaving the place. I miss Luke very much as he was a fine Waggoneer.”374 Shrewsbury’s 
description of Luke as a “waggoneer” should not necessarily lead the reader to dismiss 
Shrewsbury as a master lamenting the loss of a valuable economic tool. Nor was this the 
sadness for loss of a house slave, such as the valet reputed to be his son. The immediate 
summons of physicians and the subsequent requirement that they remain with Luke 
around the clock until he died indicate a concern born out of more than economics 
surrounding a slave who held a position of no particular elevation or unusual skill level. 
He drove wagons. This should not in any way suggest that the Kanawha Valley was a 
region of inhabitants prone to deep attachments between slave and master. Dickinson’s 
summation of his slaves and the rumors that Abram had intentionally removed his own 
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fingers should quell that idea. The overall understanding that arises is that slavery was 
endlessly malleable.  
Just as it reinvented, adapted, or twisted the technological, environmental, and 
economic resources at hand to respond nimbly to changes in national salt markets, valley 
industrialists altered their tools of labor. When local or free labor proved far too scarce, 
they turned naturally to slave labor. Indeed, many may have never looked to free labor. 
They achieved efficiency and quality by standardizing and routinizing industrial tasks for 
laborers steeped in tobacco growing. As competition for labor units grew, hired slaves 
found they could exercise greater power about their workplace. This provided the salt-
maker’s with more incentive to create an environment which was preferable to slaves 
while continuing to increase productive efficiency. The salt-makers of the Kanawha did 
not invent the “overwork” system, but they pressed it into service and used it as a tool to 
motivate slaves. They also counted on it to keep slaves from nearby non-slave states. As 
was typical of Kanawha salt industrialists, they employed a broad, flexible, pragmatic, 
and relentlessly resourceful approach to the human tools of production in their 
antebellum industrialization of Appalachia. 
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On February 25, 1829, the Western Virginian crowed to readers, “The pickling 
business has increased within the last four years at an astonishing rate. Cincinnati alone 
has put up from 100 to 150 thousand hogs—and no doubt a great portion of the hogs now 
taken to market on foot, will in a few years go in the shape of pickled pork or bacon, by 
the Mississippi to the Southern States and the Ohio, New York and Pennsylvania canals 
to the North.”375 Proclaiming the achievement of early Kanawha industrialists’ visions 
the writer continued, “The great Western States must be the immense provision stores for 
the planters of the South and the manufacturers of the North. In this way our salt will find 
a market nearly throughout the union.”376 The proud and confident prediction of 
continued national expansion for Kanawha salt markets sprang from the original visions 
of men like the Ruffner Brothers, William Dickinson, and Joel Shrewsbury. The 
exuberant forecast for continued growth held true, but only for a while.  
Continuing their well-established pattern of capitalist innovation regardless of 
proximity or scale, Kanawha salt did indeed permeate markets “nearly throughout the 
union.” In 1810, Kanawha County produced 740,000 bushels of salt. By 1840, production 
reached 1.6 million bushels. Just a decade later, that number had nearly doubled to 3.03 
million bushels.377 Kanawhans achieved this growth by continuing along the path of 
innovation, broad perspective, and relentless capitalism. This included the hallmarks of 
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unrestrained capitalism; severe environmental and human exploitation. Census figures 
indicating leaps in Kanawha County slave population relative to white population attest 
to human exploitation in particular. Between 1810 and 1820, slave populations grew at a 
rate of 6o percent to 1,717 people compared to a 40 percent increase in white residents. 
The growth of the slave population relative to the white population continued until 1850, 
when 3,140 slaves labored in the valley.378 Of those enslaved, half were owned or 
controlled directly by firms in the salt industry.379 
Among the innovations employed by Kanawhans to achieve this explosive 
growth, the Patrick grainer system is worth noting. In 1833, George Patrick invented a 
system of brine reduction which revolutionized the industry.380 That same year, the 
Kanawha Banner reported that the Patrick grainer gave Kanawhan industrialists 
unlimited means of production, and that “the salt from this region would have nearly the 
whole territory on the Mississippi and its tributaries…”381 The Patrick grainer was the 
product of the Kanawhans’ rival in the Onondaga salt producing region, yet the very year 
of its invention, Kanawhans altered it to meet their specific conditions and rapidly 
embarked on converting their furnaces. The Patrick system, in effect, transformed 
evaporative salt-making from a batch production process to a continuous stream process. 
Just as the assembly line forever revolutionized production in other industries, so did the 
Patrick grainer system for the salt industry. Kanawhans immediately adopted this new 
technology and put it to use to continue their dominance in inland salt markets. With the 
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Patrick grainer, Kanawhans produced ever larger quantities of salt at increasingly smaller 
costs per bushel. 
Despite valley industry’s efficiency, the century’s midpoint marked the zenith for 
Kanawha salt production. The Virginian salt-makers encountered circumstances that even 
they could not alter, develop a tool to remedy, or conspire to outnumber. As William 
Cronon illuminated in Nature’s Metropolis, the commercial center of the Great West 
shifted with the advent of railroads, Great Lakes shipping, and northern canals.382 When 
Cincinnati ceded the title of Porkopolis to Chicago, Kanawha Valley producers lost the 
geographic advantage they once held and Kanawhans’ domination of inland salt markets 
faded rapidly. Kanawha salt shipments dropped precipitously from over three million 
bushels in 1850 to less than half that figure just five years later.383 The number of slaves 
in the valley plunged correspondingly from 3,140 in 1850 to 2,184, a decline of 30 
percent in just one year.384  
The move of the Great West’s epicenter to the northwest vastly favored the salt-
makers in the Onondaga region of New York and in Michigan. Producers there could rely 
on lakes and canals to transport their product to the packing-houses in the city that Carl 
Sandburg later christened, “Hog Butcher for the World.”385 In 1859, the Michigan 
legislature passed an act encouraging the production of salt within the state. All 
Michigan-produced salt was exempted from state taxes. Additionally, the state agreed to 
pay a bonus of $0.10 per bushel to a firm once it had created $5,000.00 worth of salt.386 
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This state incentive energized the Michigan salt industry into becoming a serious 
competitor with far better access to the now preeminent Chicago markets.387  
Other competitors muscled forward to chip away at Kanawhan hegemony of Ohio 
Valley salt markets; some newly arisen, some long-standing competitors. Brine 
discovered at the confluence of the Little Kanawha River and the Ohio River, near 
present day Parkersburg, proved stronger and far closer to Chicago markets, adding new 
competition for Kanawhans. Far away in the Caribbean, the enslaved had long produced 
salt from sea water. In ports like New Orleans, desirable “Turks Island” salt was readily 
available, but getting the salt upriver proved too costly to compete with Kanawhan salt. 
With the growth of steamboat traffic, cotton from the Mississippi River Valley and the 
bounty of the Ohio Valley such as pork and wheat filled steamboats headed downstream 
for New Orleans. However, riverboat owners struggled to fill their holds with cargo for 
upstream voyages. Accordingly, they cut prices for upstream cargo, rendering Caribbean 
salt more accessible upriver. All these factors contributed to the erosion of the Kanawha 
Valley’s dominance.388 
Transportation had always comprised a significant portion of the mineral’s cost 
for Kanawha Valley producers. Shipping salt down the Kanawha River to the Ohio, then 
down the Ohio to the Mississippi, up to the Illinois River to the Illinois and Michigan 
Canal, then an additional 96 miles on the canal to Chicago added costs that left valley 
industrialists unable to compete for the Chicago market. While losing a geographic 
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advantage might have been overcome in some industries, in the low-margin, high-volume 
salt industry, it proved crippling. 
Faced with increased competition and a significant geographic shift in their 
primary markets, Kanawhans did not fall back onto the small-scale agriculture often 
associated with Appalachian economies. As Kanawha salt’s reign over the nation’s 
abattoir ended, Kanawhan commercial visions not only failed to turn pastoral, they also 
failed to diminish in scope. Showing characteristic global vision and flexibility, area 
industrialists reasserted their commitment to extractive industries.  
In 1848, a Colonel Stockton, who had been shipping coal out of the Kanawha 
Valley by flatboat, discovered a vein of oil-rich shale seven feet thick.389 Two years later 
in Scotland, James Young obtained a patent for a method of extracting oil from the shale 
known as cannel coal, or candle coal. This development set off a revolution in lighting. 
Cannel coal oil burned bright, exceptionally smoke-free, and left little residue. It is 
unknown whether salt-makers in the valley understood that the region’s salt industry 
would drastically shrink in just a few years, but given their attention to national and 
international markets, it seems likely that many, if not all, foresaw the industry’s troubled 
future. Even if they did not, Kanawha businessmen constantly sought new opportunities 
to capitalize on any natural resource the region offered. Few valley industrialists would 
have chosen to eschew the profits that sprang from a revolution in lighting simply 
because they were not based on brine. As their industry faded, salt-makers who in many 
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cases already owned coal mines and large tracts of land, diversified further to take 
advantage of the new breakthrough in illumination.390 
The pursuit of cannel coal, as salt markets became untenable, is reminiscent of the 
switch to coal-powered furnaces as wood supplies dwindled, and underscores that the 
history of the Kanawha Valley is of one of complete commitment to industrial pursuits. 
The cannel coal boom faded as the technology to extract the lamp fuel from crude oil 
developed, and kerosene became the primary lamp fuel. At that point however, 
Kanawhans had begun shipping the bromine extracted from brine down the Kanawha to 
Cincinnati, the Queen City of the West had reinvented itself as a soap manufacturing 
center. (Even today, Proctor and Gamble remains based there). Salt-makers continued to 
find every profitable use for brine. 
The significance derived from examining this valley’s late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century history is manifold and primarily valuable in the context of the work 
of Appalachian, environmental, and southern historians. Early Kanawhan businessmen 
held much in common with their counterparts elsewhere in the United States. The 
nation’s late eighteenth and early nineteenth century history is rife with examples of 
fiercely determined and voracious opportunists. Many regions can boast of inhabitants 
who exploited the environment to the point of its utter devastation for rewards from far-
flung markets. In this regard, Kanawhans hardly stand alone. Indeed, the understanding 
that early Kanawhan industrialists were not unique to Appalachia is part of the value of 
                                                          
     390 James T. Laing, “The Early Development of the Coal Industry in the Western Counties of 
Virginia, 1800-1865” West Virginia History: a copyrighted publication of the West Virginia 
Archives and History 2 no. 4, (January 1966):147; Conley, Philip Mallory. Early Coal 
Development in the Kanawha Valley, West Virginia History: a copyrighted publication of the 
West Virginia Archives and History (1946-1947):209. 
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this examination. An antebellum record that includes economic and industrial innovation 
with nation-wide implications, severe environmental degradation, and thousands of 
coerced factory workers might fail to elicit surprise were it to arise from Richmond, 
Lowell, or Philadelphia. While this record is noteworthy, it is only when these realities 
are placed in the heart of Appalachia that they appear extraordinary.  
As has been mentioned, Appalachian historians continue to find it necessary to 
remind readers that the idea of nineteenth century Appalachia as a land apart, populated 
by insular people, is largely a Victorian fable. Despite the constant debunking of these 
myths, Appalachians remain tethered to seemingly unshakeable attributions. On its most 
basic level, this study should help punch yet another small hole in these tenacious myths. 
Perhaps eventually, such debunking will be unnecessary, but for the time being, the 
stereotypes persist, and so the reminders of their falseness remain worthwhile. This, 
however, is not the primary value of this examination.  
The common historical narrative of the industrialization of Appalachia is one of 
internal colonization. Outside exploiters are credited with industrializing Appalachia. In 
the process of extracting natural resources and profits, they destroyed the social fabric of 
local communities as they destroyed the rugged landscape.391 It is against the backdrop of 
this valuable narrative that this examination is perhaps most useful. Kanawha’s salt 
industry stands in stark contrast to this dominant narrative of industrialization. The salt-
makers were not northern capitalists, but in general, former agriculturalists from Virginia. 
While they often relied on credit from outside the region to fund their activities, they 
                                                          
     391 Ronald Eller examines this extensively. For a fuller discussion, see, Ronald D. Eller, 
Miners, Millhands and Mountaineers: Industrialization of the Appalachian South 1880-1930 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982). 
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were not remote businessmen unconcerned with the local social fabric, nor were they 
“big fish in a small pond” who lost their economic and political grip.392 Kanawhan salt-
makers led the community that they help found. They rotated through the local political 
offices just as Clendenin did. They were integral to the social, economic, and political life 
of the valley. Even after the Civil War, salt-makers retained control of the region 
economically and socially. It should not be concluded that narratives of internal 
colonization bear less merit. It should, however, put forward that the common story (even 
in academia) of greedy outsiders tearing open and shredding local economies, 
environments, and communities cannot be assumed, even for the heart of Appalachia. 
The valley’s history also conflicts with common images of the American 
industrial revolution. Not only does Kanawha salt manufacturing occur far from the New 
England and mid-Atlantic factory towns generally associated with the industrialization of 
the country, it happened far earlier. Consequently, the environmental ills that accompany 
industrialization occurred in the early nineteenth century, earlier than one generally 
thinks of foul, blackened air, and undrinkable, greasy, stinking streams. Even when early 
environmental degradation is brought to mind, the cities of the East are seen as the likely 
sites of these ills, not the Mountain West. Contrary to these preconceptions, Virginians 
                                                          
     392 In 1864, the president of the Kanawha Salt Company, J.P Hale had been an officer for the 
Kanawha Infantry Regiment for the Confederacy, He held this important position even though the 
valley was in Union hands at the time. See, “Constitution of the Kanawha Salt Company 1864”  
(Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstack and Baldwin Printers, 1864). West Virginia State Archives. Henry 
Ruffner organized the first Presbyterian church in Charleston. See Otis K. Rice, Charleston and 
the Kanawha Valley  (n.p.: Windsor Publications, 1981) 24. Salt-maker William Dickinson II, son 
of William Dickinson, founded the Kanawha Valley Bank in 1869 with other salt-makers. One 
Valley Bank grew to be the largest bank in West Virginia before it was purchased by BB&T. See 
Bill Drennen , One Kanawha Valley Bank: A History  (Charleston: 2001). 
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had environmentally devastated this region of their state within 20 years of the signing of 
the Constitution. 
Another area where Kanawha Valley salt-making offers fresh perspectives is in 
the light of William Cronon’s superlative book, Nature’s Metropolis. Cronon’s 
examination of Chicago and its hinterlands discusses the momentous shift of the Great 
West northwest to Chicago. Cronon does not, however, attempt to examine the 
ramifications for those cities like Cincinnati, which were left to reestablish their focus 
and re-negotiate economic relationships with their trading partners like the Kanawha 
Valley. This study provides insight into how other metropolises and their commercial 
networks reevaluated their situations in light of Chicagoans’ extraordinary exploits. It 
also offers a somewhat richer and fuller scope to Cronon’s work and adds detail to the 
understanding that the boosters for Chicago did more than build a city; they 
fundamentally changed the histories of places far removed from the shores of Lake 
Michigan. This understanding adds weight to the importance of Cronon’s work. It also 
suggests the value of further study of the cities which had once hoped to dominate the 
Great West and had to reinvent their business bases and renegotiate trade networks in the 
wake of Chicago’s tremendous rise. Examinations of this type could offer a more 
extensive understanding of the environmental and economic shifts and changes that men 
in Chicago and their supporters wrought across the nation. 
Perhaps one of the most valuable perspectives to be gained from this study is the 
insight that if one is to comprehend how these early Appalachians made decisions, it 
must be understood that they viewed themselves as not on the edge of the developed East, 
but at the commercial center of the nation. They perceived that they were one of the 
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primary driving forces of an economic engine, not marginal, but central. Thus, if one 
views early Kanawhans and their history through a lens of “Appalachianess,” one risks 
missing the mark. As salt-makers desperately sought laborers in the East, constantly 
reevaluated sales and production agreements for marketing their salt in the West, ordered 
massive iron constructions from the mid-Atlantic states, tracked the price of bacon in 
New Orleans, lobbied congress, and negotiated currency discount rates across the nation, 
they envisioned themselves and their valley not as an isolated backwater, but the 
geographic and commercial heart of an empire of commerce. 
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